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Contemporary semiotics has o en gone too far in proposing language 
as the model to explain every phenomenon of communication. Giorgio 
Prodi’s seminal book, originally published in Italian in 1977, poses 
the question from the opposite perspective: his ‘natural history of 
meaning’ does not depict a biological universe that behaves as if it 
spoke, but a cultural universe structured even at its highest levels 
according to the same modes and processes of mutual adaptation and 
‘reading’ that happen at the level of cells. 
 e picture he paints shows us knowledge at its origin, as a 
process of environmental adaptation and interpretation, in which the 
discoveries of biology interact with those of semiotics. Within this 
natural history of language competence, the book emphasises the 
remote, primitive phase, which takes place below the threshold of the 
subjective and the social. Proceeding from there it outlines a holistic 
hypothesis of semiosis at the cultural level: the elementary phases of 
the recognition of meaning, which become progressively more complex 
as the phylogenesis progresses, lead all the way to the construction of 
linguistic systems in the human animal. 
 is is an investigation of the elementary biological processes in 
order to identify the material logic that is the foundation of the higher 
processes of meaning-making – prehistory of the sign, biology of 
semiosis: from the side of nature and from the side of culture.
Giorgio Prodi (1928–1987) was an Italian oncologist and a pioneer of 
biosemiotics.
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FOREWORD. 
 A biosemiotics of Giorgio Prodi
Kalevi Kull1 
Felice Cimatti2
Biosemiotics – the study of meaning-making in living systems – keeps 
advancing and is slowly transforming biology. It is building a biology in 
which the life’s process of meaning-making and the impact of semiosis on life 
in general are described and explained, a biology in which the  phenomenon 
of freedom would find a place. On this scholarly journey, rereading and 
reintepreting earlier attempts of building such a biology has a very impor-
tant role. 
 This is the reason for publishing this book written over four decades ago. 
There are several theories explaining the origin of mind from matter, either 
gradualist or emergentist creation of knowledge via primary formation of 
signs. This is one among them. We are providing it in order to encourage 
discussion on the mechanisms of meaning, on the interpretation of primary 
recognition, meaning-making and knowing, from chemistry to biology to 
semiotics, and back.
 Before moving to the contemporary, more complex biosemiotic models, 
e.g. those of Howard Pattee, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Terrence Deacon, etc., one 
should also think over a series of arguments about the distinctions between 
fitting, recognition, affinity, complementarity, representation, coding, etc. 
For that purpose, learning from Giorgio Prodi’s reasoning is most helpful. 
 Giorgio Prodi (1928–1987) was an Italian oncologist and philosopher. 
His work has earned a well-established place in the historical account of 
biosemiotics (Favareau 2010). Felice Cimatti has published a monographic 
analysis of his semiotics and philosophy (Cimatti 2018; also Cimatti 
2000). Thomas Sebeok and Umberto Eco both praised Prodi’s work (Eco 
1994; 2018; see Kull 2018a; 2018b). When introducing the concept of 
1 University of Tartu, Estonia.
2 University of Calabria, Italy.
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 proto semiosis,  Winfried Nöth describes Prodi’s model in this context (Nöth 
2001).  Prodi’s work has been discussed in more detail in Italian writings 
(Caputo 1990; Zorzella, Cappi 2012; etc.), including a recent dissertation 
by Valerio  Marconi (2020). The journal Il Margine (7/8, 1989) published a 
special issue entirely dedicated to his work of (see, e.g., Lambertini 1989; 
Pontara 1989; etc. from the issue). However, Prodi’s semiotics deserves more 
analyses in the field of biosemiotics itself.
 In 1976 when Prodi wrote this book, there was not much biosemiotics 
yet. He was rather alone with his project and, accordingly, his analysis of bio-
logical meaning was rather independent. His encounter in person with other 
bio semioticians took place at the Vienna congress of semiotics in 1979 (see a 
page of the congress’s program in Figure).3 However, semiotics was popular 
in Italy, and especially in Bologna at the time. This led Prodi to write:
What is important is to extend the field of semiotics: we need to dig deeper to 
may uncover what precedes. This task is simultaneous and coextensive with 
that of institutionally-established semiotics, and ought not to be allowed to 
suffer from possible preclusions against the open and experimental nature 
of its research. (p. 118)
When Le basi materiali della significazione (The Material Bases of  Meaning) 
first appeared in Italy in 1977, the global semiotic scenario was  dominated by 
an insufficiently thought through prejudice which placed human  voluntary 
and intentional semiosis in a somewhat different theoretical place in com-
parison with non-human (animal, plant and cellular) semiosis – if the latter 
was included in semiotics at all. At that time the concept of zoosemiotics had 
already been introduced by Thomas Sebeok: “the term zoosemiotics – con-
structed in an exchange between Rulon Wells and me – is proposed for the 
discipline, within which the science of signs intersects with ethology, devoted 
to the scientific study of signalling behavior in and across  animal species. 
[...] Genetics and linguistics thus emerge as autonomous yet  sister disciplines 
in the larger field of communication sciences, to which, on the molar level, 
zoosemiotics also contributes” (Sebeok 1963: 465–466). However, this defi-
nition does not provide a key to distinguishing (if at all) between different 
kinds of signs; in particular, it incorporates both intentionally made and 
non-intentional signs. For example, in a paper entitled “Animal communica-
tion” Sebeok wrote that “the communicating organism’s selection of a mes-
sage out of its species-consistent code – as well as the receiving organism’s 
3 However, he met Renè Thom and Ilya Prigogine in 1978 (see Afterword, fn 7).
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apprehension of it – proceeds either in accordance with a genetic program 
dictating an almost wholly prefabricated set of responses, or with reference 
to each animal’s unique memory store which then determines the way in 
which the genetic program is read out” (Sebeok 1965: 1009). In his inclusive 
semiotic approach Sebeok was interested in bringing together signs that are 
somewhat voluntarily emitted as well as signs that are involuntary because 
of being under the control of some genetic program. The basic assumption 
of the famous handbook on semiotics by Umberto Eco (1976) – one of the 
main interlocutors of Giorgio Prodi at that time4 – was, on the contrary, 
precisely that an unintentional sign does not properly belong to the realm of 
semiotic phenomena. More specifically, Eco places stimuli below the semi-
otic threshold because they are unintentional and not based on a semiotic 
convention:
If both non-human and human but unintentional events can become signs, 
then semiotics has extended its domain beyond a frequently fetishized 
threshold: that which separates signs from things and artificial signs from 
natural ones. But while gaining this territory, general semiotics inevitably 
loses its grip on another strategical position to which it had unduly laid 
claim. For since everything can be understood as a sign if and only if there 
exists a convention which allows it to stand for something else, and since 
some behavioral responses are not elicited by convention, stimuli cannot be 
regarded as signs. (Eco 1976: 19)
According to Eco, a stimulus is not a semiotic entity proper because it does 
not require any cognitive mediation on part of the receiver: “According 
to the well-known Pavlov experiment, a dog salivates when stimulated by 
the ring of a bell because of a conditioned stimulus. The ring of the bell 
 provokes salivation without any other mediation” (Eco 1976: 20). A  semiotic 
 phenomenon, however, always requires cognitive mediation. That is, a semi-
otic phenomenon is intrinsically triadic in nature, while a non- semiotic 
 phenomenon is dyadic. According to Eco, such a difference grounds the 
 distinction between the seemingly similar yet very different semiotic phe-
nomena of ‘communication’ on the one hand, and ‘signification’ on the other:
So let us define a communicative process as the passage of a signal (not 
 necessarily a sign) from a source (through a transmitter, along a channel) 
to a destination. In a machine-to-machine process the signal has no power 
to signify in so far as it may determine the destination sub specie stimuli. 
4 About the relationship between Umberto Eco and Giorgio Prodi, see Afterword by Anna 
Gasperi-Campani, and also Cimatti 2019; Kull 2018a, 2018b.
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In this case we have no signification, but we do have the passage of some 
information. 
 When the destination is a human being, or ‘addressee’ (it is not necessary 
that the source or the transmitter be human, provided that they emit the 
signal following a system of rules known by the human addressee), we are on 
the contrary witnessing a process of signification – provided that the signal is 
not merely a stimulus but arouses an interpretive response in the addressee. 
This process is made possible by the existence of a code. (Eco 1976: 8)
A genuine semiotic phenomenon requires that the ‘response’ of the addressee 
be the result of some sort of mental reasoning. That is, semiotics seems to 
imply the presence of a mind, be it self-conscious or not. The theoretical 
ground of this stance lies in Peircean semiotics. In the following famous 
definition of the semiotic process, Peirce underlines that semiotics means 
mediation, and that mediation in turn implies some form of representation:
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for some-
thing in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in 
the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more  developed 
sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The 
sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all 
 respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called 
the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of 
Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk. (Peirce, CP 2.228)
It should be noticed that such a definition implies that the interpretant is a 
basic unexplained assumption of Peircean semiotics. Since the inter pretant 
is a semiotic equivalent of the mind – “a Sign is a representamen of which 
some interpretant is a cognition of a mind” (Peirce, CP 2.242) – this means 
that according to Peirce the very existence of the mind is assumed as an 
axiom of his own semiotic model. It is apparent why such an assumption 
poses a tremendous problem to any naturalistic approach to semiotics. 
 Peirce describes the semiotic mechanism as it shows itself to human beings, 
the animals of the Homo sapiens species, that is, of the Homo loquens  species. 
However, the model does not explain how mind could be developed from 
the bare material world of the Earth origin. That is, the assumption that 
at the very beginning of life there was already a mind or something like 
a mind seems quite implausible. This is a hard problem that the Peircean 
 semiotics leaves as a legacy to any subsequent semiotic and/or biosemiotic 
theory based on his triadic model.
 This is exactly the critical point raised by Prodi (from a materialistic 
point of view) when he confronts Eco and the interpretative semiotic model 
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(Cimatti 2018), a model which does not explain the origin of semiosis, that 
is, its non-conscious origin: “since there is no doubt that the world of culture 
is, wholly and integrally, a world of discourse, what is  specifically human 
is  theorised by its authorised science – semiotics – as a quality that erupts 
miraculously from nature, without antecedents,  characterising a  species 
 created ex novo in Linnaeus’ final chapter. Discourse and the word are 
breathed into man, and man moves from his clay, transfigured in the image of 
the word” (p. 28). Prodi introduced a problem no semiotic theory can avoid, 
because one cannot assume such complex notions as ‘mind’, ‘intentionality’ 
and ‘consciousness’ as unquestioned: “behind human communication there 
is a void, or the weak backing of bird cries and scent calls [...] by dismissing 
from the field of analysis the various impurities, the improper codes, the 
natural situations which only our ingenuity regards as sign” (p. 29).
 In this vein, Prodi proposes a simpler molecular model as a natural 
ground for semiosis. In such a model, semiosis there is no need for a cog-
nitive mediation between the ‘sender’ and the ‘recipient’ in the very first 
stages of the development of. Prodi renders the basic distinction made by 
Eco between ‘communication’ and ‘signification’ inoperative. According to 
Prodi, we need to start the biosemiotic explanation from the completely 
unintentional and unconscious notion of ‘complementarity’:
We can define this condition as follows: the reciprocal change in two things 
is subject to their being complementary. The change is represented, for 
 instance, by the formation of a metastable complex between the two terms. 
We do not need to initially assume a primary role for one of the two terms, 
but simply postulate the kinetic characteristics necessary for A and B to meet 
in the sea of possible objects and events. “Reciprocal  specificity” does not 
mean “tending towards”. We shall no longer take the existence of  reciprocity 
as entailing an “external design” or “plan”. Thus, we rule out any  recourse to 
models of tropism. All that needs to be posited is the  possibility of  movement 
(the simplest condition of which is random) of A and B in their context, 
with a certain probability of meeting. Whereas contacts with other mate-
rial elements present are collisions (and these elements are  indifferent), the 
 accidental contact between A and B turns into a reason for change. A and 
B, that is, reveal themselves as contextually correspondent precisely through 
the reciprocal modification regulated by selectivity. This is how A and B 
select each other in the context of indifferent presences. (p. 37)
Thus, Prodi tries to transform the mentalistic (therefore idealistic) notion of 
‘meaning’ into the simpler and naturalistic notion of ‘reciprocal specificity’ 
plus context. Take the case of the two generic entities A and B. The former 
interacts with the latter, while discarding the “uninteresting”  entities C, D 
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and all other entities it could interact with. This means that A is somewhat 
a posteriori “interested” in B. Therefore, one can “say that A reads  (deciphers, 
explores) B and vice-versa. In nature, complementariness is above all a 
 reading or interpretation, that is, an exchange subject to  reciprocal meaning-
fulness” (p. 38). Through the unintentional notion of ‘complementarity’ plus 
‘context’, Prodi describes proto-semiosis5 which places itself before the very 
distinction between living and non-living  entities as between mental and 
non-mental entities: “the terms ‘inter pre tation’,  ‘reading’ and ‘meaning-
fulness’ are used here at the most basic level, as a sort of amorphous  linguistic 
allusion to the ‘correspondence of specificity’. However, they have an ana-
logical function, as well as foreshadowing the direction this study will take 
later on” (p. 39). It turns out that Prodi renders inoperative such distinctions 
as those between ‘communication’ and ‘signification’, ‘stimulus’ and ‘sign’, or 
the notion of ‘semiotic threshold’ itself (Cimatti 2019; see also Diodato 2020) 
which risks tracing a net  boundary between human and non-human semio-
sis. Therefore, Prodi proposes a different definition of  ‘meaning’: “mean-
ing in nature is thus the relation of correspondence between material states 
which appear as triggers for change [...]. Meaning and the attribution of 
meaning are sequential material processes that presuppose both a world to 
be explored and a structure  capable of exploring, and, in all cases, the lim-
ited and specialized possibilities of this exploration” (p. 39). According to 
Prodi, the origins of semiosis are  unintentional and uncognitive: this is the 
only way to make semiosis a  natural  phenomenon: “initially the poles of the 
semiotic relation are two. There is the thing, which is sign in the first place, 
since it is both interpreted and consumed by a reader. Mediation – the sign 
as an independent entity – comes later, but it is important to go back to this 
biunivocal origin because, in such a perspective, the sign no longer refers to 
an indefinitely long chain (in which one sign is explained by another and 
so on) but to a chain of interactions which are finite in number, however 
many – in other words to the meaning of the sign in the sphere where it is 
used by a reader” (p. 118).
 It may strike the reader’s eye that Prodi does not make almost any refer-
ences in his text. Umberto Eco’s name is not mentioned, yet his presence can 
be felt implicitly.6 Prodi’s original book contains no list of references at all. 
5 The term ’protosemiosis’ appears in Prodi (1988b: 55), he is not using it in the current 
book. Sebeok (1997: 436) mentions that this term “must surely be read as a metaphorical 
expression”.
6 For instance, the last sentence of the book (p. 189): “Structures are thus open onto the 
world” (“Le strutture sono dunque aperte al mondo”) can be considered as an allusion to 
Roland Barthes, or Umberto Eco, or both.
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The names mentioned (mostly once and very briefly) throughout the 
whole text amounts to only around twenty (see the index). However, these 
include classic authors of semiotics such as Gottlob Frege, Charles S. Peirce, 
Roland Barthes, Ferdinand de Saussure, Charles Morris, Charles K. Ogden 
and Ivor A. Richards. Even fewer biologists’ names deserve mention – only 
Carl  Linnaeus and Charles Darwin appear briefly.7 Prodi wrote very much, 
 penning also novels. However, he was certainly well aware of semiotics as 
well as the contemporary theory and philosophy of biology. For instance, 
we can find Giorgio Prodi’s name as the editor of the Italian translation of 
Michael Ruse’s Philosophy of Biology (Ruse 1976). 
 In a rare paragraph, Prodi is explicit on his views on Saussure and Peirce:
The delimitation of the field of semiotics constitutes a crucial issue. As 
founded by De Saussure, semiotics is a science of artificial and conventional 
systems, such as language, of course, and all the other inter-human exchange 
systems governed by rules (e.g. rules of politeness, the highway code, mili-
tary signs, etc.) In this respect, the general system outlined by Peirce may 
also be non-human, since the process of semiosis occurs wherever there is a 
mediation between an interpreter and a thing by means of an interpretant. 
But in Peirce’s framework, and broadly speaking in Morris’s too, the only 
possible domain for this kind of semiosis is the human one; at least, they 
both conceive interpretation in an anthropomorphic and anthropocentric 
manner. Unlike the De Saussure’s demarcation, Peirce’s does not need to 
postulate either intentionality or conventionality (i.e. the artificial nature of 
semiosis). Nevertheless, in his approach to the problems of semiosis, the sign 
is something already given as a mediator. It is already inserted in a semiotic 
function whose origins thus remain totally obscure. What we must do is to 
go a step further and eliminate not only intentionality but also mediation in 
the most elementary stage of meaning. A sign is not something that officially 
represents something else. It is a natural object that corresponds to (and is 
a function of) something else. When we use the expression “stands for”, we 
really mean to allude to a material function, even if the term seems to carry 
a highly metaphorical aura. (p. 117–118)
As Prodi says, “General semiotics [...] is a comparative physiology of com-
munication systems” (p. 121). Important works which demonstrate how to 
reconcile Peircean semiotics with material basis of signification appeared 
only in 1990s  – Jesper Hoffmeyer’s Signs of Meaning in the Universe 
(1996), and Terrence Deacon’s Symbolic Species (1997).8 In parallel, there 
were  scholars who worked out their own, independent terminology for 
7 More references can be found e.g. in Prodi 1983 and 1988c.
8 See also Stjernfelt 2014.
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 biosemiotics – like Marcel Florkin (1974) who did it about simultaneously 
with Prodi, or Yoshimi Kawade (1996; see Favareau, Kull 2020) and Marcello 
Barbieri (2000) somewhat later, while facing similar difficulties of extending 
semiotics to biology as Prodi had before them. A more integrative general 
semiotics with biosemiotics as its natural part is a 21st-century development.
 Therefore, one can appreciate the global value of the biosemiotic proposal 
of Prodi, who many decades before the actual re-emergence of the prob-
lem of “realism” (Kroupa, Simoniti 2020) and the contemporary debate on 
the “anthropocene” (Crutzen 2002) assumes a radical anti- anthropocentric 
stance in semiotics and philosophy. Both in respect to the independent 
 existence of external reality and the place of Homo sapiens with respect to 
nature, Prodi removes the human position from the central position that 
humanistic anthropocentrism has always attributed to it.
 The main legacy of The Material Bases of Meaning, which is maybe more 
relevant today than when the book first appeared, is a deeply naturalistic 
stance, which is still not well understood by the humanistic sciences. The 
position for the human species in the world is not that special. Our semiotic 
and cognitive capacities are products of the development of much simpler 
forms of natural and widespread forms of semiosis. There is nothing so 
 special in being human: “the possibilities of human communication – from 
its first anthropological organisations to formal logic and poetry – are given 
as the fruit of ever more ancient natural antecedents and [...] the possibility 
of receiving and transmitting signs is an ancestral fact [...]. [I]t is impossible 
to fix a priori a semiotic threshold. The field must be totally open towards 
the origins and remain indeterminate in any case” (p. 29–30). Since there are 
bacteria, there are also interpretation, knowledge, and signs, says Giorgio 
Prodi. 
 Giorgio Prodi’s academic production was extensive (see also the After-
word by Anna Gasperi-Campani in this volume). Almost all of his philo-
sophical and semiotic works were in Italian and until this book, there was 
rather little available in translation. Prodi’s earlier semiotic publications in 
English include only the following. 
(1)  An article in the encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics edited by Thomas 
A. Sebeok (Prodi 1986). Compiled from two unpublished pieces 
“Ontogeny of codes” and “Phylogeny of codes”, it was republished in 
the second and third editions of the encyclopedia (Prodi 1994; 2010b), 
(2)  A long article translated as an excerpt from Prodi’s 1977 book (Prodi 
1988a).
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(3)  A chapter in the Proceedings of a semiotics and immunology con ference 
(Prodi 1988b). It was republished in Donald Favareau’s  anthology of 
biosemiotics (Prodi 2010a).
(4)  A talk given at a symposium on the nature of culture in Bochum, on 
October 7–11, 1986 published in the Proceedings of the symposium 
(Prodi 1989a).
(5)  A chapter on biology as natural semiotics, published in a volume edited 
by Walter Koch (Prodi 1989b).
(6)  A talk on biologically grounded ethics, given at the 1987 conference 




    
      
 
 
    
Figure. The section on biology and semiotics in the second world congress of semi-
otics in 1979. The first and last pages of the congress programme. [From Giorgio 
Prodi’s archive, kindly provided by Anna Gasperi-Campani.]
The present volume contains the English translation of Giorgio Prodi’s book 
Le basi materiali della significazione that appeared in Italian in 1977 (Prodi 
1977). The existence of this translation became apparent in a corres pondence 
between Felice Cimatti and Anna Gasperi-Campani, Giorgio Prodi’s wife. 
The translation was made by William Dodd already in the 1980s, but had 
remained unpublished until now. However, this is also a new version of this 
book, as it is not the Italian original. For the purposes of the translation 
18 KALEVI KULL, FELICE CIMATTI
and after it had been finished, Giorgio Prodi himself made several improve-
ments in the text (see more about this in the Afterword by Anna Gasperi- 
Campani). The completed translation was not published; instead, a brief 
 version was made which appeared as an article in Semiotica (Prodi 1988a). 
That “brief version” was a long article, but to really understand  Prodi’s 
thought, the book-length version serves the purpose best. Based on the pre-
served typewritten translation with many additional remarks by Prodi, the 
manuscript was prepared for publication by Anna Gasperi-Campani.
 Between the same covers we also publish the text of Prodi’s talk (“The 
formation of meaning in phylogenesis”) at the Second Congress of the Inter-
national Association for Semiotic Studies in 1979 in Vienna. In that con-
gress, the section of semiotics in biology (“Levels of semiotic integration: 
Isomorphism between biological structures and specialisation of functions”) 
was organised by Thure von Uexküll and Harley C. Shands, with a presenta-
tion by Giorgio Prodi (see the programme in Figure). The congress was an 
important mark in the history of biosemiotics as it included one of the first 
specialised sessions on semiotic biology ever. The same year Sebeok and 
Prodi spent several days together at Thure von Uexküll’s home in Freiburg 
to discuss biosemiotics (see Sebeok 1998: 34–35). The text of Prodi’s talk 
was not published in the volume of Proceedings of this Congress (Borbé 
1984), and has been prepared for its first publication in this volume by Anna 
Gasperi-Campani. 
Acknowledgement. We are deeply grateful to Anna Gasperi-Campani Prodi for her help, work 
and care that made the publication of this volume  possible. We thank Ene-Reet Soovik for her 
help in editing. Support by the University of Tartu and by the grant PRG314 from Estonian 
Science Foundation is appreciated.
References
Barbieri, Marcello 2000. I codici organici: La nascita della biologia semantica. 
Ancona: Pequod.
Borbé, Tasso (ed.) 1984. Semiotics Unfolding: Proceedings of the Second Congress of 
the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Vienna, July 1979. 3 volumes. 
(Approaches to Semiotics 68.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Caputo, Cosimo 1990. Bio-logia vs semio-logia: La proposta di Giorgio Prodi. Idee: 
Genesi del senso 5(13/15): 183–188.
Cimatti, Felice 2000. The circular semiosis of Giorgio Prodi. Sign Systems Studies 
28: 351–379.
19FOREWORD. A biosemiotics of Giorgio Prodi 
Cimatti, Felice 2018. A Biosemiotic Ontology: The Philosophy of Giorgio Prodi. (Bio-
semiotics 18.) Berlin: Springer.
Cimatti, Felice 2019. Linguaggio e natura nell’Italian Thought: Il dibattito sulla 
‘soglia semiotica’ fra Umberto Eco e Giorgio Prodi. Agalma 38: 60–69.
Crutzen, Paul J. 2002. The “anthropocene”. Journal de Physique IV 12(10): 1–5.
Deacon, Terrence 1997. The Symbolic Species: The Coevolution of Language and the 
Brain. New York: Norton.
Diodato, Filomena 2020. The embodiment of language: sign function and semiotic 
threshold. Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggi 14: 203–215.
Eco, Umberto 1976. A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Eco, Umberto 1994 [1988]. In memory of Giorgio Prodi: A challenge to the myth 
of two cultures. (Johnston, Marina, trans.) In: Jaworski, Leda Giannuzzi (ed.), 
Lo studio bolognese: campi di studio, di insegnamento, di ricerca, di divulgazione. 
Stony Brook: Forum Italicum (Center for Italian Studies, State University of New 
York at Stony Brook), 75–78. 
Eco, Umberto 2018. Giorgio Prodi and the lower threshold of semiotics. Sign 
Systems Studies 46(2/3): 343–351. 
Favareau, Donald 2010. Introduction and commentary: Giorgio Prodi (1928–1987). 
In: Favareau, Donald (ed.), Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and 
Commentary. (Biosemiotics 3.) Berlin: Springer, 323–327.
Favareau, Donald; Kull, Kalevi 2020. [Chapter 14. Yoshimi Kawade:] A bio-
semiotician of the first generation. In: Iwakura, Yoichiro; Yonehara, Shin; 
 Fujisawa, Junichi; Asano, Masahide; Kawade, Tokinori (eds.), Keep Asking What 
Life Is: Beyond Molecular Biology. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 197–225.
Florkin, Marcel 1974. Concepts of molecular biosemiotics and of molecular evolu-
tion. Comprehensive Biochemistry 29A: 1–124.
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996 [1993]. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, Barbara 
J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Kawade, Yoshimi 1996. Molecular biosemiotics: Molecules carry out semiosis in 
living systems. Semiotica 111(3/4): 195–215. 
Kroupa, Gregor; Simoniti, Jure (eds.) 2020. New Realism and Contemporary 
 Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Kull, Kalevi 2018a. Biosemiotics by Giorgio Prodi: A postscript. In: Cimatti, Felice, 
A Biosemiotic Ontology: The Philosophy of Giorgio Prodi. (Biosemiotics 18.) 
Berlin: Springer, 135–147.
Kull, Kalevi 2018b. Umberto Eco on the biosemiotics of Giorgio Prodi. Sign Systems 
Studies 46(2/3): 352–364.
Lambertini, Roberto 1989. Mangiare, parlare, indagare: alcuni aspetti della teoria 
della conoscenza di Giorgio Prodi. Il Margine 9(7/8): 8–21.
Marconi, Valerio 2020. La linea, il triangolo e il quadrato: La natura relazionale di 
segno e significato in Aristotele, Peirce e Hjelmslev. Doctoral dissertation. Univer-
sity of Urbino: Dipartimento di Scienze della Comunicazione, Studi Umanistici 
e Internazionali.
Nöth, Winfried 2001. Protosemiotics and physicosemiosis. Sign Systems Studies 
29(1): 13–27.
Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1958. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. [CP]
20 KALEVI KULL, FELICE CIMATTI
Pontara, Maria Teresa 1989. Biologia scienza umana: l’uomo schiavo della biologia? 
Il Margine 9(7/8): 106–113.
Prodi, Giorgio 1977. Le basi materiali della significazione. (Nuovi saggi italiani 21.) 
Milano: Bompiani.
Prodi, Giorgio 1983. Linguistica e biologia. In: Segre, Cesare (ed.), Intorno alla 
 linguistica. Milano: Feltrinelli, 172–202. [Discussion on “Linguistica e biologia”, 
308–319.]
Prodi, Giorgio 1986. Semiosic competence, development of. In: Sebeok, Thomas 
A. (ed.), Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Vol 2, N–Z. (Approaches to 
 Semiotics 73.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 884–887.
Prodi, Giorgio 1988a [1977]. Material bases of signification. Semiotica 69(3/4): 
191–241.
Prodi, Giorgio 1988b. Signs and codes in immunology. In: Sercarz, Eli E.; Celada, 
Franco; Michison, N. Avrion; Tada, Tomio (eds.) 1988. The Semiotics of  Cellular 
Communication in the Immune System: Proceedings of the NATO Advanced 
Research Workshop on the Semiotics of Cellular Communication in the Immune 
System held at Il Ciocco, Lucca, Italy, September 9–12, 1986. (Nato ASI Series 23.) 
Berlin: Springer, 53–64.
Prodi, Giorgio 1988c. Teoria e metodo in biologia e medicina. Bologna: Editrice 
CLUEB.
Prodi, Giorgio 1989a. Culture as natural hermeneutics. In: Koch, Walter A. (ed.), 
The Nature of Culture. Proceedings of the International and Interdisciplinary Sym-
posium, October 7–11, 1986 in Bochum. (Bochum Publications in Evolutionary 
Cultural Semiotics; BPX 12.) Bochum: Studienverlag Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer, 
215–239. 
Prodi, Giorgio 1989b. Biology as natural semiotics. In: Koch, Walter A. (ed.), For 
a Semiotics of Emotion. (Bochumer Beiträge zur Semiotik; BBS 4.) Bochum: 
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Preface
The prevalent tendency of semiotics is that to analyse definite conditions of 
semiosis: language, for instance. The outcome, in a second degree analysis, 
is a theory of semiosis.
 The alternative proposed here is to consider the natural evolution of 
(any) condition of exchange, which functionally define the coalescence of 
systems of communication and signification. The outcome is a theory of 
semiotic function. 
 This second path is not an alternative to the first: one might say that the 
first is semiosis proper, the second its prehistory. 
 However, the latter way of proceeding bears relevant consequences 
also on the level of a “general theory of semiosis”: not only prehistory, 
then, but historic interpretation, also in the sense of the present-ness of 
 communication. 
 The most important consequence of such point of view is that the 
 semiotic function becomes deeply identified with knowledge. The second 
is that considerations on systems of signification and of communication 
can never be only analytical – that is, purely concerned with an anatomy of 
semiosis – but functional and dynamic. 
 The present book sets out to treat the prehistory of semiosis through its 
momentous consequences on the history and on the theory of semiosis. 
 It is a continuation – narrower in scope but identical in perspective – of 
the discourse I began in the book “La scienza, il potere, la critica”, published 
in 1974 by Il Mulino. 
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Premise
Semiology today presents several uncertainties, which amount to a crisis in 
its self-identity. These doubts concern fundamental points, and perhaps they 
raise questions on the very existence of a discipline called semiology.
 Someone involved in the subject in some irreversible, institutional way 
will naturally explain the crisis with impromptu interpretations of a histori-
cal bent: a discipline that grew too quickly, loaded with excessive expecta-
tions. And it is easy to indicate equally impromptu remedies: the necessity of 
a pause for reflection and of critical work on the materials already collected. 
In the main, such interpretations aim to protect the existence and autonomy 
of the discipline.
 It seems necessary, however, to go beyond the reasons and modes that 
have historically defined semiology, and to examine the case for it vis-à-vis 
other disciplines, whether well-established or evolving, so as to determine 
whether it filled a gap and occasioned fruitful connections, or conversely 
it overlapped with fields that were already solidly ‘taken’, disguising well-
known problems and questions under new jargon and enthusiasm.
 Semiotics takes culture as its model referent and construes itself as the 
study of the intentional sign, or at any rate sign adjusted to cultural, human 
behaviours. In this sense it spreads all over culture, with a necessarily all-
encompassing trajectory. Since culture is given only as meaningful com-
munication and unfolds by means of receptions and emissions, the way to 
view culture as a unity is as signs, and semiology is the science that uni-
fies the various aspects of the artificial, human world. Except that this very 
assumption is what gives rise to the various questions. First of all: does 
 semiology, as the study of culture in its essential aspect of communication, 
aim at the roots of communication and its mechanisms, thus becoming iden-
tical with the study of knowledge, or does it consider a more ‘discursive’, 
superficial layer, that is the modes of communication in an already-given 
language, whether natural or artificial?
 The fork in the road is fundamental, and so far there have not been hints 
towards definite choices: one can only ascertain that the majority of semioti-
cians have a background in linguistics, and that the second  tendency is 
 certainly the more represented. The questions raised, then, habitually concern 
factual correlations that can be analysed in the mechanism of communication, 
rather than critical problems posed by the physiology of  communication.
 Evidently, both deal with the same body of communication, but the 
standpoint of their inquiry is very different. If one chooses the path of the 
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mechanisms, that is of physiology, one must delve into the logical and psy-
chological aspects, in a framework of ‘a natural history of culture’, where 
communication organises itself as a characterising element of the manners 
of the new species and its differentiation, that is, where it is tied to the kind 
of environmental contacts and the organised – and therefore cultural – 
 prevalence that the interpreter gains over the environment. In this sense, 
semiology is the study of the historical organisation of cultural modes of 
exchange, and of the collectivisation of exchange, on the anthropological, 
economical, linguistic, aesthetical level.
 If this is the path, however, the discipline risks ending up with  little 
autonomy. Reconstructing it as a unitary fact from the ashes of the many 
disparate data and from those (the majority) that are only known as 
absence – as gaps – requires an effort that will easily slide into some sort of 
meta physics: in this perspective, if semiotics exists alongside anthropology, 
sociology, the historical analysis of documents, it must exist as a norm, as a 
unifying moment, as the soul of the other disciplines, capable of organising 
the scattered limbs of communication. Semiotics is the science of these laws. 
Outside of this idealistic perspective, semiology would be of no more use 
than to highlight the necessity of considering moments of connection within 
and between the individual sectors: in other words, no more than a road 
sign or a warning notice – “Be Aware of Communication”. This unifying 
emphasis often materialises as the fabrication of words with no real content 
but capable of creating the illusion of an objective domain. Thus to speak 
of man as a symbolic animal gives the impression that there exists a science 
that decodes this human specialty, while what we get in practice are the data 
of the individual disciplines; what connects them is nothing more than an 
ingenious emphasising of the term, which in and of itself says nothing.
 Under this aspect, semiology is forced to fight a rearguard action; which 
is no obstacle to a certain triumphalist attitude, as happens when a  theology 
is justified only by the existence of theologians. It is for this reason that 
objective or even quantitative analyses often conceal an interpretative key, 
and a motivation, of an idealistic bent.
 Therefore, by choosing this first path semiotics spreads itself heavily onto 
other disciplines, and distinguishing syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic 
sides to it means nothing more than adding to the name “semiotics” a series 
of operations that are already established or investigated in other fields and 
with other techniques.
 As for the other path, which is decidedly prevalent in quantitative 
terms, it takes human language as its starting point and becomes a sort of 
 general linguistics. To examine language means not to address the reason 
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of  language in the context of the differentiation of the species; to start from 
a highly  differentiated moment and accept the individual modes as ready 
instruments without dwelling on their origins in terms of the reason of com-
munication and of the evolution of what is specifically human. Conversely, it 
is stated that genetic problems can be marginalised and that it is possible to 
analyse what is given through a comparison of uniform – or diverse – modes 
of exchange, so as to create that linguistic tabulation that may bring to the 
surface the rules of discursive communication. Here too, then, through 
the appearance of positive glottology and phonology, through the critical 
or experimental alignment of factual data that emerge from quantitative 
and empirical inquiries, the metaphysical soul of unification rears its head. 
If semiotics is something more than comparative linguistics – i.e. if it is 
 unifying – it is so in that it defines the synchronic soul of discursive com-
munication. Since there is no doubt that the world of culture is, wholly and 
integrally, a world of discourse, what is specifically human is theorised by 
its authorised science – semiotics – as a quality that erupts miraculously 
from nature, without antecedents, characterising a species created ex novo in 
Linnaeus’ final chapter. Discourse and the word are breathed into man, and 
man moves from his clay, transfigured in the image of the word. Structural 
analyses of verbal communication lead to the discovery of a pre-existing 
scheme, which pulls the strings of the words by infusing them with life, 
that is, meaning. Relations between words do not represent a function that 
emerges from use, but an embodiment of the rules of meaning. And if, in 
such a systematic, totalising vision, some digression is made towards the 
realm of animal communication, so much the better: the rules are so general 
that they make one think of Teilhard de Chardin rather than Darwin.
 Another reason of the crisis resides in techniques. It is they, diverse and 
difficult as they are, that give the irksome impression of a conglomerate that 
is hard to master: it is they, therefore, that push towards adopting clean, uni-
tary models that have not much to do with the individual analytic processes. 
For what technical familiarity is there between zoo-semioticians, phono-
logists, psycholinguists, scholars of artificial languages and of social behav-
iours? If they do somehow regard themselves as semioticians, they need to 
be able to understand each other beyond the technical specifics, and they 
will do this by gestures, as it were, on a common ground that consists of – 
precisely – gestures: some uncompelling nod, some utterly general rule, and 
a terminology that makes no reference to the genetic area and physiology of 
the individual discourse. So the emphasis placed on rules – not necessarily 
synchronic, but also those of a bland, recent diachrony – arises also from 
technical reasons, or rather from the necessity of avoiding technique.
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 If, on the contrary, one maintains that the technical, experimental side 
must precede any unitary speculation, unity can only – perhaps – be recon-
structed from an examination of the individual mechanisms and the indi-
vidual contexts of communication, in order to establish a sort of general 
physiology of communication, which will be merely an analysis of those 
modes of interaction which, in the human realm, we call cognitive. There-
fore the experimental mindset causes semiological theory to devolve into 
semiology qua study of knowledge. At the same time, starting from a clus-
ter of mostly linguistic techniques based on accepting discourse as a given, 
experimental analysis invites recourse to very diverse techniques, not only 
psychological and behavioural but also physiological and neurological. Since 
experimental analysis is in itself a discourse that seeks out connections, it 
becomes necessary to explore models further afield, for instance in bio-
chemistry and comparative anatomy, so as to see if a discourse on “the whole 
of communication” may be led away from metaphysics to the discovery of 
genetic mechanisms common to the various aspects of communication or 
meaning. Therefore the unity of semiology and its raison d’être as a dis-
cipline lie in the validity of such a quest for connections, in order to establish 
if there exists a physiology of communication, one that is also compara-
tive  physiology and therefore differentiation. The perspective is thus one of 
“natural history”.
 The key point – and the topic of the present book – is therefore the fol-
lowing. Semiotics can give its field of inquiry a date of birth, and it can estab-
lish conventionally the nature of its objects. At that point it invents its own 
discourse, creates disciplinary boundaries for itself, exists, and  flourishes. 
The date of birth of the objects themselves remains in the dark and there it 
must remain, because its experimental study can only turn up an ancestry 
and refer back to areas of uncertainty. One is therefore content with positing 
as the date of inception the ‘intentionality’ of the sign communication, its 
organising of itself as a human activity, its assumption of an already-born, 
already-communicating man; with construing the history of this being with 
no earthly father, or the timeless laws of its heavenly father. In any case, 
behind human communication here is the void, or the weak backing of bird 
cries and scent calls. Instead of analysing the enormous pressure of use in the 
genesis of sign, they incentivise the construction of graphs and anthropo-
morphic situations, the “categorisation” of sign-intentional  situations by 
 dismissing from the field of analysis the various impurities, the improper 
codes, the natural situations which only our ingenuity regards as sign.
 Otherwise one assumes an indeterminate field of observation, hypo-
thesising that the possibilities of human communication – from its first 
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anthropological organisations to formal logic and poetry – are given as the 
fruit of ever more ancient natural antecedents and that the possibility of 
receiving and transmitting signs is an ancestral fact, or even the very way 
that biological objects have of organising themselves, progressively more dif-
ferentiated until they can produce complex cultural systems of transmission 
of signs. In that case it is impossible to fix a priori a semiotic threshold. The 
field must be totally open towards the origins and remain indeterminate in 
any case.
 If one adopts this second criterion, the manner of proceeding must 
needs be experimental and concrete: however, the question becomes 
corres pondingly broader and deeper in time, and disciplinary boundaries 
 disappear, while the objects in question appear and become more definite. 
At that point, semiotics is an interesting opportunity to talk about things 
that, in any event and under whatever name, concern us closely. Its opera-
tive validity as a discipline is determined precisely by the impulse it may 
give to historical research – in natural history as well as cultural history – by 
 determining the physiological modes of communication.
 The viewpoint adopted in the present essay is this second one. Its experi-
mental and objective claim to being defined as “the biological genesis of 
semiotic-cognitive functions” does not imply that the points of the analysis 
are all circumscribed and scientifically located. On the contrary, this  analysis 
is full of massive gaps. Yet it remains to be seen which is more scientific, 
whether a lacunose analysis where a few certain points are connected by 
many hints and hypotheses, or a construction that is clear, precise, and 
totally invented, built on imaginary foundations. Our choice goes to the first 
way of proceeding, which is that of scientific research.
 The reader who is attentive to the use of words (since, presumably, such 
is the reader of a book on semiology) deserves a preliminary warning. 
They will notice that some terms are used initially in a reductive way. Near- 
synonyms like sign and signal, interpreter and interpretant, and so forth, 
actually have very different meanings, and it is wrong to conflate them. 
Yet their differentiation, or opposition, only arises on the level of theory, 
at a certain stage of the development of our topic. According to the kind of 
analysis which we have set before us, initially they are amorphous, and they 
can be used as such. So the reader is advised to keep a low cultural register 
initially. Attunement to the text consists of holding to the level required by 
the text, without raising issues of “semiotic high treason”. We shall take care 
to put between inverted commas those terms on which we wish the reader 
to suspend philological activity.
First Part. 
From the side of Nature
Some fundamental models of specificity, complementarity, 
 correspondence, etc. are examined at different levels of complexity, 
proceeding from an elementary concept of sign operative at the level of 
molecular biology till the concept of sign as considered in semiotics.

1. Analysis criteria
To begin with, criteria must be defined, capable of delimiting the domain 
and the techniques of observation. We believe, above all, that analysis has 
to do with the objective world: i.e., that the exploration of the world is 
a verification of actual things. We do not claim, however, to be external 
to this state of affairs, but admit, on the contrary, to be part of it. We are 
among the things that we identify and we can verify their existence only in 
so far as we can interact with them and be modified by them.  Knowledge 
of things is, in this sense, both objective and inescapably subjective. The 
required  criteria are thus subjective and serve to organize the exploration 
of the existing world: from the outset, the central issue of the philosophy 
of knowledge is the relation ship between categories and facts, between cri-
teria and things. This is a thorny philosophical problem, but one which 
semiotics can go a long way towards formulating and, in our view, towards 
 resolving. The semiotician cannot simply avoid the issue by defining it – as 
often  happens – as “extra-semiotic”. In other words, the basic criterion is 
that of allowing the horizon of the semiotics to coincide completely with the 
horizon of  knowledge, and the semiotic enquiry itself with the mechanisms 
of  knowledge. This means that the world (real or possible) in which  semiosis 
occurs is not an area detachable from reality and confined in the human 
world. It is, rather, the world – open before us and indefinitely extended 
beyond what we see – that can be talked about. 
 The process of semiosis is throughout subject to the state of affairs of 
which we are part, and to our own position within the network of exchanges 
in which we are involved. So we accept the initial hypothesis of a use, and a 
physiology, of communication inevitably translated in terms of the deriva-
tion and evolution of its very function in the natural world domain, begin-
ning from elementary conditions. 
 To return to the argument already broached in the premise, these cri-
teria force us to reject a definition of the term “subjective” which places 
its meaning in opposition to “objective”. The customary anthropomorphic 
criteria which postulate the data of evidence and of consensus as primary 
facts – not at an individual but at a cultural level – are quite improper. These 
are what are normally meant by “subjective”. If we accept, in defining the 
field of semiosis, intentionality as a condition of evidence (whereby semiosis 
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begins with the “intention to communicate” and is thus distinct in a self-
evident fashion from other natural functions), we are guilty of an anthropo-
morphic operation. The discriminatory criterion by which we delimit the 
field is “consciousness”, with all the ambiguities that the term involves. Thus 
the semiotician who rejects as extra-semiotic all psychological and in the 
broadest sense biological influences, and who limits his attention to strict 
correlations (discarding both actual things and the speaker’s introspections), 
becomes conditioned himself by powerful psychological and introspective 
presuppositions.
 On examination, the facts of “consciousness” are seen to be rooted in 
unconscious and automatic natural bases, and can only exist with their sup-
port. Consciousness is merely the tip of the iceberg, and if we wish to explain 
anything at all (in the sense of simply connecting it with other things) we 
are bound to resort to the submerged part, to that which holds the top above 
water. On the other hand the very juxtaposition of these two terms (inten-
tionality and consciousness) is ambiguous. There are many animal attitudes 
which can legitimately be defined as intentional or intended but the “con-
sciousness” of which it would be vain to seek.
 Even at the level of the habitual actions of man, how can we distinguish 
behaviour and facts on the basis of a man’s consciousness thereof, without 
entering into inextricable and fruitless psychological questions? And how 
can we delimit and measure the zones and acts of consciousness? We must 
inevitably adopt, in this way, other presuppositions (autonomy, interiority, 
liberty) which prevent us from seeing how the instruments of language are 
rigidly fixed and prevail over individual consciousness thereof. If we define 
the objective world by means of such criteria, our approach – quite fatally – 
will no longer be that of studying how intentionality originates in  preceding 
behaviour, but how it is opposed to preceding behaviour, thus creating a 
 specifically human field. 
 This sets up the myth of a “radical human novelty”, i.e. an easy and timely 
point of view which effects a division into opposing phases and  oscillating 
moments, whereby the appearance of man is the only possible unit of mea-
surement. Dialectic is the most deeply rooted anthropomorphic vice. In 
semiotics it coincides with the presupposition regarding the intentionality 
of communication: differentiation and opposition, within a general theory 
of communication systems, tend to become synonymous. Actually, if the 
system is fixed and every operation is considered as a fact occurring with it, 
then differentiation has nothing behind it to justify it and so is deprived of 
history. It can thus be understood as an epiphany of the rules of the system. 
It will not be explained by the history which has produced it but by the 
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 dialectic within the system itself. Historical differentiation will therefore be 
a “tending towards”. 
 We reject the criterion of the anthropomorphism of intentionality and 
the methodology of an oppositional dialectic. We underline, instead, the 
need for a functional and objective investigation of the field, which will 
never be closed and structured by universal rules, but open and structured 
by its functions. 
2. Situations of correspondence and specificity
In the material world we observe changes and our observation is a participa-
tion in change. Knowledge is modification of the world in the sense that the 
interpreting mechanism is altered by the phenomena or things it deciphers. 
We are inside changes, we become aware of them and interpret them in so 
far as they change us. It is a general condition that changes take the form 
of correspondences. To a variation in one object corresponds a correlated 
 variation in another, or in a series of objects. The extremely long sequences 
produced are based on these single or multiple time-located correspon-
dences which take place serially in a material context. It is this which defines 
the tissue of what is in reciprocal contact. It is the tissue that has produced 
us and that we act in. It is our non-contradiction. We interpret changes with 
our own changes and cannot but give a subjective account of events. Yet 
these, and our deciphering of them, would be meaningless outside an objec-
tive, material framework. Idealisms crumble before the objectivity of all that 
is subjective. We see the material correspondences of nature as a constant 
condition, as a state of fact, erecting them into the concepts of causality and 
probability – and they are real enough to sustain some of those flights of 
idealism that researchers occasionally indulge in.
 In any case, correspondences are identified through modifications in 
the system, that is, through exchanges of energy. An explosion is a thermo-
dynamic event occurring in a change of nexuses, it is physical correspond-
ences in material strata, which release a certain quantity of energy. Thus, 
if there is an explosion in a distant star, we try to identify the situation of 
unknown correspondences that have caused it, just as, when an individual 
dies, we try to define the framework of correspondences surrounding this 
death. However, we do not succeed in defining the essence of things but only 
their characteristics revealed by energy exchanges. Experimental  science 
consists in “provoking” objects, in rendering correspondences evident. It is 
hardly necessary to stress that the present argument is built on a very  definite 
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and essential assumption: namely that the framework is homo geneous and 
thus has no “reserved areas”. We ourselves are within the framework on a par 
with everything else. There is thus no point in posing ourselves problems 
regarding the creation of the world by human intelligence: such hypotheses 
simply cannot be propounded. 
 In nature, however, there are particularly complex situations of correspon-
dence where energy exchange, which is always the mark of a correspon-
dence, is conditioned by reciprocal relationships that we shall simply label 
“adjusted” for the moment. These situations constitute a second  category of 
natural facts which obviously cannot be separated from the former but are 
interpretable as a development of these in the direction of a differentiation 
of exchange conditions. Their basic characteristic is that the material cor-
respondence which acts as a trigger for the energy exchange is a specificity 
condition, in the general sense that the two terms of the correspondence 
are reciprocally adapted. Whereas with phenomena of the first type – for 
example, a falling body – the framework of relations is extremely general 
(e.g. the mass of the earth and the absence of constraints), with the second 
type, the exchange occurs only if the condition of correspondence expresses 
the reciprocal adaptation of the objects which form the site of the change. 
 In nature we thus find the general situation of a material object whose 
conditions are varied by a correspondence in the form of another material 
object specifically adapted to it. The energy conditions capable of producing 
the change depend on reciprocal adaptation. We are not interested at present 
in the genesis of the specificity or of the adaptation. What we wish to stress is 
that the liberation of energy requires the evidence of a specific key and needs 
to be triggered by the contact with it. 
 All these phenomena come under the heading of what, in the broadest 
sense, we can call biology. It is a very extensive domain whose origins are 
uncertain. We are not concerned with drawing boundaries or establishing 
oppositions between the “biological” and the “non-biological”. 
 We are concerned, rather, with the basic characteristics of the condition 
of specific correspondence. First, there must be two material objects that 
interact (i.e. that come into contact, in the broad sense used here). A change 
will occur only if the two objects correspond sterically in some part. The 
concept of specificity is thus found, materially, in spatial correspon dence, 
reciprocal adaptation, or complementariness, which can be roughly repre-
sented as an interlocking, or key-and-keyhole condition. The concept, how-
ever, is more general than the image of spatial correspondence suggests. In 
knowledge, too, the identification of forms is a prerequisite for triggering 
exchanges. The same holds for artificial, man-made machines. 
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 In any case, we can define this condition as follows: the reciprocal change 
in two things is subject to their being complementary. The change is repre-
sented, for instance, by the formation of a metastable complex between the 
two terms. We do not need to assume initially a primary role for one of the 
two terms, but simply must postulate the kinetic characteristics necessary for 
A and B to meet in the sea of possible objects and events. “Reciprocal speci-
ficity” does not mean “tending towards”. Any more we shall take the exist-
ence of reciprocity as entailing an “external design” or “plan”. Thus we rule 
out any recourse to models of tropism. All that needs to be  posited is the pos-
sibility of movement (the simplest condition of which is random) of A and 
B in their context, with a certain probability of meeting. Whereas  contacts 
with other material elements present are collisions (and these  elements are 
indifferent), the accidental contact between A and B turns into a reason for 
change. A and B, that is, reveal themselves as contextually correspondent 
precisely through the reciprocal modification regulated by selectivity. This 
is how A and B select each other in the context of indifferent presences.
 A number of issues need to be faced with regards to this general con-
dition – or general model – of correspondence. They have also termino-
logical aspects. First of all, correspondence is a reciprocal configuration of 
objects. We can call this an “order” or an ordered condition, or a situation 
of ordered structures, bearing in mind, however, that the concept of order 
is inde pendent of the concept of an ordering entity. Order, in its elementary 
state, is a condition of reciprocity between two things revealed by a mate-
rial event. It does not dwell in one or the other, but in both, at least in the 
initial model. There is no “container of order” but only one thing ordered in 
 relation to another. All this needs stressing because many misappre hensions 
arise from distinguishing between order and structure, as if a structure could 
be  nothing more than the container of an extrinsic, metaphysical entity 
called order (and, naturally, at higher levels, intention, consciousness, plans, 
etc.).
 Secondly, the correspondence, and the occurrence of the metastable com-
plex and the change that follows, are based on material states which render 
the process physically possible. To say that correspondence is regulated by 
form does not mean that form is superimposed on matter or is the arbiter 
of exchanges; the form of A is felt by B to be complementary, and vice-
versa, because it is materially superimposable via a process which involves 
energy. We can exemplify this from macromolecular chemistry: “adaptation” 
and “recognition of complementariness” occur because  molecule A comes 
within the range of action of molecule B’s weak bonds, and a number of 
points of A adapt to the correspondent points of B. On the other hand, the 
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“internal structure” of A and B, too, from the molecular point of view, con-
sists of energy bonds which must occupy space and are inevitably orientated 
and endowed with a proper configuration. 
 The distinction between form and matter, structure and function, is mis-
leading. There are realities which come into contact with each other in so 
far as they are structured. A material complex cannot exist without a given 
volume and a given form. On the other hand a form can only be identified 
by interaction with its matter and through the energy exchanges produced 
by this interaction. Material structure is something built in a way defined in 
relation to something else. 
 If we consider specificities not immediately verifiable as the corre-
sponding by the senses and far more complex than the single structure of 
A in relation to B (for instance, the correspondence between a word and its 
thing), we shall not on this account say that they are immaterial or that their 
existence is evidence of a different world, but simply that the situation of 
material correspondence is very complex. The situations of correspondence 
must be explained in genetic terms, that is to say, in terms of derivation. To 
define an ensemble as a “structure” involves making a hypothesis about its 
functioning, its mechanism, and above all its derivation. This holds true for 
all levels, even such higher levels as cultural interpretation.
 Structure, then, is a material state interpreted by another material state. 
This cannot simply be taken as given, as if it were a photograph, for the 
reason that material states do not exist as simply “given” but derive from a 
history of interactions leading to their assumption through knowledge. This 
in no way alters the objective value we assign to the term “structure”.
 These remarks are necessary as a warning against the incautious manner 
in which the term “structure” is currently employed, for it has been much 
abused by contemporary cultural fashions and its meaning distorted by quite 
illegitimate analogical operations. 
 It needs stressing that material correspondence, as exemplified by two 
objects-molecules, is an extremely general issue. We cannot conceive of cog-
nitive processes without a moment of reciprocal contact and the creation 
of a metastable complex upon which the continuation of interpretation is 
dependent.
 A third issue, of a terminological kind, concerns “reciprocal meaning” in 
reactions of specificity. We say that A reads (deciphers, explores) B and vice-
versa. In nature, complementariness is above all a reading or interpretation, 
that is, an exchange subject to reciprocal meaningfulness. 
 But reading or interpretation does not make sense if we consider it solely 
in relation to the two terms which come into contact. Reading, in order to 
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be defined as interpretation, must be seen objectively in the material context, 
otherwise we shall be waylaid into the most facile and absurd interpretation 
that A seeks B because it is made for seeking B. Rather, what we have is A 
and B plus an indefinite number of indifferent presences. If A and B can 
meet, it is above all because they can “review” all the presences. This process 
can be either an entropic and random agitation, governed by a certain degree 
of probability or an ordered series of contacts in sequence.
 The terms “interpretation”, “reading” and “meaningfulness” are used here 
at the most basic level, as a sort of amorphous linguistic allusion to the “cor-
respondence of specificity”. However, they have an analogical function, as 
well as foreshadowing the direction this study will take later on. 
 The process of finding each other is therefore a reading or interpretation 
of reality carried out by A and B according to their constitutional modules. 
Thus for A and for B, reading reality consists in reviewing and rejecting 
indifferent objects and choosing significant ones. In its exploration that 
 terminates in the contact with B, A makes a judgment about reality, since it 
is moved to change only when it finds its complementary significant  reality. 
It is this which is A’s interpretation of the environment: its being moved to 
change by B. Thus the material presence B is detected by A as follows: it 
elicits a change by means of complementariness. We shall say that A “reads” 
reality and knows B. It can only know B through its own structure, which 
is what makes it reject the indifferent presences. Reality is always known 
(and this is an extremely general condition) through the modules of the 
exploring structure. Knowledge in this sense is inescapably subjective, or 
perspective-determined: it is A’s perspective on B, or B’s on A, according to 
their structures. “Subjective” is here, of necessity, taken as the opposite of 
“arbitrary”. There is a necessary logic in this subjective operation which goes 
back to A and B’s reciprocal genesis. At the level of the most complex – i.e. 
human – knowledge, the terms of the problem do not change substantially. 
 Meaning in nature is thus the relation of correspondence between mate-
rial states which appear as triggers for change: though it is often understood 
in the same way as order, as something that is transferred to a container in 
the present context is “the existence of an object which is significant for” (i.e. 
which is capable of inducing a specific modification). Meaning, therefore, 
is neither the essence proper to a given object nor the essence proper to the 
totality of the objects of a system. Totality does not exist in this sense: there 
will never be a total or overall interaction. Meaning and the attribution of 
meaning are sequential material processes that presuppose both a world to 
be explored and a structure capable of exploring, and, in all cases, the limited 
and specialized possibilities of this exploration.
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 Hence: B is a “sign” for A, and vice-versa. This is the ground of semi otics. 
For the moment we shall not distinguish between signal and sign. We must 
go back to the roots of elementary situations and on the basis of these we 
must reinterpret complex situations. Of course, we do not  pretend to exhaust 
complex situations simply by tackling elementary ones and we are in no 
way proposing to assimilate, reductively, the linguistic sign sic et  simpliciter 
to the univocal molecular sign. On the contrary, it is only an awareness 
of the extreme complexity of the biological situations upon which culture 
is built that can protect us from the oversimplifications of purely cultural 
inter pretations, which usually appease interpretative demands by  simply 
 coining a name. It is important to point out that, for all the enormous, 
often inextri cable complexity of language phenomena at the human level, 
we cannot interpret them other than by starting out with the phenomenon 
of elementary complementariness, for the simple reason that the things of 
which language is composed passed through this stage at some point in their 
development. The objection that our present state of knowledge is extremely 
limited for this issue is not a relevant one. It is a mistake to think we have an 
answer to everything. The most serious mistakes are those made when we 
simplify things artificially on the basis of analogical and anthropomorphic 
 assumptions. 
 Reciprocal meaning, then, is manifested by a process which selectively 
modifies the states of the terms. This in itself is a signaling process, which 
is one and the same with (i.e. contextual to, not superimposed on) the reac-
tions that take place. The signal is embodied in the event, of which it is the 
symptom in that it is the mode of occurrence of the event. It is not a poster 
attached to the event, or a pointer indicating the event, but the event itself 
signaled by its being triggered off or its developing. We can imagine a blind 
object examining what surrounds it (excluding any perceptive and, above 
all, human implications from our image): it will identify certain things that 
correspond to its parameter and identify them by their shape and with its 
touch. What the blind object performs is a process of material knowledge. 
3. Remarks on the methodological standpoint
We have postulated a situation which is both concrete and general, assuming 
from the outset that generality is not to be found in some common substance 
or idealistic organic unity. Our schematic model is neither the essence nor 
the law of the situation by the concrete situation itself at its simplest level. 
It reoccurs, variously combined, in more complex situations. Thus, to our 
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a priori premise (which is assumed but not demonstrated, and explains us 
but cannot itself be explained) that the plane of reality is homogeneous, we 
must add a further premise of a methodological kind: the complex explo-
ration is made up of simple ascertainments and its roots lie in the mate-
rial knowledge implicit in the simplest model. Single material events can 
be linked to form extremely complex situations and highly unitary reading 
machines: but we are by no means entitled to assume that the increase in 
complexity at some point involves a radical, qualitative leap forward. The 
situation we are faces with is composed of single, particular events in which 
particular exchanges and signaling take place. The possibility of interpreting 
them as a whole with the aid of a model implies highly sophisticated cogni-
tive procedures but not new faculties involving a leap from the particular to 
the universal. 
 The only possible way of extending the particular is in the direction of a 
greater degree of generality, which means widening the area of inter action. 
The network consists of the occurrences of particular correspondences 
which influence one another at a distance (in space and time) via a chain of 
material occurrences. There can be no gaps in its tissue. It is worth stressing 
that this does not mean we are ascribing “totality” or “universality” to the 
tissue. All we can say is that this horizon is external, too, i.e. greater than the 
sum of the reading machines, and that these must be interpreted by means of 
the horizon and not vice-versa. Human knowledge is necessarily a product 
of material knowledge that has been developed and complicated within the 
tissue. 
 A typical objection to this kind of assumption is that it degrades knowl-
edge into mechanical atomism. Unfortunately the term “mechanical 
 atomism” is quite meaningless and thus has no value as criticism. It is pre-
cisely by breaking down complex situations and reconstructing their his-
torical development that we are able to see that they differ from the sum of 
simple situations and are in fact built up of structures capable of complex 
interpretations. 
 When we talk about specificity – and our premises show how important 
this concept is to our argument – it is a mistake to think that it consists of 
something “new” opposed to and superseding the “old”. Whilst it is reason-
able to insist on the specificity, in nature, of human cultural situations, we 
must not overlock the fact that these are new arrangements that presuppose 
what preceded them and could not appear without the sum of the previous 
construction. 
 Briefly, then: our assumption is that knowing implies a world of things 
all on a par which can be interacted with and that this is the all-embracing 
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a priori of whatever we are able to do, write or interpret. Things are the 
 starting point: things in their singleness and capacity for exchange, things 
connected by the network of facts and thus things in their overall con-
nectibility. Any interpreter acting within this network and in a given sector 
is secondary in respect of the network and must be seen as a thing capable 
itself of being interpreted, as a thing among things.
 The framework of our analysis is thus a complex of given things, a sum 
of things capable of interacting and of interaction events. In any operation of 
knowledge, we are an A equipped with single interpretative parameters and 
form part of the framework of all possible Bs. We cannot remotely conceive 
of escaping from our context.
 It follows that semiotic discussions of the referent, in particular of the 
so-called “referential fallacy” need to be reconsidered from a different 
 methodological angle. The referent, of course, has a complex relationship 
with human knowledge and with semiotic processes on a cultural kind. This 
is why it is usually kept in quarantine and has become something of a skele-
ton in the cupboard. Man’s modes of semiotic contact with the environment 
are highly complex, so that to promote the things named into fully-fledged 
participants in the naming process certainly seems puerile. But if things 
themselves can, in a precise and predictable fashion, be modified by scien-
tific knowledge (i.e. by a particular way of naming them), this means that 
there must be some sort of link with the referent in the chain of  meaning. The 
referential fallacy cannot be eliminated by adopting an idealistic approach 
to the problem. There are two ways of verifying how name and referent are 
related: the one consists in accounting for the complexity of human knowl-
edge by a discerning and critical epistemology (i.e. in  explaining the modes 
wherewith science registers objects), the other in studying the birth of the 
exploratory function itself. The second kind of approach reveals how, at the 
onset, the referent is so far from being fallacious as to coincide, without any 
need for the mediations of codes, directly with the sign – obviously a “sign 
for” something capable of “being modified specifically by”.
4. Consequences of specificity reactions
Some concepts derive from A B model.
(1) The concept of environment. We have seen how the material presence 
A reviews indifferent material presences. It does not enter into relation with 
them or find meanings, and it does not “identify” them as corresponding 
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to its parameters of exploration. It does enter into relationship with B. B is 
a meaningful environment for A and vice-versa, but the environment is 
larger than these and contains the indifferent things which must be able to 
review without “feeling” them. This means that we cannot take A and what 
is complementary to A as our sole parameter for the action of A, for this 
would amount to an idealistic interpretation or the knowledge of A. There 
is, in fact, a general situation which is not measured by A alone – not even 
as regards what is specific for A. The system as a whole has enough motion 
and exchanges to enable A to carry out the process of screening. It has a total 
energy which is greater than A and of which A takes advantage. Thus the 
single is always within something and is a particular case.
 The complex surrounding A in the totality of the presences is A’s environ-
ment. This has an important consequence: just as A’s mode of inter action 
is particular, so is A’s knowledge-response to the environment partial. The 
situation taken as our model is thus purely schematic. If some things are 
indifferent for A, they will not be so for a U. An observer connected to the 
whole of presences would be able to see the network of single meaning-
relationships – a network of particular but interlinked events that force us to 
recognize that there are not simply two categories of things, some indifferent 
and others meaningful, but a quantity of things, each of which is indifferent 
and meaningful in relation to the others. What counts is their “being specific 
for”. A sign is a thing which is complementary to another thing, and reality 
observed in a given area is a network of reciprocal meaningfulness and of 
exchanges conditioned by these: a network of transformations regulated by 
meaningfulness. We shall see that this “environment-area” of the terms of 
the interpretation is not simply a geometrical space, but a genetic area. It is 
from this that meaning derives its meaning. 
(2) The concept of generality. When A interacts with a B, it can interact with 
all Bs, that is, with all the objects that come within the realm of its reaction 
capacities. For instance, the complex [AB] can be reversible, and A can again 
meet another B. The reaction is thus particular, since it can only take place 
under the physical conditions that constitute the single B, but it is general 
too, because it can occur with a plurality of Bs. In the process of identi-
fication of meaning, then, there is no strictly and exclusively particular (i.e. 
individual) moment. Recognizing meaning is, from the outset, recognizing a 
condition of generality. It is the reaction of identification of meaningfulness 
which identifies the class of Bs. In a universe made up of A, B, and indif-
ferent objects, the experimental definition of the class of Bs is their relation-
ship with A, and that the category is relative to the interaction. Indifferent 
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things reveal themselves as members of the category of Bs as they come to 
react with A. The “perspective” (the category) of A makes the category of Bs.
(3) The concept of complication. Let us suppose that an A is bi-functional, 
i.e. that it interacts via two given points with a B and a C, feeling two dif-
ferent things as meaningful. What we have is an elementary amalgama-
tion (combine) of meaning reception. This situation is only slightly more 
 complex than the previous one: collisions permit the recognition of two 
 categories of objects, Bs and Cs. If we imagine a tri- or four-functional A, 
the number of objects identifiable increases, but A’s mode of interacting 
with its environment (the categoricity of A) does not alter, so the effect of 
compli cation is solely apparent. But let us suppose that destructive and non-
destructive contacts are possible within the same environment. A will be 
faced with two possibilities or results: a metastable complex A-B involving 
the loss of functionality and destruction of both, and a more stable complex 
A-X. Clearly, whether A encounters B or X will radically affect A’s history. 
If A is bi-functional, once it has been stabilized by X it can react with an n, 
producing an AXn. Suppose A-X “gains from” the interaction with a given n, 
that is, not only is the A-X interaction not destructive, but it is also facilitated 
and stabilized by reading an n. The reading complex A-X will thus be more 
“constructed” in the sense that it has reading advantages in the context of its 
sign environment given that it can read n. Complication, therefore, is linked 
to real reading advantages in the interpretation of the environment. 
 The reciprocal, non-preferential reading of A and B was taken as basic 
model, necessary for defining the beginning of the condition of meaning 
in nature: but the construction of more complex readers occur, that is, dif-
ferentiated and specialized reading machines whose possible area of inter-
pretation is larger. Thus situations of interpretative asymmetry come into 
being. Given that it is a real situation that occurs within the horizon, asym-
metry can be interpreted solely in terms of actual complication, i.e. of dif-
ferentiating and evolutionary processes that can be understood only in their 
historical development (in terms of natural history). For the moment we 
shall deal only with the possibility of “centralized” interpretations (those 
converging in a single entity with high identifying powers) and of more 
or less vast areas read or deciphered by the interpreting structure. We can 
thus here draw the distinction (an extremely relative one, of course, which 
derives from a basic situation of non-preferentiality) between objects read 
and a subject that reads. Here the contraposition between individuals and 
environment comes into being. If the “interpreters” increase and grow more 
complicated, the number of non-indifferent things – i.e. the “signs for some 
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reader” – grows too. The environment is thus a set of signs connatural with 
and contextual to the interpreting machines. Neither recognition nor, on 
higher levels, knowledge would be possible if all elements were not of neces-
sity on the same plane, without any “qualitative preference”. Preferences are 
determined solely by complexity. With an increase in complexity goes an 
increase in the meaningful environmental area or section of the world with 
which the reader interacts. For a given complex reader, the sign-things 
increase and the indifferent things diminish. But the primary condition that 
generates complexity is the interchangeability of interpreter and referent. In 
the elementary model, every A is at once the interpreter and referent of B. 
Each referent is itself a sign. At the same time, we do not find an A face with 
a B, but an A and a B moving in a thicket of presences simultaneously with 
other reader-referents. Each has its sectors of meaningfulness, and each is 
susceptible to alterations in its interpreting capacities. 
 This means that the possibility of distinguishing sign from referent and 
from sense (together with the rest of semiotic subdivisions, their various tri-
angles and nomenclatures), as well as the distinction between a “spe cialized 
reader” and an object of reading, are “recent” developments, produced by 
a mechanism of evolutionary complication and differentiation. If we have 
deliberately mixed up the terms of Ogden’s triangle and those of various 
 others, this does not mean that our position is unrigorous: on the contrary it 
is a clear point of view, which precisely identifies an elementary and primary 
situation. If we decide to situate the beginning of semiotics at that point 
where the sign begins to acquire in the exchange the meaning semioticians 
ascribe to it (which may be quite legitimate), we shall still need to situate this 
sign as a point in an evolutionary process. 
(4) The “discrete” nature of reading. Reading is a “thing by thing” process, a 
singular, biunivocal process. Even when complicated, it continues to be built 
upon singular contributions. This characteristic is maintained even in the 
most complex interpretations, in which reading has to break up a  process 
into its fragments and segments for the purposes both of deci phering 
and transmission. Facts mingle, accumulate and are complicated, but the 
 resulting combination is always that of single phenomena connected with 
single things. The discrete character of interaction by no means rules out an 
overall structural interpretation of it, nor is it synonymous with atomized, 
dispersive interaction. Here again we must reject various “either/or” which 
cultural dogmas would bully us into accepting. No overall interpretation 
makes sense unless it is based on (and explained by) a coordination of dis-
crete events. 
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 Undoubtedly, “singularness” is relative to the scale of observation: at 
a certain degree of approximation the discrete will appear as  continuous. 
 Nevertheless, a complex construction that takes the continuous as its  starting 
point is still built upon discrete events, each of which is governed by speci-
ficity. It is no accident that scientific analysis works backwards through the 
stages of phylogenetic complication. Even the functioning of knowledge, 
which appears to be based entirely on the continuous, is the approximated 
overall resultant of discontinuous processes; often enough this resultant, if 
it is to be described with precision, has to be based on statistical assump-
tions and thus presupposes a plurality of discrete events. As regards the 
transmission of knowledge, hypotheses as to its mechanisms again involve 
 re-segmentation of the continuous. 
(5) The physical ground of reading. A “chooses” B on account of material 
correspondences, but this does not become a purely qualitative, immaterial, 
metaphysical choice between a “yes” and a “no”. It is a natural fact expressed 
by the stability of the metastable complex formed: the phenomenon occurs 
with a given “affinity”, the recognition has a given “force”. The reading thus 
has a certain degree of precision. Specificity does not consist in  finding one’s 
absolute partner: from the history of A and B we cannot extract a dialectic of 
contraries or complementaries. It is governed by conditions of equi librium, 
affinity, stability, and bond energy that can be exemplified by thermo-
dynamic situations. The process comes entirely within the domain of natural 
processes and is not endowed with any new quality. 
(6) The “function” of the recognition process. It was remarked earlier that 
recognition is the condition of the exchange of energy. This means that 
recognition, in the exchange economy, makes the “money” available. The 
potentialities made available to the reciprocal referents (and then to the 
reading machine in a position of vantage) by the sign process are those 
inherent in the energy of the ensuing process. But the liberation of energy 
in a sign-referent chain means an exchange governed by sequential  reactions 
of meaningfulness. This places the stress both on the physical and  material 
consequences of reading (which is always a natural process), and on its 
 status as “exchangeable material”. If an A is transformed by a B so as to reach 
a state of excitation enabling it to react with a C, this clearly constitutes a 
chain of reactions which is at the same time a chain of complementariness 
and of meanings. The environment is interlinked by these exchange actions. 
In a chain of readers, communication is a primary, essential fact for the 
 phenomenon of meaning, and not an accessory feature (as if a fact, once 
ascertained, could the at will be communicated). 
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5. Material logic
The things which make up the world (whether they are known or unknown) 
are the datum which precedes our reflecting upon them. Their “behaviour” 
is an a priori with respect to ours and includes ours as a particular instance. 
We will never understand the world if we do not start from the assump-
tion that the interpreter is an object among objects of the same kind, pre-
supposing that the entire semiotic process, whatever its nature or mode, 
takes place on a horizontal plane of basically “non-preferential” verifications. 
The idea of homogeneity of the world is expressed roughly as follows: given 
an a, around which are situated c, d, e, such that when a is transformed into 
a’, c, d, e, are transformed into c’, d‘, e’, we shall say that a, c, d, e, are linked 
to each other and, more particularly, that a is correlated with c, d, e. in the 
field of specificity correspondences, this can be translated as: “every time A 
is able to interact with a B, the complex A-B is formed”. Specificity, however 
important, is nothing more than an expression of homogeneity established 
through correspondence. The “form” directs the exchange, prevents its dis-
persion, makes use of it by “aiming it” at an A and a B, and subsequently at 
the other elements that intervene in the complication of the reading struc-
ture. This “orientated direction” of the consumption of energy is not a quali-
tative leap forward. It is a particular case included in the vast domain of 
natural homogeneity and connaturality. 
 Here, then, a general situation of “non-elastic” exchange appears. How-
ever we interpret it (whether by Newtonian or probabilistic mechanics, 
microphysics or macrophysics) and whatever our instrument and tech-
niques, the correspondence between phenomena is the datum from which 
we begin and conditions any interpretation. Correspondence is material and 
given, and the fact that it is possible to influence it does not prove that we are 
introducing new dimension into the phenomena. On the contrary, it means 
that we are so completely immersed in these as to be included ourselves in 
the number of possible correspondences. Knowledge can change the world 
because it is an element in the world and partakes of its possibilities. 
 This absolutely objective framework (most of which we do not know, 
but presuppose) consisting of things in a relationship of non-elastic change 
transformation, which is our world, is logical in itself. We are accustomed 
to associating logic only with the capacities of thought. But if these capaci-
ties exist in nature, it is because they have been differentiated in nature; and 
given that they act upon nature, they share a common origin with the mate-
rial exchanges they are capable of interpreting, since they are founded on 
the logic of material exchange differentiated by increasingly more complex 
functions. 
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 The material logic lies in the facts themselves and the relations between 
elements forming the horizon. These are simply what they are. They are 
given and they can only be influenced in so far as their orientation and 
possibility of relation is concerned: we can exploit the non-elastic, material 
logic upon which they are built in order to direct them. Even phylogenetic 
complication, which has given rise to an enormous variety of complexity 
conditions, has acted on the material available and adopted the only logic 
possible – that inherent in things. Things which undergo alterations due to 
the action of other things are logical in that they cannot be otherwise. They 
are immersed in the logical situation. It does not seem reasonable to pose 
further questions in order to try and “explain” the logic. Our logic can go as 
far as ascertaining the more general logic of things, one of whose aspects is 
knowledge. 
 In this sense, at its lowest level, logic is a material tautology. What is, is 
logical. In the sense used here, the verb “to be” is thus an integral part of 
the logic. There is a material logic, because the tissue of correspondences 
is thus and thus, and the relations of correspondence are non-elastic and 
cannot be altered at will: they are given and uniform. If an A interacts with 
a B, and if every time A meets B it interacts, this is a logical operation, a 
 logical type of material relation; it expresses the inescapable tissue of the 
real. Our logic is inevitably built upon the objectivity of material logic. If we 
say a thing “exists”, we are referring to the operations that identify it through 
modifications. These will be both subjective, as for every A that identifies a 
B, and logic-connective, in that they belongs to the uniform, homogeneous 
plane of the real. This is why logic and existence are synonyms if considered 
in the framework of the dominant a priori which constructs us. A human 
logic can only been constructed by retrieving the material logic underlying 
extremely complex exchange situations and ridding it of the arbitrary modes 
and improper uses to which certain cultural situations have put it. 
 As regards correspondence conditions in their aspect as signs, it is obvi-
ous that material logic and material semiotics coincide. If a thing interacts 
selectively with another, discovering it as a referent-sign and as an opera-
tive trigger, this is a logical condition, connected with the impersonal asser-
tion “every time that...”, and it expresses the non-elasticity of the tissue in 
which everything is immersed, and which extends beyond all reflection and 
encompasses all reflection. 
 It simply leads us to our “particular”, i.e. to our single environment where 
we find only particular, single things. From these, we try to reconstruct (in 
a particular, single way) both a connaturality – a state of “deriving from” or 
“being born of ” – and a generality capable of connecting us also with not 
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strictly genetic areas. The interpretation of things is basically a matter of 
 recognizing that they “come first” and are “what they are”, neither preferen-
tial nor influenceable. 
 It is important to interpret in this respect the transformation of the 
world effected by human logic. Elected to a central role in science, logic 
has come to be identified with that myth of man as a shaper of reality from 
without. This myth is not essentially different from those pre-scientific and 
idealistic myths which assign man the role of interpreting the world and 
 giving it meaning. Yet it is clear that if man is able to act upon things, inter-
preting them and directing them, it is only because he himself is a  particular 
thing among other things – one endowed with material volume and a large, 
 specialized, connecting structure that has fully preserved the material logic 
upon which it is built. Man with his possibilities of knowledge is thus a center 
of very complex connections – so complex as to give rise to that  special 
state of vision and control of his total situation that we call consciousness. 
He knows because he is connatural and homogeneous with the logic of the 
world to which he belongs, and because he himself derives, historically, from 
the very material logic he is capable of interpreting. We must thus reject 
any idealistic strivings and temptations in favor of a totally objective inter-
pretation that is both more embracing than, and wholly anterior to man. It 
should be clear by now that this absolute objectivity in no way amounts to a 
“metaphysics of the object”: on the contrary, it is an interaction. 
 The introduction of human logic into material logic is basically a sign 
situation. Man as a complex connecting center is a center for the reception of 
signs and the identification of meanings; these exist because the relationship 
between interpreter and environmental referent is non-elastic and logical. Of 
course, situations of elasticity, ambiguity may well arise from this, but they 
are generated subsequently to the first natural, non-elastic constructions. 
 Broadly speaking, from our present standpoint, logic and semiotics coin-
cide at the human level too. They themselves have developed in the con-
text of material logic and material semiotics. Thus the relationship between 
inference and meaning is much older than the modes of human interaction.
 The roots of our present logic-semiotic situations, which characterize 
us as cultural beings – with all our ambiguities and obscurities, should not 
be sought in some “specific class” of “the ambiguous” or “the obscure” that 
mysteriously emerges from the depths of a quasi-divine, new, mysteriously 
primitive being. They must be traced back to progressive combinations 
(objectively, these are always logical and semiotic) which have prospered as 
material situations in a natural context. These combinations are not abstract 
possibilities but the product of the specific situation of man’s phylogeny, 
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whereby he is differentiated as an animal capable of complex connections. 
Human differentiation has progressed by means of interaction and signaling 
situations. It is clear that “logic” in this sense is by no means the contrary of 
irrationality. Also natural facts of an instinctive kind have their own logic 
for the simple reason that they have come into being in nature. Here again, 
then, we must dismantle certain facile dichotomies that have vitiated our 
culture – all of which stem from our idealistic-dialectical tradition based on 
fictitious symmetries, oppositions and oscillations of a prevalently dramatic 
and emotional type, in which man casts himself in the hero’s role and fails 
to make due allowance for the tissue he derives from. 
 It is worth emphasizing here that the recurrent use of the term “mate-
rial” in these pages should not be taken as a harking back to 19th-century 
positivism or to dialectical materialism. It serve simply to denote the homo-
geneity of the horizon, which is nothing other than “x” (i.e. material). The 
term could be replaced by various others, such as spiritual, given, present, 
provided this were done uniformly throughout the whole text. 
6. Systems of complementariness and signaling 
Many semioticians start from artificial communication models consisting of 
circuits, channels, emitters, receivers, etc., and make direct use of the con-
cepts of information, redundancy, background noise, and so on. Our model 
A-B is not of this kind, and A and B are not meant to represent circuits and 
feed-back (though clearly, if this model is valid, it will also cover the latter). 
 Neither does our use of the term model coincide with that of the 
 philosophy of science or of mathematics, where model is a theoretical con-
struction that “embraces” and simplifies numerous specific cases. Our model 
constitutes an elementary situation. Because the whole of our argument is 
based on the presupposition that this situation is objective and determines 
our very ability to reconstruct it cognitively, our model will thus also be a 
fact. It implies the existence of a real model “situation A-B”. This means that 
the substantiate terms like “material knowledge”, “material logic”, “elementary 
sign situation” (all more or less synonyms of the situation represented by the 
model) we must find specific natural situations and explain the complexity of 
the model as a complication of these. We must therefore analyze actual situa-
tions from an experimental standpoint, rather than analyze formal models.
 With regard to this issue, we may underline the following assertions, 
some of which have already been foreshadowed in propositions advanced 
earlier.
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(1) The model of specific correspondence came into existence and asserted 
itself in the biological domain. What we call living beings are such because 
they are based on, and organize, specificity correspondences. Thus, given 
the original identity between sign and specificity correspondence, we can 
roughly identify the area of signs with the area of biology, and interpret the 
latter as a collection of sign systems. 
(2) This area is not sharply demarcated from what lies outside it and what 
precedes it. It grows, little by little, out of conditions of selective adjustment 
of correspondence. Life rises from the realm of the inorganic in so far as it 
specializes in the reception and manipulation of signs. The domain of the 
living and of the inorganic are thus homogeneous and continuous. The  living 
beings known to us – even the most elementary – are extremely  complex, 
so that we have to postulate an intermediate stratum for which there is no 
actual evidence, and try to reconstruct it by experimental research. 
(3) The “domain” of living beings is not a class characterized by an essence 
or a distinctive feature, but embraces extremely diverse, real material objects 
whose common property is that they interpret an area, correspond to a given 
neighborhood of signs (which constitutes both the reference and environ-
ment of the organism). This variability is itself a natural fact in the sense that 
it does not take accidental or fantastic paths but rather standardized ones 
implying some basic procedures. Evolution is the complication that occurs 
in the natural history of correspondence systems, always in single objects 
and single situations and with particular mechanisms. Differentiation is the 
evolutionary process as it appears in the single individual examined. 
(4) Evolution, the growth of complexity, is based on mechanisms that are 
part of material logic and cannot be interpreted as finalized or directed. If 
complexity arises (and it is a synonym of order, as we have seen), it does 
so as an accidental event carrying reading advantages – i.e. it increases 
the chances of setting up relations with the referent. This means, broadly 
 speaking, that the reading of the referent is linked to the “emergence”, the 
“persistence” and the “predominance” of the structure. It is thus not a formal 
reading like that of the semiotician but one with a metabolic and survival 
function. This reading is basically a destructive process: as soon as a system 
has a reading advantage over its environment it will read the referent because 
it gains by so doing – which means that it uses the referent to stabilize itself 
whilst destroying the latter as such. This is the path that eventually leads to 
the formal reading of the semiotician via successive complications of the 
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possibilities of identifying the referent by material, destructive operations. 
An objective, necessary texture is set up between reader and what is read. 
7. Methods for analyzing structures
The only way to analyze real, elementary models belonging to the biological 
domain is through scientific research. It is a complex procedure in which the 
“provocative” role of the observer is an essential factor. 
 There are two types of experimental approaches. One consists in working 
backwards from the complex to the simple, collecting and classifying traces 
surviving in nature in the manner of paleontologists. The other consists in 
analyzing the spectrum extant in the present and interpreting the complex 
as deriving from the simple in a dynamic, evolutionary process.
 There is no doubt that the latter is the more concrete approach. Pale-
ontology is extremely useful for identifying “options” that have taken place 
at already highly complex levels, but the traces of elementary levels have all 
been definitively cancelled. Following the second approach, there are again 
two possibilities – that of what we can call comparative anatomy and that 
of biochemistry. The approach of comparative anatomy (an umbrella term 
here that also includes zoology, comparative physiology, ecology, ethology, 
 genetics of populations, etc.) is, however, too embracing and deals with 
 systems too complex for our purposes.
 When it approaches simple situations it analyzes these as a whole both 
morphologically and functionally, and considers them both in themselves 
and in relation to their environment. What we need here is an approach 
capable not only of analyzing the most simple elements that have survived till 
the present, but also of carrying out a componential analysis from within – 
i.e. through the constituent parts of the object. On the contrary, the bio-
chemical – structural approach “dismantles” the structure of the object and 
enables us to reconstruct extant complexity as an assemblage or composition 
of simple situations. It endeavors, in other words, to pick out those very 
units capable of selective interaction that we have postulated as our  general 
condition or elementary model. Under the heading of “bio chemistry” a wide 
range of disciplines is included: molecular genetics, molecular biology, bio-
physics, as well as those “analogical” sciences, such as cybernetics, bionics, 
etc, that can be considered subsidiaries of these. We do not intend, of course, 
to tackle this problem from the biochemical standpoint, but simply to draw 
attention to the relationship between biochemistry and the matter in hand. 
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 It is worth noting that a third kind of approach is possible, namely a sort 
of “artificial biochemical paleontology”, reproducing in the laboratory the 
conditions. This kind of research is that being carried out on the synthesis of 
amino acids and nucleic bases under temperature, pressure, and irradiation 
conditions presumably corresponding to those found on the earth’s surface 
some billions of years ago. It has so far led to the construction of over-simple 
situations and thus suffers from the opposite kind of defect to that of the 
“comparative anatomy”. 
8. The initial phases
There is a lacuna at the level of what we have called “reciprocal signalling” of 
specificity where the terms A and B are each both sign and efferent for the 
complementary term, without having any reading advantages over the other 
so far. The simplest biological systems are already, by definition, systems with 
reading advantages and use the sign-referent-environment complex for the 
purposes of metabolism. The identification of the complementary element 
is, in fact, carried out by a reading machine which already has an enormous 
“predominance” over the section of the world it deciphers and exploits. A 
bacterium has an overwhelming complexity compared with the environ-
ment on which it survives and with the referents-signs that it  metabolises 
and exploits for their energy. Even a single compound isolated from this 
integrated complex (an enzyme, for example) has a  phylogenetically well-
established advantages over its substrate. It is precisely these advantages, 
combined with others, that go to make up the overall advantage of the 
reader-individual over its referent-environment. The enzyme has a marked 
advantage over its substrate because it has a natural history of information 
and options behind it.
 Thus even those rather artificial in vitro systems in which we try to break 
down complexity provide situations which are rather complex and in evitably 
“biological” in the normal sense of the word. Our initial system (non- 
preferential A-B) could be defined, from this standpoint, as pre-biological.
 However, many stable reciprocal reading situations are to be found in 
biological structures. These are many cases in which the specificity con-
ditions are well established and yet give rise not to a metastable complex 
followed by the destruction of one of the two terms, but to a stationary inte-
grated complex – for instance, the macromolecules forming the cell mem-
branes and all the other relatively stable structures of the cell. Each macro-
molecule receives signs from, and sets up relationship with, the others and 
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gives rise to a  structure. This may be the product of the situation of elemen-
tary  reciprocity, though in each case it has become an internal and constitu-
tive signalling situation, and is no longer simply a relationship between a 
reader and the world it reads. 
9. Real biological situations
The evidence supplied by biochemical analysis concerns a relatively advanced 
stage in the development of “natural semiology” or the  orga nization of speci-
ficity. The basic feature of this stage, which distinguishes it sharply from 
the previous one of pure reciprocity, is that one of the two terms has an 
advantage over the other in the sense that the interaction is not destructive 
for it. If this term is A, it interacts specifically with B and destroys it, appro-
priating the energy released by B’s destruction. Which is to say that A’s form 
in relation to B constitutes the trigger permitting the release of the energy 
contained in B without this causing the destruction of A. On the contrary, 
the destruction of B in some way reinforces A or the aggregate to which A 
belongs. No doubt this sounds a very anthropomorphic way of putting it. Yet 
it is what actually occurs in metabolism, as exemplified by the structures that 
carry out the various phases, namely the enzymes. It is an objective situation, 
regardless of the fact that we intuitively describe this “orderly energy release 
connected with steric complementariness” as “ex ploiting” or “degrading” or 
“metabolizing” or “feeding for the sake of survival”. 
 What characterizes the enzyme is its specificity with respect to the 
 substrate. In the enzyme macromolecule there is a section which is struc-
turally complementary to a given substrate. An enzyme is specific in so far as 
it enters into interaction with, and can metabolize, only one substance – its 
specific substrate. We can imagine it (though structural analysis has already 
described this in terms of amino acid sequences for many known enzymes) 
as a structure with a complex socket or hollow into which only the given 
substrate fits; the latter, once captured in this way, is subjected to an energy-
releasing process which is exploited either by the same structure or trans-
mitted to others. 
 Here all the concepts found in our model are exemplified. The enzyme 
comes into contact with all the indifferent elements present in the system in 
a purely statistical, thermodynamic way, and enters into relationships only 
when it encounters its own substrate and no other. The substrate is thus the 
referent-sign for the reading machine, or interpreter, and the “reading”, i.e. 
the signalling phenomenon, consists of the destruction and utilization of 
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the substrate. Here too we can employ the normal terminology of semiotics: 
an interpreter is “one who interprets”, a synonym of interpretant, and the 
two terms, though quite distinct at a higher level of semiotic analysis, are 
equivalent at this level. 
 What gives the substrate its “meaning” or “specificity for”? Obvi-
ously the presence in nature of a structure capable of reading it. The basic 
step is that one of the two terms becomes not destructible (i.e. acquires 
 structural stability): it outlasts the single reading event. This means that A 
can  read-and-destroy as many Bs as the thermodynamic conditions of the 
 system and the concentration of Bs allow. The reaction as a whole does not 
“outrun” the natural terms of the system; which is to say that the energy 
released by the substrate is such as is actually present in it and could be 
released non-enzymatically (and thus not be exploited). The elementary sign 
reader is thus fully encompassed by the world in which it operates and in no 
way creates a “special” situation. Moreover, the reaction of complementari-
ness is based on a formal – one might almost say “qualitative” – recogni-
tion of a “key-and-keyhole” type relationship, but it takes place because this 
relationship is a manifestation of both a structural and an energy situation, 
since a metastable complex will show varying degrees of affinity, and may be 
broken up by the input of greater or smaller quantities of energy, and each 
hollow or socket in a structure that adapts to the complementary substrate 
structure consists actually of weak bonds – in other words of given physical 
interactions. The organization of living beings is based entirely on thus type 
of situation of complementariness. The generalization is the extension of 
particular cases and tends towards a greater degree of concreteness, whereas 
the philosopher’s “universal” fades away into the indefinite. Looking at the 
modular nature of extremely diverse biological situations, without a single 
exception they are built upon a situation of sterile correspondence or sig-
nalling. Thus elementary systems are really contained in complex ones. They 
are the prehistoric phases living on within present situations and are by no 
means forgotten. Differentiation should not be thought of as the appear-
ance of qualitatively new situations, but as a combination of elementary 
situations. What is new is the way they are differentiated from their sign 
environment and how they are combined and integrated at the level of the 
reading machines they come to form. The advantage of A on its referent-
environment consists in the natural history of A. Molecular contraction 
and movement, hormone correlations, the transmission of impulses in the 
nerves, the systems of perception, the antigen-antibody reaction, the control 
of cell proliferation, protein synthesis and genetic coding, are all without 
exception based on situations of complementariness. 
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 Even pathology as a whole can be defined as an interference on the 
 systems of complementariness.
 To come back to our enzyme model, for instance, we can “cheat” the 
enzyme by inserting in it, as a substrate, an almost identical molecule – an 
analogue – on which the enzyme fastens without then being able to manipu-
late it or to detach itself again. This confirms that reading is a natural phe-
nomenon which, though precise, can never attain to the absolute, flawless 
precision of a supernatural fact. 
 There are areas of biology that we are quite incapable of exploring today at 
the molecular, biochemical level: for instance, memory, the logical function, 
the psychology of behaviour. Does this mean that it is intellectually arbitrary 
to see these functions too as being organized on the basis of complemen-
tariness? On the contrary, an assumption of this kind is necessary, and the 
only possible experimental procedure in these fields too is to break these 
functions down into their constituents. In any case, bio chemical physio-
logical research inevitably dismantles and reassembles complex situations, 
isolating particular compounds and identifying their functional interactions 
with other compounds. 
 The breaking down of situations into their modules carried out by bio-
chemistry in no way leads to the substitution of a series of dead elements 
for the living one. This is just one of the many scientific clichés current 
among laymen. Actually, the complexity and unity of structures, far from 
being destroyed by this anatomical operation, are heightened by it, and what 
emerges extremely clearly is in fact the unity, the coordination, the inter-
dependence of the modular components. Whether the structure as a whole 
is simply the sum of its parts or something more is, quite frankly, a super-
fluous question. 
 To search for the elementary situation means to seek the “reason” for 
a mechanism. Its “essence” lies only in the combination of the elementary 
situa tions. The dissection which, with the aid of our techniques, we carry 
out today is, in a certain sense, as we interpret it, an operation inverse to 
that carried out by nature from the start of phylogenetic development during 
evolution. 
10. Origins of complementariness
If certain objects within the horizon are specifically complementary to 
 others, the problem arises as to “why” this should be so. “Why” in this case 
simply means “of what origin”: how this fact has come about in nature, and 
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also how complementariness has expanded and amalgamated in nature so 
as to construct individuals which can be seen as organized centres in which 
complementariness is both internal and self-regulated, and directed toward 
the outside in relation to the environment.
 The general principle is that reading systems construct themselves upon 
signs. They become reading systems because they complicate themselves 
interacting with signs, and are solicited by referents. If, out of an original 
state of “parity” of correspondence (model A-B) states arise in which a 
reader is constructed (i.e. a stable complementary structure capable of non-
self-destructive reading), this is because, among the combinations that have 
accidentally aggregated, some which are specific to a given substrate are also 
produced; the latter in some way represents an advantage for the combina-
tion which is complementary to this given environmental referent-object. 
Thus the specific structural combination is selected by the environment. 
We can imagine, at a very early stage, that accidentally-formed structures 
are labile and that the structure accidentally specific for n, by forming a 
complex with n, is more stable (that is, tends to preserve its complexity) and 
is saved from destruction by the possibility of reading an n that really exists. 
Of course, a stabilized structure of this type may be accidentally complicated 
by being further stabilized by another n, setting up a sort of mechanism for 
safeguarding the stability and complexity achieved step by step against the 
lability and decay of ordinary thermodynamic situations. 
 Some points of this scheme can be outlined.
(1) The referent, which can be said to be noumenal and illegible, becomes 
a sign when in nature a machine that can read it is constructed: when it 
becomes itself meaningful for another piece of the world. The machine for 
sign interpretation builds itself on the referent sign. 
(2) The reader and what is read, the interpretant and the interpreted, are 
 contextual and on the same plane. Out of their reciprocal dynamic and 
through the progressive logic of their interactions and the homogeneousness 
of correspondence situations, further situations of specific correspon dence 
are produced which in their turn lead to complex, non-self-destructive 
 reading systems. A reading machine makes no sense by itself, but in con-
nection with the thing it “has learnt” to read, upon which it has built and 
exercised itself during evolution: a structure “interprets” its own genetic area 
and can only be related to that. 
 The situation of a complex cognitive reader of the human type is in no 
way different. He too is built upon his own genetic area; he can interpret the 
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things that have produced him; his knowledge of the environment is neces-
sarily acquired through his modes of interpreting environmental signs. The 
idea of an absolute reader, the touchstone of all possible readers, is absurd. 
Each extension of the reading area (and man’s reading area is extremely vast) 
is achieved through operations translating possibilities of natural readings, 
and these themselves are natural operations. 
(3) This sets up priorities, not of a hierarchical kind but natural-chrono-
logical, or factual, in our view of the terms of semiotics. Signs come before 
the code. A code does not make sense by itself, nor does it make sense to 
speak of a given artificial code linked to its signs by rules. A code in this 
sense is the fruit of a highly complex sign activity which the code does not 
explain, but by which on the contrary is explained. Code is constructed on 
signs, a structure is constructed on her environmental sector, which is the 
sum of things that, indifferent at first, become signs via a series of natural 
processes. The connection between code and interpreted signs is the his-
tory of the complications of a structure capable of stability with respect 
to the signs it has learnt to interpret: it is thus a natural history relation-
ship. There is no such thing as a pre-established relationship between two 
given orders of things; no relationship is “occasionalistic” or anterior to the 
event of  co-formation. What exists is a relationship established by history in 
the framework of things. But the code is the key, because it represents the 
 unitary result of the reading capacity of the reader. 
(4) Complication as a natural fact is based on advantages that complication 
itself confers on structures. Originally accidental and ephemeral, compli-
cation stabilizes itself by a more advance exploitation of the environment. 
The transformation of indifferent things into signs is linked to the stabilizing 
of the reader and confers advantages on the latter (taking the word advantage 
in a non-anthropomorphic sense as signifying stability, and subsequently 
competitive advantage too). In this kind of dynamic, a sign establishes itself 
as such because it is useful, in other words it creates new thermodynamic 
and energy conditions for its user. Thus the signalling phenomenon has a 
concrete natural basis and retains this even when the signalling machines 
attain to the level of cultural complication. Obviously the term “advantage” 
must in this case include “situations held to be advantageous by the reader”; 
it must, that is, be taken in a much broader sense than when it is used in its 
biological, metabolic sense, and the functions on which signalling is based 
imply exchanges of an analogical-hypothetical kind – including complex 
memorizing and combinatory mechanisms. 
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(5) Complication is a gradual adaptation of a reader to its reading area, 
which thereby becomes its genetic area. Signs construct their reader in the 
sense that it adapts to the signs, building itself on the things to be inter-
preted, learning to interpret them and exploit them. Genetic space and 
sign- exploitation space are the same thing. Thus complementariness (as 
 increasing complexity) is always a correspondence between a structure 
and its correlated sign complex. Considering a slice of the “reader-environ-
ment” complex at time t1, the reader is distinguished by an “entry section” 
for meaningful things: this defines the signs-environment as interpretable 
things. Things can come specifically into contact with the reader because 
they pass through his “entry section”: they are “picked up” by his inter-
pretative parameters (by his categories). These differ from structure to struc-
ture and, correspondingly, the single sign complexes differ too. The connec-
tion between a structure and its area-environment is thus at once contextual 
(visible on the same plane at time t1, as a single structure-thing complex, or 
adapted complex) and genetic. 
 There are different structures that read different environments of dif-
ferent dimensions. Ecological interaction niches vary from the extremely 
narrow ones of bacteria which can read water, nitrates and little else, to those 
of man who can read human surroundings and, with the aid of particular 
devices (which are what make up human knowledge), can extend his own 
natural reading area at will. 
(6) Natural mechanisms of contextual adaptation and of complication are 
based on the selection of favourable results, in a mixture of random events. 
Order is thus a natural condition resulting from selection of some structural 
configurations rather than others, fixing and stabilizing them. Order is thus 
always:
(A)  an order with respect to something, i.e. to a referent which becomes a 
sign: it is “complementariness in respect of ”;
(B)  an actual state of real structures and not a characteristic inspired from 
outside;
(C)  a structural configuration achieved by trial and selection through 
 performing on large numbers, on things, in a statistical, thermo dynamic 
system. It cannot occur in evolution unless there is repetition and itera-
tion of individuals, i.e. long generation spans, and large numbers of 
individuals exposed to selection. 
(D)  a situation resulting from the noise of the background, which comes 
before and remains outside (and will take again its prevalence, through 
the death). There can be no building of structures if there are no 
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 non-preferential collisions. Preferentiality enters the framework as an a 
posteriori advantage.
   The relationship between life and non-life is quite different from 
that suggested by the myth of a progressive order that invades nature 
and transforms it. These two aspects are always contextual and form 
part of the same horizon; they are, at bottom, the same thing, a kind 
of distribution of roles. The possibilities of interpretation exist because 
they have been elicited by collisions between things, and they main-
tain their contextual relation with collision and disorder. Each structure 
can thus be interpreted as a history of little advantages in the general 
development from the inorganic and in the continuing presence of the 
inorganic. History as a whole is itself a return to the inorganic. 
(E)  Complementariness is based on phylogeny. Order is genetic and 
 historical in essence. For structures – especially those capable to some 
extent of “seeing themselves” (i.e. those that possess self-awareness) – 
inter dependence with things means genetic interdependence – a  filial 
relation ship or constitutional connection with the genetic area. We form 
a single whole with our surroundings. We can interpret them because 
they have made us. Structures grow upon signs which are  legible 
because they are connatural with them. There is only one horizon, and 
the subjective roots of the objective reality lies in returning to the roots, 
in seeking our parents in things as a whole – both remote parents, and 
recent parents in our own environment. 
11. Natural structures
The domain of specific complementariness is, as we have remarked, roughly 
that of biological objects (though it would be as useless as it is impossible 
to try and define and delimit this domain with precision). These are the 
objects which can read their complementaries for the purposes of survival. 
Thus structures of complementariness are not abstract entities, but concrete, 
 modular-type molecules. The direction taken by evolution is quite definite 
and is based essentially on two types of modular-sequential macromolecules, 
proteins and nucleic acids. Nature – this collection of colliding elements – 
has developed and perfected these two in particular. The reason for this – 
which is usually considered inscrutable – is really fairly simple. It is not 
necessary to carry out a detailed biochemical analysis here, though two facts 
need taking into account. The concept of complementariness entails that of 
specifically complementary structures, i.e. macromolecules endowed with 
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complexity. A situation of this kind can only come about via carbon.  Silicon, 
the next best candidate after carbon, admits of an extremely low degree 
of complexity. Complexity could not develop other than through organic 
chemistry. The physical conditions suitable for complexity are extremely 
critical, and it can only exist in a very narrow temperature range. In the 
realm of carbon chemistry and the temperatures permitting  complex aggre-
gation, the environmental context is represented mainly by water, which is 
indispensable as an “immediate environment” for the movement and struc-
tural integration of organic molecules, while the thermodynamic conditions 
are represented by solar energy. The modular elements that have asserted 
themselves by aggregating to form more complex structures are the amino 
acids, and the purinic and pyrimidinic bases linked by mono saccharidic 
units and by phosphorus. To ask why, within the range of carbon structures, 
these in particular have been “selected” is rather pointless: they have been 
chosen as the fittest, and any other structure could only be proposed by an 
artificial and hypothetic activity which itself is in some way derived from the 
sequences of amino acids and bases. There is no doubt that our real a priori 
is the natural invention of proteins and nucleic acids. 
 It is also immaterial to ask whether life or some other planet could be 
based on something other than amino acids and nucleic bases. Allowing for 
the fact that, in this case too, the alternatives to carbon are eliminated by 
Mendeleev’s table, and that the homogeneity of the real is the a priori of all 
possible interpretations, any other lines of development of complexity will 
be explicable in terms of the selective characteristics of the environment, and 
each will be characterized by its own natural history dominated by selection 
events. Hence, there may be differences corresponding to different environ-
ments, but the mechanisms will be uniform. In principle, we may assume 
that the co-formative, evolutionary relationship between structures and 
environment in the context of physical conditions of the general environ-
ment is a constant: reading mechanisms and the mechanisms for building 
structures on signs are always involved. 
 As regards proteins, their complementariness with respect to the sub-
strates is ensured by the sequence of amino acids (primary structure which, 
however, being rigidly determined for each protein, conditions the proteins’ 
development in space – their hindrance and their specific conformation 
with regard to a given substrate. Enzyme-proteins can be taken as a general 
example: in nature we find an immense number of proteins which are in 
some way specific, that is, adapted to their specific substrates. This is the 
result of the assembly of a very limited number of amino acids. 
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 The general rule, or rather the path actually taken, is that of a great  variety 
of situations of complementariness, and hence an extremely wide range 
of complexity derived from the use of a very small number of elementary 
 structures. Clearly, it is a matter of a large number of  possible  permutations. 
The number of combinations that have actually been retained is vastly 
 inferior to the number of accidental combinations possible. Enzymes, 
 hormone receptors, antigen receptors (antibodies), membrane receptors, 
coordinated repetitive structures forming films, contractile and elastic struc-
tures, are all made up of proteins, integrated by other structures such as 
polysaccharides and lipids. 
 The structure of nucleic acids is less “proteiform”, more definite  spatially, 
and more monotonous in its sequences. A typical case is the two-strand, 
evenly-spaced structure of DNA, where four different entities (bases) 
 combine, with far fewer possibilities of combination than the twenty amino 
acid units of proteins. Nucleic acids are particularly suitable for coding-type 
structures because they are more monotonous and more stable and can thus 
be more easily read and translated. We shall return to this point later and 
shall see that basic complementariness arises precisely between these two 
types of macromolecule in the mechanism of protein synthesis. This, how-
ever, from the semiotic point of view, implies other concepts, such as that of 
code, which we have only mentioned in passing so far. 
12. Simple evolutionary situations and their generalization
Let us suppose there exist a large population of bacteria in contact with n 
sign-things, such that each member is capable of reading-metabolizing the 
n referents. If, thanks to a mutation produced by an accidental disorder, 
one of the individuals is enabled to exploit an n+1th metabolite, then an 
evolu tionary step has taken place in the bacteria in question and in all the 
clones that descend from it. This is manifested in an expansion if the reading 
area. What was happened to the n+1 thing is that it has acquired a natural 
possibility of being read, and can be deciphered as a sign, thereby joining 
the ns that preceded it. The microorganism’s environmental range has thus 
increased. What chances have the new clones of being stabilized? Neither 
more nor less than the advantages deriving from reading. If n+1 is concen-
trated in the environment and provides energy, the mutation gives the clone 
immediate advantages over the others and will certainly be stabilized. The 
new clone fits things better, is adapted better, and is more coherent with its 
ecological niche. Furthermore, if n+1s are denser in zones outside the niche 
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in which the mutation took place, the new clone will occupy a broader area, 
namely that of n+1. And since the new area will presumably be different 
from the previous one in other respects too, containing for instance things 
or properties n+2, n+3 etc., there is a certain probability that a mutation will 
take place in relation to this new environmental situation. A condition of 
this kind might seem to be very mechanistic, given its selective automaticity. 
But we shall see that this is by no means the case, because it is not primary 
situations which have to be selected individually (accepted or rejected) that 
come into contact with the environment, but individuals which have already 
travelled a certain distance along the path of evolution and are equipped 
with an overall stability. Thus the new circumstances and reading possi-
bilities are not only external aspects (in relation with the referent) but also 
internal ones (consisting of a rearrangement of the sign relationships that 
make up the individual). There is no doubt that n+1’s capacity to be read 
arises only if the new reading system appears, but the new reading system 
is inconceivable without n+1. The possibility of reading is thus constructed 
on the referent. And this becomes meaningful for the structure capable of 
 reading it. The mutation that reads n+1 is inconceivable without n+1. All 
a structure can do during evolution is expand into the forest of things sur-
rounding it and learn to decipher more and more of them, modifying both 
itself and the things in the process. Little by little the forest is converted into 
a place of family, connatural presences utilized by the structure; it becomes 
an interpretable sign complex, an environment. In the last analysis, it is 
things that have themselves read, building suitable structures to this end. 
 This is an extremely general truth. Things have themselves described 
by the structure and are spoken through the structure. Reading modes are 
extremely varied and depend in all cases on the single structure and on its 
entry sections, i.e. its genetic area. There is no natural function which is 
not based on this. The natural knowledge an enzyme has of its substrate is 
extremely circumscribed. There is no doubt that for the substrate there exists 
in nature a machine capable of interpreting it separately, with given, specific 
parameters. Human knowledge, which is obviously extremely complex, is 
characterized by being able to interpret things through its own particular 
entry sections. But even here the parameters are particular, not universal, 
and the area of meaning is so large not because qualitatively new conditions 
have occurred in connection with the referent, but because complexity has 
enormously extended the chain of interpretative operations, rendering pos-
sible memory, hypothetic simulations and logical operation. 
 The purpose of scientific knowledge is to decipher the referent objectively 
with the subjective parameters of the human entry sections. We  originate in 
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the referent and return to it, and on returning there we find that the referent 
is a sign and makes sense to us precisely because it was already meaningful 
during the natural processes of construction of human complexity. 
13. Internal signs and internal complexity
In the actual evidence of signs, namely in biological structures, we never 
encounter isolated signalling situations. Even the example of the enzyme and 
its substrate is artificial, since we have isolated an enzyme from its context, 
a cell or a complex virus. Of course, this complexity must, as we have seen, 
have been achieved via biunivocal situations, but it has established itself in 
a position involving reading advantages achieved by aggregation. What we 
must now try to understand is how this step was taken, from the point of 
view of the complementariness and the cognitive-metabolic identification 
of the referent.
 We have already examined a hypothetical path towards complexity 
whereby a bifunctional structure links up with another bifunctional struc-
ture. This system indicates how simple readers can aggregate by amalgamat-
ing their ways of reading what lies outside them thanks to a complementary, 
internal aggregation. Nevertheless, this model needs working out more thor-
oughly. Let us suppose that there is a relationship between A and B such that
(1)  they form a stable spatial complex,
(2)  one term supplies the other with a reading “mediation” (e.g. B binds to a 
substrate n, modifying it so that one of the metabolic products can bind 
to A and be metabolized by A in turn).
In this case it is the complex A-B that obtains advantages from reading the 
substrate. The referent-sign is such for the complex and not for A or B taken 
separately. Clearly, a state of affairs like this favours aggregation since, in the 
area of substrate n, it gives the combination A-B an advantage over A and B 
taken singly. In other words, the amount of energy that can be tapped from 
the environment increases and the “knowledge” of the substrate is deepened 
by means of the aggregation.
 Let us now suppose that A and B are “stabilized” respectively by a and 
b. If A and B find only a in their surroundings, then B will eventually dis-
appear. Let us now suppose that b is a piece of a released after A has acted 
on it. In this case B will be stabilized (and survive) only if an A is present; B 
is thus a kind of saprophyte because A supplies it with its b. But suppose B is 
stabilized only if the b is provided “immediately” (for instance, because b is 
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labile). In this case the form A-B in which A and B are spatially continuous 
or contiguous will be favoured. In an environment where there are A and B, 
but only a, the stable complex A-B will be favoured because B too cooperates 
in exploiting a better, by exploiting the b contained in a as well. 
 The new condition which has arisen here is the interiorization of the 
sign, that is, the formation of the individual. Reading remains an opera-
tion toward outside, but its development is conditioned by presence of an 
 internal signalling process. This new development of meaningfulness in 
relation to the environment is bound up with progress in the complexity of 
the exploring machine, namely the aggregation of single interpreting units 
by means of the “interiorizing” of meaningfulness.
 The two-element model is obviously greatly oversimplified compared 
with that we find in bacteria, but on this pattern, we can imagine an indefi-
nite number of internal reading sequences, all based on complementariness. 
This gives rise to two mutually dependent aspects: 
(1)  the internal reading is complicated by the complementariness of ever-
more-correlated internal structures which tend increasingly to stabilize 
“individuals”, since the amalgamation and interdependence of single 
reading structures is advantageous;
(2)  the external reading, too, is complicated: the section of the world the 
structure can interact with is widened and deepened. Thus the com-
plex and interrelated reading of reciprocal of external referents (which 
thereby acquire meaning and the status of signs) are necessarily inte-
grated. 
All this may sound very schematic. Nevertheless, it is exactly what hap-
pens at all levels of complexity. Not only are the basic mechanisms of syn-
thesis and metabolism based on complementariness, as can easily be seen 
by examining the mechanism of protein synthesis, but so are homeostatic, 
self-regulating processes, from the simplest types in which a bacterium regu-
lates its enzymatic activities according to the substrate concentration, to the 
extremely complex one regulating ontogeny in vertebrates. 
 The product of the federation of reading structures by interiorizing their 
meaning is a unitary reading structure. Disconnected readings – which can 
undoubtedly occur – get dispersed because they are not advantageous. An 
organism is a unity in the sense that it is actually involved in reacting uni-
tarily and specifically. This has nothing to do with the “unity as totality and 
perfection” to which the exegetes of biology have accustomed us. Unity is 
coordination. Just as a sign is a “sign for”, so unity is “unity in  relationship 
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to”. Unitary types of reaction – that is, the types of individuals actually pro-
duced in nature (these can be exemplified by the species, considered as 
standard modes of aggregation with regard to a given environment) – exist 
in enormous numbers, and it is hard to see what connection there could be 
between them other than that of reacting univocally with respect to their 
own environment, which is also their genetic space. 
 It is the individual as a whole which deciphers external things as signs, 
and the latter are characterized by being signs for the whole of the  individual: 
they are meaningful for it, a specific trigger (in the sense of “peculiar to the 
species” too) for changing it. Reading is never piecemeal. The adaptation of 
a type of individual to its genetic area is shown in the way that the environ-
mental things are not indifferent for the individual, but are there “for its 
sake” – in other words, they are meaningful, and the referent has the quality 
of a sign. 
 With the expansion of the internal area of meaningfulness and the 
increase of the structure’s size in its environmental space, the size of the 
signs read increases too. What permits the structure’s “cognitive-metabolic 
exploitation” is still a complex of discrete internal reading at the molecular 
level. For a lion a gazelle is a sign in exactly the same way as glucose is a sign 
for bacterium. The way this referent-sign is deciphered involves a chain of 
enormous complexity and implies a vast history of selection an adaptation. 
But the lion as individual feels this section of the world as a “unitary” sign 
of complementariness. In nature the two things (the lion’s hunger and the 
gazelle’s fear) have forced their way through natural history thanks to a long 
chain of aggregation of meanings. 
 There is certainly no contradiction but on the contrary a profound unity 
in the fact that the gazelle – recognized through instinct and eaten by a 
complex, adapted macroscopic machine like the lion – should be digested 
by the protease synthesized within the microscopic, molecular level of the 
same reading machine. The macroscopic sign “gazelle” is supported by the 
entire past history of the reading machine, whose roots lie in the integration 
of A and B in the elementary model discusses. Between the kind of readings 
we can for convenience call microscopic and macroscopic, there is a rigid, 
logico-material sequentiality. 
 This does not mean that a complex machine is simply an accumulation of 
simple reactions added together; it does not work in the mechanical, auto-
matic way suggested by our usual engineering criteria. On the contrary it 
is its capacity for internal adjustments that enable it to make an  eventual 
“decision” with regard to events and facts in the environment. There is 
 nothing strange about the gazelle’s becoming a rather indistinct sign, almost 
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a shadow, for the satiated lion, since this is how feedback mechanisms 
 regulate the “acuteness” and “discernment” of the reading machine. It is 
worth  recalling that even at the simple macromolecular sign level (that of 
A and B) the concepts of affinity, kinetics and thermodynamic bond energy 
are applicable. The “precision” with which a sign is recognized as such – i.e. 
as meaningful and complementary – is strictly bound up with the physical 
nature of the interaction. 
 The interpretation (or knowledge) of surroundings is always subjective, 
since it consists of the identification of signs by means of the  interpreting 
structure’s modules. What is identified is what the species is capable of 
 identifying with the aid of the parameters it has acquired during evolution. 
Thus knowledge – the exploration of signs and the recognition of meaning-
ful presences – is always subjective and always explores real objects. The 
subjective/objective antithesis is simply one more of those numerous false 
problems besetting our culture. Subjectivity is a particular instance of a 
 relation encompassed by the overall objectivity of sign relations. 
14. Levels of reading
Reading consists in deciphering a connecting event, of which the basic 
form is the reciprocal modification of A and B when they meet and form 
a  complex. However, if we speak of a “connected complex” of A-B which is 
itself interpreted (a fact that expresses something and is “meaningful for”) 
we must also postulate a C with the following characteristics: it must be 
external to A, B; it must be able to interact on the same objective plane 
through an (A-B) C, however this comes into being; and it must be of a 
higher order of complexity than A, B. The last of these conditions is very 
important because if C was at the same level of complexity, the result would 
simply be a polyfunctional situation of A and B – not (A-B) C, but A-B-C. 
 In the formation of the complex (AB) C, C does not enter into  connection 
with A or B separately, but with (AB). C deciphers a connection-phe nomenon 
A-B, it is a “second degree” reader. C is structured in a more  complex and 
environmentally-adapted way. It can be outside A-B but it can also be inside 
the structure that contains the connection-phenomenon A-B. In the latter 
case, the adaptation of the elementary units appears as a part, or basis, or 
phylogenetic starting point of a more complex adaptation. Given that any 
adaptation is a natural fact, this in its turn can select and orientate other 
interpreting structures which occur in nature and are n+1 order  readers.
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 The relationship of continuity between a fact (content, contextuality, 
adaptation) and its position in a higher, and broader, circle of  interpretation 
(the plane of expression in the context of a more complex interpretant) 
introduces the concept of levels of reading. A structure has a given range 
of, and capacity for, adaptation and interpretation; it is able to capture the 
meaningfulness of given levels according to its own material status. 
 Levels can appear as single individuals that interpret external reality or as 
amalgamations and hierarchies of readings inside the reader, like a system 
of filters wherewith the complementariness that interprets the environment 
organizes itself internally. 
 If, as the species most favoured by evolution, we are in a position to 
view the road thus far travelled from a standpoint of mythical anthropology 
according to which the sign-using animal is the crown and apex of things, 
it is precisely because this connective capacity has developed through struc-
tural options that have produced both the nervous system and the genetic 
code. We are able to theorize about human communication models because 
nature has actually provided the communication systems. Nevertheless, and 
it is worth repeating this, the presence of levels does not imply a theory of 
the hierarchy of levels, and the structure of which these are the manifestation 
is not “The Structure”, some entity which is self-contained and specific in its 
own absolute world. What we have is simply levels arranged in series on the 
plane of horizontal contacts.
 Things, facts, phenomena (i.e. referents) are signs for a level capable of 
reading them. We cannot simply, at some point, label a thing as a “sign”. 
It is things themselves that promote the construction of adequate reading 
machines. They are always “sign for” a given reading level. We can, if we 
wish, accept the concept of a transition from signal to sign, and the distinc-
tions made by semiotics in this respect are certainly valid: however, as we 
frequently remarked, what interests us is the prehistoric layer, the archae-
ology of communication. If we start by analysing what is “meaningful for 
man” we will be misled from the outset into accepting that meaningfulness 
is a product of something prior to each communication act, something that 
“legalizes” the latter – in other words, the code. Even if this is true in the 
specifically human field, in a more generally historical, phylogenetic sense 
it is the single, repeated, selective reading (productive of natural effects) that 
constructs codes. 
 We are thus perfectly entitled to posit that interpreter and interpretant, 
in symmetry with sign and referent, are initially equivalent. The process of 
semiosis, precisely because it takes place materially at various levels, is never 
unlimited. 
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In man the capacity for multilevel reading has developed. He has acquired 
a complex analogical system which explores things and connects present 
experience to systems of encoded experiences. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that:
(a)  This sign system is tailored to fit the world. What we find then is not 
an unlimited number of situations but structures built through recipro-
cal adaptations brought about by a succession of facts and interactions, 
in which the interpretant in Peirce’s sense is strictly dependent on the 
interpreter and the interpretation. The physiology of cultural semiotics 
is no less rigid in this respect than that of natural semiotics. 
(b)  If horizontally-connective interpretation exists, it is because vertical 
reading exists: culture – horizontal connection – is only the most recent 
development of nature, being a phylogenetic progress on vertical con-
nections. Neither complex connection nor codes could exist without 
the natural capacity for making complex connections and for building 
codes and using them – in other words, without the development of the 
human nervous system, the highest achievement in vertical reading. 
The semiotic function is indefinite but not the semiotic field itself or the 
historical processes that have shaped it. It is finite because it is built on a 
finite environment and out of a finite number of operations and individuals. 
It is easy to see that the process is drastically limited and that our ability to 
influence things and languages personally is minimal. Thus the texture of 
the semiotic field, which may easily look as if it gives free rein to the imagi-
nation, is actually a standardized situation, a uniform process established by 
the things and the language already in use. Novelty does not lie in the use of 
language in itself (i.e. merely in the interplay of interpretants), which would 
be meaningless, but in the relation to language functions to our particular 
position in the world, for it is this which is really different and specific. 
 A physiologist, on the other hand, is inclined to consider discourse 
not as the identification of elements in a classifying system but as a pro-
cess reproducing what has been created historically as discourse.  Semantic 
 markers and syntactic connections are nothing other than the history that 
has  enabled us to identify what we want to communicate via discourse: 
something that remains bound up with environment and referent. The 
genera tive sequence is a historical one, even if we are tempted to see “genera-
tiveness” as inherent in the entity called language itself, accustomed as we 
are to  seeing it  exhibited in standardized, artificially-codified situations. 
From the standpoint of a historical-physiological interpretation, the range 
of  meanings  covered by the word “bachelor” is quite immaterial, since all 
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words are built up, altered, differentiated and rendered independent. What 
is important, on the other hand, is how the single semantic unit gets formed 
during  exploration of the world, how it is stored in the code, what inter-
ferences it sets up, what readjustments it gives rise to when introduced into 
man’s logico-syntactic circuit, and above all in the situations we are able to 
pull it out of the repertory of language and demonstrate its fitness for actual 
situations. We can only extract myths, not rules, from the flat surface of the 
page on which words are traced; we will draw a blank unless we follow the 
thread of history out of the page we are reading. Contextual value, which is 
inseparable from meaning, is the product of a process of experience which 
renders the interpreter interdependent with his predecessors and the world. 
 The problems of ambiguity and synonymy in reading are relatively 
 marginal and can be disposed of by observing that it would be unnatural 
if there were no ambiguity or synonymy. Communication, though highly 
complex, is obviously an approximate process. As far as possible the reality 
of language should be unravelled by reference to the formation of language 
and not by transfiguring it into absolute rules where even ambiguities are 
seen as proof of an unambiguous substratum. Language has always solved 
ambiguities passably well in practice, meeting the requirements of a given 
historical moment in relation to a given environment. The obstacles man has 
had to face in the course of his natural development have not been linguistic 
ones. 
 The return to our description of the levels of internal reading (i.e. those 
organize in relation to an overall interpreter): we may say that each level 
organizes itself as a set of correspondence which are meaningful for a higher 
system of interpretation. But at the same time the reading machine remains 
a unitary whole for the simple reason that it is organized with reference to 
the lower levels.
 However, a theory that formalizes the organization of levels statistically, 
transforming the organization of one level into material for the level above, 
risks being at once obvious and impracticable. We must accept that in the 
physiology of interpretation there is a system of meaning which is filtered 
by an interpretation at a given level and introduced into the next level, and 
so on. In other words, a system must exist whose complexity, whatever its 
degree, organizes itself by turning denotation into connotation and  setting 
up the latter as a denotation for a further level. But to formalize this  system 
in reading levels set up by ourselves would inevitably be an anthropo-
morphic operation. Let us simply say that natural selection has extended our 
possibilities of connections with the referent thanks to a number of filters 
and levels of which we at present know very little. 
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 Semiotic evolution viewed from the standpoint of the organization of 
reading levels shows that the problem of the relationship between expression 
and content is extremely ancient and not, as is often supposed, recent and 
human. There is always a content (a state of affair that triggers an observa-
tion process, for which it constitutes an operation-expression – that is, an 
inducement of change).
15. The role of generation and code in producing complexity
Our model of the internal complication and amalgamation of interpreting 
structures illustrated in the last chapter is not imaginary; it is simply incom-
plete. We have made a hypothesis about a state of increasing complexity but 
have not shown how this can arise in nature. Since we are seeking real phylo-
genetic complexity and not cybernetic models (which can describe systems 
a posteriori but cannot prefigure them), we must find out how internal self-
regulation and adaptation to the exterior have come into being.
 It is necessary for the purpose to posit a plurality of individuals in time, 
and hence the possibility of their being repeatedly copied – in other words, 
generation. For changes to be brought about by the environmental selection 
of accidental mutations, the individual must subject itself to its environment 
in a multiplicity of copies. It is this qualifying test that renders adaptation 
possible, and it cannot but be statistical – that is, it must involve large num-
bers of individuals over long periods of time. 
 Each type of development (for instance, each species) sets its individuals 
in contact with the environment at the level of complexity so far attained, 
and the individual confronts the environment from the vantage point of 
the previously-won internal complexity present at that particular stage of 
its evolutionary development. We need to postulate both a multiplicity of 
 copies and a continuous linear sequence. We cannot conceive a kind of dia-
lectical phylogenetic hypothesis. 
 So far we have talked about a one-dimensional individual “flattened” so 
to speak against its section of environment, a being nothing more than a 
relationship between internal signs in action and environmental signs. But 
this individual is an abstraction. In the course of its material development he 
has a kind of internal dimension of which its external development  vis-à-vis 
the environment – the structure that reacts to the environment – is a mani-
festation. 
 This is the structure that ensures the stable reproduction of the copy, i.e. 
the multiplicity and the continuous presence of the species throughout the 
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evolutionary time-span. All changes must pass through this structure. In 
short, there is a kind of “assembly-manual” – the genetic code. Obviously, 
by “internal dimension” we mean molecular structures and not some kind 
of teleological proclivity, and when we talk about the continuity in evolution 
of these structures, we mean the modifications that take place within the 
uniformity of replication and alter it. 
 The relationship between these fixed, informational-type structures 
(which vary only on account of the accidental mutations and of selections 
which the phenotype containing them undergoes) and their specific  single 
manifestations in the bearer individual (the environmental-related-sign 
mechanisms and the internal signalling mechanisms) must not consti-
tute an exception to the rule. It must be a relationship of ordered comple-
mentariness: in other words, it must also be a product of the function of 
internal aggregation and signalling. 
 It is not necessary to examine the mechanism of genetic coding in detail 
here, with the exception of those points that affect our argument.
(A) The basic relationship between the phenotype (the real individual 
 actually operant at time t1) and its genotype (the sum of information that 
forms a single copy of a basic type proper to the species) is correspondence-
complementariness between nucleic and protein structures. The key to this 
lies in the steric correspondence between the nucleic and protein chains, 
and the existence of a process that translates the former into the latter. Each 
nucleic chain (according to the sequence of the four possible bases) corre-
sponds to an amino acid sequence, i.e. to a protein with a given spatial shape 
and given zones of complementariness that is capable of reading internal 
and external things-signs. Each information unit is specific in the sense that, 
by means of a correspondence – developing process (i.e. translation), it can 
give rise to another specific, active, operative structure. There is thus a code 
(the sequence of bases along the strand of DNA making up a single piece 
of information) that contains, in a simple, linear, compact, repeatable and 
potentially flawless form, all that is necessary to guide the development of 
a correlated protein. The protein, on the other hand, is an object with an 
extremely varied development in space, it has its own functional specificity, 
it is continually renewed and its production is also regulated quantitatively 
in keeping with internal and external demands. 
 There are thus two planes, one continuous and historical which per-
petuates itself, the other single and contingent, an efflorescence of the 
 former, a product of its translation. 
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(B) The individual is unitary because it develops an overall, inter dependent 
signalling mechanism, but it is also unitary in a much more “historical” 
sense that might appear from the kind of interdependence achieved by a 
single individual. All its useful correspondences have been accumulated in 
the course of time in the code, and are preserved, reproduced and translated. 
Behind the single correspondences we see in action, there is a further cor-
respondence with informational structures. 
 The path followed by phylogenetic complication when reading the envi-
ronmental referent thus has more than one level. Here too, there is little 
point in asking “why this path and not another?” What has emerged is what 
has proved fittest for the situation. The logic appears in the facts themselves.
 
(C) The sign builds the reading machine through a precise mechanism of a 
posteriori options. When we argue that it is the efferent that elicits descrip-
tion by constructing suitable machines, we certainly do not mean to suggest 
that this is an intentional process, or that it corresponds to some universal 
design of things. Nothing could be further from our position than this kind 
of mysticism. The unity of things is far deeper, and far more generational, 
than our mystical fantasies. The referent does not build anything at all, 
because it has neither hands nor brain. It is simply a touchstone for acci-
dental errors: the variations retained are those which have “passed through” 
the code, and can be replicated and translated into all subsequent copies. In 
other words, to go back to our example of the mutant bacterium that learns 
to metabolize the substrate n+1, this phenomenon occurs because an infor-
mation error produces a protein capable of utilizing n+1. Thus an indifferent 
presence is transformed into a sign by passing through the code, and it is 
only by means of this procedure that n+1 can select its specific reader and 
therefore can be read. The adaptation of the interpretant to its section of the 
world of signs occurs in this gradual manner because the code does not end 
with the individual but is a super-individual continuum that equips each 
individual with the sum of selections carried out on previous individuals. 
(D) Contributions to the building up of complexity are provided both by 
the cumulative selective action of the environment and by the fact that each 
positive result is preserved in the continuity of the code. The possible varia-
tions do not interact singly and isolatedly with the environment, but through 
the individual as a whole. A mutation may imply the appearance of a new 
phenotypic property; it is the whole individual, altered in one of its features, 
that enters into contact with the environment. The process is in no way 
mechanistic, fragmentary or purely cumulative: it implies, on the part of the 
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individual, a high degree of self-regulation and self-reaction with respect to 
the environment. Thus a single variation can lead to a shake-up of selection 
possibilities as well as of internal signs and meaningful interactions of the 
homeostatic type. The action of the environment is thus far more complex 
than that of a filter sifting useful combinations.
 It is clear that these statements could be supported by a battery of 
explana tory notes on particular sectors of genetics and biochemistry. How-
ever, our aim is to reinterpret the data of present-day biology in a semiotic 
key or rather, perhaps, to reduce semiotics to the concreteness of biological 
analysis: we are thus not interested in giving a detailed discussion of the 
purely biological side of the matter. Nevertheless, since contacts between 
semioticians and biologists are few and far between, for the sake of  clarity 
it will be worth specifying that the kind of framework postulated here is 
 Darwinian, enriched with structural information about codes (the bio-
chemistry and biophysics of nucleic acids) and with the investigation of the 
replicable “errors” of the code – i.e. mutations – of which today we have a 
very thorough knowledge, due, among other things, to their importance in 
the genesis of cancer. However, both the standard Darwinian framework 
and the neo-Darwinian one too are insufficient. We need also to take into 
account the importance of the individual’s role in modifying the environ-
ment, and we shall later be stressing the importance, in selection, of the 
 collective role of the species as a super-individual organization of adaptation 
producing communal behaviours. This is the line of approach which will be 
followed in the chapters on human knowledge of the environment. It will 
nevertheless be worth mentioning (above all for specialists) two issues that 
are usually left somewhat out of the picture.
 (a) The “broad” presupposition of our mechanism is that there are acci-
dental errors: information decay, background noise, increase in entropy. It 
is on the basis of these errors that a small amount of order comes into being 
and separates itself off, accumulating and progressing. We have already 
discussed this at length. These errors are illustrated by “point mutations” 
induced in DNA by alkylating substances, radiations, etc. However, what 
counts is the information variation, in whatever manner this is produced, 
provided it is retained and is replicable. The term “mutation” is thus used in 
a very broad sense. In a world with many structures and codes, it may not be 
rash to ascribe a degree of responsibility for selection also to variations pro-
duced by a “mixing” and “integration” of separate codes, as in the integration 
of viruses or in cell hybridization. Horizontal transmission of information is 
probably very important. If, moreover, the mixing of information also takes 
place between already-complex codes, complicated inferences may occur, 
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with the possibility, therefore, of evolutionary leaps forward. In any case, the 
evolutionary model proceeds by “fits and starts”. 
 (b) The basic condition for anchoring the new reading to the inter-
pretant as a whole is that the complementary structure that carries it out 
passes through the code. In other words, the following condition must be 
fulfilled: new meaningfulness of referent = new arrangement of reader’s 
code. This is how material interdependence between a structure and its 
genetic area is brought about. However, it is not essential that this should 
take place through processes acting in the first place on the code and then 
 emerging in the pheno type. Without impairing the validity of the mecha-
nism, we might imagine an inverse influence from the phenotype to the 
code, provided this leads to situations of discontinuity-selection of the code. 
All we can say is that this does not happen in practice and that the direction 
selected is one-way, from information to transcription and translation, and 
that all  influences or importance for evolution must take place at the source, 
in other words at the level of code (leaving aside the issue of inverse tran-
scriptase, which might lead us to admit some amount of inverse information 
flow, perhaps important in evolution). 
 This chapter cannot be concluded without a reminder of a warning given 
earlier: a code is a structure, not a concept. The information it contains con-
sists of choices made by the history of events and sequences of events. Order 
is “order in relation to things that can be explored”. Obviously, in complex 
individuals, most of the code is devoted to information of internal meaning-
fulness, “interiorized” complementariness, self-regulation and the control 
of embryogenetic and morphogenetic mechanisms. The fact that a code is 
a particular structure also implies that it has a precise location and distri-
bution. From a certain level of unicellular organization onward, it is situated 
in the nucleus. In unicellular beings, the basic rule is that each cell has its 
own copy of the code, and that this is “realized” variously in the variously-
differentiated cells (in other words, in each type of cell a different section of 
the code is operant and can be translated, even though the code is identical 
in each cell of the organism). 
16. The translating function
We can now define the typical situation of all biological organization: 
 complementariness always takes the form of complementarity reactions. It 
is simultaneously being and happening, confrontation and demonstration, 
a matching in possibility and practice. Thus complementariness is work 
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and energy consumption, and transformation of the structures involved. 
The deciphering of internal and external correspondence and hence of the 
 meaningfulness of the environmental referent is an exploration which must 
take place and which makes sense only if it develops in the genetic area and 
in time. 
 Since with increasing complexity of structures complementariness 
takes the form of multiple coordinated interpretations, the latter give rise 
to sequences of processes that witness to and realize complementariness – 
authentic chains of coordinated processes related both to inside and outside. 
If an external sign is identified by a complex structure, it cannot but be 
the result of a chain of coordinated sequential processes which develop in 
cycles characteristic of the particular organization of each species. To what 
we have, in somewhat synchronic terms, called the “entry section” of the 
individual with respect to its genetic area, there corresponds a diachronic 
development of “internal routes of interpretation” (exemplified once more, 
at this level, by interpretation – utilization – that is, metabolism) which are 
fixed, and form a cascade of reactions of complementariness. 
 In internal signalling too, where signs are internalized, complementari-
ness develops in coordinated sequences. Structure A produces a substrate 
that is meaningful for B which is thereby brought to state B1, becoming 
meaningful for the reader C, and so on. This can be ascribed to the fact that, 
as we have seen, structures are not static and given, but develop and interact, 
and are built as a result of the expression of information. 
 This brings us directly to the definition of an important concept – that of 
translation. In fact, complementariness that occurs as a process in time and 
in space is a process of translation. Two corresponding, complex, comple-
mentary structures (for example, DNA and protein) are yoked together by a 
process of translation and not by similarity or by extrinsic laws. They corre-
spond because they are united by an actual or possible mode of correspon-
dence. Their complementariness manifests itself in a series of operations in 
material structures: these operations (constituting life) are what demonstrate 
complementariness or specific correspondences. 
 Let us examine the basic mechanism of protein synthesis. There is a 
rigid correspondence between the sequence of bases in the strand of DNA 
and the sequence of amino acids in the corresponding protein. Three bases 
arranged in sequence “stand for” (correspond to) an amino acid, though it 
would perhaps be more correct to say “stand towards” an amino acid. The 
parallel between the two structures is not static but is set in motion by a syn-
thesizing process whereby the DNA order is translated into the amino acid 
order. This process is complex, however, and has various stages. First DNA 
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is transcribed into RNA, then the latter is translated into proteins, each stage 
taking place in a particular site and organelle inside the cell. 
 A more careful analysis of this situation reveals the following points.
 
(A) First and foremost, the complementary structure are quite dif ferent from 
each other. They are reciprocally meaningful not because they are the same, 
or almost the same, or similar, but because they are linked by a translation 
process. This is in general feature of meaningfulness. To  interpret a sign, to 
interact with a meaningful referent, does not mean – even at elementary 
 levels – to incorporate and absorb it, or to collect its essence as in a recep-
tacle. It means to interact selectively. To identify what is external does not 
mean to confound it with what is internal; it means to locate it in the out-
side. The same can be said of the signs of internal correspondence. There is 
no mixing, only interdependence. They must remain distinct if they are to 
influence the organism as a unitary whole. Complication is built in all cases 
of separate structures linked together in the translation process.
 A strand of DNA has, in itself, nothing in common with its protein. If 
they are corresponding structures it is because they are yoked together by 
the logic of a process – that of protein synthesis. The protein as an internal 
sign “means something” to the DNA in so far as there is a physical mecha-
nism connecting them. The translation process promotes those equivalences 
and correspondences that go to make up what we have earlier called “mate-
rial logic”. A process may have various stages and be subject to numerous 
interferences – it may, in other words, appear (and be) extremely elastic and 
open to modulation: but it remains based on an ordered series of logical, 
inelastic correspondences. Elasticity is a sophisticated product of complexity 
in the chain of translation and complementariness. If we insist on the con-
cept of the material logic of correspondence, it is because it is here that the 
interdependence of what is internal to the individual and what is external to 
it is demonstrated. 
(B) The same principle of translation of meanings is at work in the identi-
fication of an external sign. The sign-presence, the thing, is quite dif ferent 
from the deciphering structure. It is absolutely heterogeneous, even if the 
two “things” are reciprocally adapted. The source of connaturalness must 
be sought, as we have seen, at the level of ancestry and generation, in the 
phase in which the reading machine was being constructed. But when reader 
and horizon are face to face, they are quite heterogeneous, and there is no 
 mystical bond uniting them. Identification of a sign, then, equals  locating 
the heterogeneous. And this is precisely what complementariness is, when 
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 conceived against the general background of the homogeneity of the 
 horizon. Identification always takes place via processes of translation and 
chains of meaning. Locating an object always consists in recognizing other-
ness by indirect methods (indirect in the sense that they are implemented 
via mechanisms with various stages and with a temporal extension). There 
is no such thing as the assimilation of a particular essence by the self. The 
self does not identify with the sense of the things or immerse itself in its 
soul; nor does it confer its own sense on things. This relationship is simply a 
process whereby to things in nature interact, one of them being specialized 
for exploration and recognition. The process of meaning is this. 
 Knowledge at all levels is an indirect, mediated dynamic of successive 
locating operations performed by various entry sections – i.e. from various 
angles by the reading machine in cases of complex reading. This is particu-
larly evident in the case of human knowledge, which has developed highly 
sophisticated locating techniques by gradually objectifying the referent-
sign, interpreting it on a hypothetical basis, and reducing it to a segmented, 
exchangeable form. 
 There is no doubt that those mysticisms according to which inner knowl-
edge is a connaturality of essences are the most serious anthropomorphic 
pitfall besetting analysis of the process that links us to the world. Inner 
knowledge can only be that of the analysis of our origins; this is our only 
“interior”. At the human level, also the relations with the human referent are 
equivocally considered “interior” in this sense, whereas, in all their com-
plexity and their cultural nature, they too remain indirect locating process 
mediated by translation processes. 
(C) The translation process is never one of “useless equivalence”. The con-
structions of structure M on structure N is correlated to a specific func-
tion of N. M, by translating itself into N extends the range of meaning. If 
we accepted an “essentialist” theory of order, the degree of order would be 
equal in each case and basically M would be equal to N, whereas actually 
the functions are quite different. For example, the mRNA is fairly similar 
to the DNA transcribed, but its function is to carry the information from 
nucleus to cytoplasm, to extend the range of action of the information so as 
to locate elsewhere the constructed sign, thus setting off a further phase of 
the  physical mechanism of translation. 
 In nature there are no cases of different structures that are perfectly 
equivalent and interchangeable. Translation is always linked to functional 
novelty. It is not to be confused with the simple replication of identical 
 copies. Obviously the whole of biology is based on the repeated reproduc-
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tion of the same structures (nucleic acids, proteins etc.) but this is not what 
we mean by “translation”. 
 The synthesis of a “perfectly identical” object would imply an  indefinite, 
non-economical process: why consume energy to produce an  “indifferent” 
synthesis? This too illustrates the concept of material connection or of a 
 logico-material chain. The translation of signs extends the frontiers of 
 contact and knowledge. 
(D) A final remark on the concept of analogy. Complementariness equals 
“standing for”. What is complementary is an “analogue for” and can “stand 
for” something. Translation is a process of analogy. The analogous terms 
(what translates itself and what is translated) are different and non-inter-
changeable, yet are correlated situations in a process of translation. A sign is 
by definition an “analogue of ”, but this is not a peculiarity of human signs, 
because any sign-referent is received by an analogical chain and is the last 
link of this chain. The nature of analogy in human communication is not 
essentially different, the sign being an analogical operation inserted in the 
sophisticated translation chain that makes up human knowledge. From this 
point of view, analogy reveals the material logic of translation processes. The 
whole of knowledge is an analogical chain, and it has a logical structure. The 
referent is reached, identified and transmitted (known) by a rigid analogical 
chain. 
 By way of a conclusion to these remarks on translation, we must repeat 
that the relevant processes are “facts of the world” – chemical and physical 
ones. These facts can all be handled by a quantitative treatment of infor-
mation content (considered from a thermodynamic standpoint) and can be 
described with the aid of cybernetic models of information transmission. 
 The rigidity of transmission does not rule out information decay, and 
therefore implies self-correcting mechanisms (like the repair enzyme); not 
does it exclude non-univocalness – i.e. redundancy and errors of translation. 
17. Sign localization and process
At a high level of complexity, the paths followed by reactions set in motion 
by a structure for the reading of a referent may be very numerous and inter-
fere with each other in various ways, giving rise to a multifocal identi fication 
of the referent – locating it, that is, from various angles. The entry sections 
can be of different types. The phenomenon, of course, remains subjec-
tive – in the sense that it depends on the entry sections and the internal 
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routes peculiar to the individual – but it is “located” more accurately. For 
the moment we shall have to settle for the rather imprecise term “locate”, 
though it does suggest an exploration of an external referent with the aid of 
give parameters. What needs stressing is that the recognition of an external 
sign is, at high levels of organizations (ignoring for the moment objectifying 
and hypothetical functions of human kind), a complex reaction, made up of 
successive phases, that can: 
(A)  differ greatly from structure to structure, obviously, and must only be 
considered in connection with the structure for which it is a sign; 
(B)  develop differently in different situations in the same individual or in 
equivalent individuals. The process of recognition can be developed 
to its utmost or kept to a minimum as regards the location and dis-
tinguishing of the sign; this will be particularly important in the most 
advanced stages of sign knowledge; 
(C)  appear as a confluent process of several entry sections, each linked to a 
sequence forming an “internal route”, the various routes being coordi-
nated. External meaningfulness (that related to signs in the normal 
sense of the word) is coordinated just as internal meaningfulness is 
coordinated in homeostatic process. Things in the environment are 
located by tropisms depending on concentrations (and on the concen-
tration’s reading structures) in very simple systems such as bacteria, or 
on highly complex perceptive coordination (sight, hearing, touch etc.) 
in some organized being. 
It is clear, anyway, that even at this level the sign location process taken as 
a whole is not an “all or nothing” operation that lays bare the essence of a 
thing, defining its sense and illuminating it as a sign. A sign is an identi-
fication, a recognition of meaningfulness, a more or less approximate trans-
lation operation that depends on the nature and working of the interpretant. 
Even at a level devoid of history in the cultural sense what we get is a “loose” 
identification of the sign which can be “tightened” to a certain extent both 
by the structure’s entry sections and its internal routes. At each reading the 
reader discovers things to which it is adapted; in other words it rediscovers 
its genetic area, recognizes that it is connatural with this, and reconstructs 
its own history. It goes without saying that this operation (which is a natural 
one) does not take the form of an instantaneous insertion of external data 
into an immutable mosaic. It is, in a certain sense, an experimental adjust-
ment. Moreover, since the reader itself is altered, subsequent internal testing 
on the modification cooperates in verifying the sign. 
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 The reader also carries out the identification by means of a process of 
feedback on the sign. It is as if a first adjustment were made and this were 
followed up by further, more precise, circumscribed adjustments (this takes 
place at all levels of complexity). 
 There is a moral to all this: when we talk about signs, we must resist the 
tendency – so dominant today as to have become a kind of cultural reflex – 
to consider them as “one and univocal”, endowed with the metaphysical 
 property of meaning. They can be so only with the mediation of conven-
tions, in other words, at the level of sophisticated, self-conscious, human 
knowledge, as an extension of the adjustment procedure just  mentioned. The 
science of signs cannot possibly take statistically given signs as its  starting 
point. A sign is a process. 
 Words too are processes. The way words can be used loosely and con-
notatively shows that it is not true that “in the beginning is the word”; what 
is true is that “in the end lies the most probable meaning of the word”. The 
adjustment procedures referred to above obviously are the judgements based 
on context. As we shall see, there is no such things as an isolated sign, but 
there are references to what is contiguous. A science of signs that takes signs 
as absolute, ultimate data, independently of the processes and structures for 
which they are signs, in other words independently of their physiology, is 
doomed to be a formal science in the negative sense of the term. 
18. Contextuality and representation
Without allowing anthropomorphic conceptions to interfere, we can main-
tain that an individual who has a number of entry sections for different 
objects in reality, or signs, builds a complex, multi-parametric picture of 
reality. Each entry is attuned to the others, for there are processes of corre-
lation and internal meaning such as the individual’s reaction does not simply 
follow the route that identifies object n by means of the complementary 
structure N, but passes through a multiplicity of mutually attuned structures. 
 Thus, if we continue to call the identification of meaningful objects 
for metabolic ends “knowledge”, given that it is directed simultaneously at 
 various objects via various, mutually-attuned parameters, knowledge will 
be the specific structure’s overall representation of the environment; it will 
be an exploration of the horizon. It is the totality of the representation and 
of the operations identifying meaningfulness that exhibits the individual’s 
adaptation, evolutionary differentiation and phylogenetic development. 
Moreover, as we have seen, each single situation of complementariness is 
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of necessity attuned to the others, so that the individual’s exploration of the 
environment is not a mechanical process of breaking-down resolution of 
signs. Each expression of meaning is linked to the others – not by a con-
sciousness (which we rule out completely at this level), but by procedures 
of mutual adjustment. Thus each sign feature of reality is “pin-pointed”, in 
the sense that, by means of internal translations, other complementariness 
functions that are not those specific to the sign in question converge on it. It 
follows that each sign, in addition to being a recognition of complementari-
ness, is also the location of a process in a context of other processes – i.e. the 
differentiation of a thing-sign from others in the horizon. The process of 
identification is accompanied in advanced stages of evolution by a process 
of location and differentiation. 
 It is hard to avoid misapprehensions about consciousness at this point 
yet it is essential that we do. We are not talking about a conscious represen-
tation of the world or a breakdown of its various components into units of 
a conventional, potentially communicable kind. What we are referring to 
is simply the sum of sign reactions an individual is capable of and which 
are to some extent correlated and hence do not function separately. At this 
intermediate stage signs are never without surroundings. For that, more 
complex differentiation and exchange procedures based on more sophisti-
cated analogical capacities are required. A sign is always either near or far; 
it is  situated in a sign-perspective and is integrated with other signs. This is 
usually thought to be a later stage than that of the identification of the single 
sign as a unit, whereas in fact it is an earlier one.
 In order to rediscover the situation of single point-to-point correspon-
dence at the level of representation (the original situation of bi-univocal 
correspondence) we need a more complex cognitive function that is peculiar 
to human sign exchanges.
 Thus in the phase the identification process no longer takes place at a 
stage consisting simply in finding meaningful complementariness in the 
midst of a multitude of indifferent presences (which form an environment 
merely because they are scanned). There is a sort of background (a general 
dimension or representation of the situation), itself a result of sign processes 
produced, however, by a lower order complementariness: it is from this that 
higher-order meaningful referents capable of eliciting overall reactions and 
entering the circuit of the species’ complex routes – i.e. of being recognized 
as signs – begin to detach themselves, emerge and take shape. The situation 
is rather like that of the new born child’s inchoate perception in which the 
mother’s face gradually begins to delineate itself, with all its sign and referen-
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tial implications. This too confirms the sign’s complex nature (it is never a 
“one hit” event) at an intermediate level of complexity. 
 This of course raises the problem of the relation between sign and reflex. 
Not all reflexes are signs, but all signs at lower levels enter into environ-
mentally-triggered circuits – which is to say that they act like reflexes. 
 The representation of the horizon from the subjective point of view – 
from the standpoint of the individual parameters and the entry sections, 
that is – involves all the things that can be explored. If at some point this 
representation becomes so complex an self-attuned as to be conscious, this is 
because the biological connections preceding consciousness permit it. Con-
sciousness cannot simply grow out of nothing but implies a gradual com-
plication of the adjustments converging on the referent. The result is that, 
at a given degree of complexity, the representation as a whole influences 
the reader’s attunement to the single referent, which is further identified by 
being distinguished from the others. Thus context, contiguity, location and 
differentiation come to be important in the identification of meaningfulness 
at much earlier levels than those of the literary analysis of connotation. 
 It will be as well, here, to discourage the out-and-out structuralists who 
support the notion of a total system. One can imagine them remarking “even 
a phylogenetic approach to cognitive problems cannot do without totality, 
then, and has to admit that signs are formed by opposition and differen-
tiation processes”. This is not the way things are at all. The “system” does not 
exist. All that exists is the complex formed by the readable horizon. The only 
system is that which has in reality grown out of this horizon and is capable 
of reading it in a way that remains subjective, partial and reconstructed. The 
only “whole” that exists is the one we cut out of the surrounding world when 
we fix our attention on it (unless we want to define the reader as a “whole” 
because he reacts unitarily – but this would be a very imprecise use of term). 
 These observations on the totality of the horizon and on the importance 
of contextuality enable us to add one or two further remarks on that widely-
used concept “intentionality”. The term normally defines a specifically-
human cognitive way of behaving, and is phenomenologically equivalent 
to the attribution of meaning. Yet this process too has its roots in earlier 
phases than consciousness and can be identified as “location of sign areas” 
or “definition of areas of interest” or “convergences on referents-signs”. We 
have seen that originally the sign directs metabolism: it brings the reading 
machine to bear on the object to be read. Thus intentionality is not so much 
a matter of giving sense as of receiving it. Even in more advanced phases, 
where intentionality becomes conscious and involves planning, the terms of 
the cognitive problem are never completely inverted. It is not the interpreter 
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that gives a meaning to things by means of his intentional predilection. It is 
things that are genetically and topographically predominant. Man remains 
like the other structures – he moves among things already given. What in 
particular about him is that he moves farther abroad, and is more highly 
differentiated from the things outside. 
19. The sign and the collectivity of structures
One of the chief features of human signs is that they are social. In other 
words they are exchangeable, artificial-cultural objects which are incon-
ceivable without a plurality of human interpreters. They are generated col-
lectively and this is the only reason why they can be exchanged and used 
collectively. 
 However, even this feature does not appear out of the blue and it is not 
this which characterizes qualitatively man’s semiotic condition, or knowl-
edge. Signs, in the basic sense of things in the world endowed with meaning, 
play in fact a decisive role in the evolution of interpreting structures in the 
form of collectivities and species. As we have said, a sign is originally an 
external complementariness, an object in nature, a referent that finds a cor-
respondence in a structure. Thus the sign directs the structure, makes this 
converge upon it, and guides and promotes the structure’s metabolism. It is 
thus a reference-point, a goal necessary for survival. We have also seen how 
the sign retains this characteristic even when it grows more complex. From 
the point of view of utilitarian or metabolic interpretation, the gazelle has 
the same meaning for the lion as the glucose molecule for the bacterium. 
 A structure, however, is never isolated, but is replicated in copies and 
persists throughout generations and time. Thus what the sign directs, and 
maintains as a population precisely by virtue of its power of attraction, is a 
collectivity [collettività]. The sign prevents it from being accidentally dis-
persed. Moreover, even when we talk of a sign in the singular, we actually 
mean a plurality of presences, and these are not randomly distributed but 
concentrated preferentially: it is this variety of densities that goes to make 
up an environment. It follows that the relationship between a collectivity of 
presences and the density of its reference-point is what defines the ecological 
niche in which the collectivity develops. 
 This has an important consequence: to see evolution as operating on 
 randomly-scattered individuals merely by environmental selection is an 
oversimplification. The collectivity itself forms a unit endowed with  solidity 
and resistance vis-à-vis the environment and is a promoter of evolution. 
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Furthermore, its reciprocally-binding social habits make for selection 
advantages. Yet this could not happen if it were not for the fact that a num-
ber of individuals converge in the same environment, of which the other 
 individuals, as signs, come to form part. 
 It is thus the environmental sign complex that maintains a sufficient den-
sity for selective mechanisms involving social behaviour to come into play. 
This should not be interpreted simply as if the sign created the opportunity 
for density and hence the statistical conditions for selection. The sign as 
such is a collective meaning in the sense that all the members of the collec-
tivity identify each other (here, again, no connotations of consciousness are 
intended) precisely because the sign is equally meaningful for all of them. 
Which is to say that they are born, objectively, of the same genetic area. 
 The solidarity between individual and species must also be viewed as 
the motive force that constructs the individual in relation to things, a sort 
of ice-breaker, a progressive accumulation of conditions of collectivity or 
interdependence. The genetic area is not simply a physical environment 
but, constitutionally and historically, a species-environment. Hence the sign 
is, and remains, a meaningful datum for all. Its value lies in its being the 
 reference-point for a collectivity that recognizes itself in it. In this sense eve, 
a collectivity is an organism. 
 The collective condition at its basic level forms the first scheme of an 
operative logic for the inter-subjective interpretation of the sign through 
material logic – which thereby becomes a kind of material logic of classes: a 
sign that can be interpreted by all Ns defines the class of Ns. Moreover, every 
N that can enter into relation with any x defines the class of xs by the  criteria 
of the substitution of equivalents. Let us remember that x is a  referent-sign 
and that it is formed of a plurality of copies. Its “unity of  meaning” is given 
by the equivalent substitution of an indefinite number of single copies 
 vis-à-vis a single reader. This is one of the first operative generalizations in 
the interpretation of the sign.
 Examples of collective situations at lower levels are necessarily schematic 
since they refer to purely competitive situations. The tropism of bacteria 
towards their substrate takes the form of population density and compe-
tition for the substrate, without the development of collective systems for 
acting on the latter. (Nevertheless, we know how important this condi-
tion is for the emergence of a clone capable of learning to use a different 
substrate present in the environment and devoid of meaning for the non-
mutant  bacteria.) The only reactions are forms of saprophytism and inte-
grated cohabitation which do not yet amount to organic collectivities. At 
higher levels, on the other hand, we find examples of collectively-orientated, 
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even interspecific, meaningfulness. It will suffice here the mention (though 
already at an extremely advanced stage) social insects whose collective exis-
tence is organized around specific sign nuclei, which have given rise to social 
selection with modes and functions that differ from individual to individual. 
Just as we cannot conceive of an individual structure without the signs on 
which it is built, neither can we conceive of a social structure – i.e. collective 
behaviour – without a referential complex in which all the members of the 
collectivity come to share. 
 This remains strictly true for cultural sociality too, where behaviour is 
organized around nuclei of meaningfulness that may be extremely com-
plex but clearly orientate and structure the society. And obviously the entire 
social body, by organizing itself around these nuclei, contributes in its turn 
to maintaining their status of signs. This means that the purely referential 
sign becomes a criterion of differentiation and meaningfulness for inter-
preting other members of the collectivity. They will be interpreted according 
to the functions they have vis-à-vis the sign: they will be the same or dif-
ferent according to their relation to it. If we take as the ultimate referent of 
bees the object of their metabolism identified through specific apparatuses, 
then it is their metabolism identified through specific apparatuses, then it 
is their function vis-à-vis this referent (in other words, the sign process) 
that distinguishes one sub-population from another. At the same time this 
 referent is also the origin and cause of this organization. 
 The concept of class as related to the collectivity of structures and to 
processes of generalization requires further discussion at this point. Reading 
interpreted as the identification of a single referent ends up by banishing the 
referent and becomes nonsense. It acquires semiotic value only if it moves 
from the object read towards something more general – i.e. the class. 
 This is usually held to be a higher level operation: from token object to 
type object, from real object to Frege’s Bedeutung, with a qualitative leap that 
is basically extra-semiotic. It is for this reason that the referent is  usually 
shunned by semioticians. Not only does it not suffice to explain com mu-
nication, but it is not even useful: the best thing is to get rid of it then!
 Nevertheless, in our view, the construction of classes is an operation 
already included in the material process of reading and the Bedeutung, is to 
be found at the level of the construction of the interpretation on the object. 
In other words, on the bottom right hand side of Ogden and  Richards’s 
 triangle we have things as they are – reviewed one by one by a system 
which is by definition an authentic “classifier”, a constructor of classes. The 
 construction of classes is implicit from the outset in the material interpreta-
tion of the sign; it is in no respect peculiar to a higher level of reading, nor 
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is it an “abstraction”, still less is it a construction of a “universal” that can be 
superimposed on single events. Rather, it is a process of generalization that 
unfolds sequentially (“hit by hit”) and “experimentally” identifies the series 
of objects that form the class. That the concept can then pass over into the 
sphere of human knowledge where its possibilities of use and formalization 
are more extensive is quite comprehensible. Nevertheless, in the last  analysis, 
there is no such thing as an intentional interpretation that is not based on 
extensional-sequential operations. It is at a higher level that extension can, 
for convenience, be re-interpreted as intension, and during evolution, in 
fact, structures capable of an intentional use of extensional interactions 
come to be formed. Yet one type of a structure is simply the continuation of 
the other. 
 In making these remarks we do not intend to raise the problem of 
 normalizing the terms used here with those found in other domain – terms 
like reflexes, behaviour, instincts, learning. Standardization, however, is 
certainly both conceivable and possible. As a conceptual framework, the 
sign’s power of attraction and selection is more general that that of schemes 
derived from sectorial issues such as, say, the relation between instinct and 
learning, between the rigidity and modifiability of reflex chains, and so on. 
For instance, if man’s cognitive function is interpreted as attuned to signs, 
the problem of what to ascribe to reflexes and what to learning is relatively 
secondary: in adjusting itself to signs, a structure implements the whole of its 
evolutionary acquisitions, which, of course, in the case of man, also includes 
the capacity for evaluation, comparison, hypothesis etc. On the other hand, 
all these functions are built upon things that have acquired the status of 
signs, so that a purely behaviouristic criterion seems inadequate. Between 
complex structure and sign we do not get a reflex-type relationship that can 
be explained simply by the punctual behaviour of the structure interacting 
with the sign. This would be true only if we had access to all data on the 
overall behaviour (total, internal and external, individual and collective) – 
but this is never the case. What experimental psychology calls “behaviour” 
is a very limited part of the whole. 
20. The social sign
It is only in the previous chapter that we have approached the problem 
of more than one interpreter, of inter-individual communication. Up to 
that point we dealt with a fairly schematic situation consisting of a single 
interpreter and sign, linked by a chain of translation reactions. In the last 
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chapter we began to explore sign reference as a collective process, though 
what interested there too was mainly the relationship between individual 
and environ mental complex. However in a society built upon signs – which 
serve to direct and standardize the behaviour of a number of individuals – 
the  capacity to recognize signs as meaningful is common to all. This is why 
all attune themselves to the signs and why the latter become a meaningful 
presence that regulates and mediates interpersonal relationships. The “com-
merce” and exchange of signs have their roots in an earlier stage that that in 
which the human sign as artificial analogue comes to be constructed. In this 
stage the sign is an objective referent and does not lead to any kind of cul-
tural circulation or to any conventions of meaning. It is a much earlier phase 
than that of symbolic communication, then, though the latter develops from 
it. If in the general framework of its environment the individual can observe 
both the behaviour of the others and signs, and if the others’ behaviour is 
his own or in some way equivalent to his own (for each becomes equal to 
the others precisely by virtue of the meaningfulness of the sign), then the 
signs can be viewed through the mediation of the behaviour of the others. 
Behaviour thus comes to signify an environmental condition and is thus 
itself a sign. Since this phenomenon occurs in a socially organized collec-
tivity, connections of meaningful interpersonal behaviour are established, 
and these are signs. They differ enormously from case to case in correspon-
dence with the genetic area and the social structure, and extend from the 
functions of ants to the display colours of birds. In short, we are in the field 
of zoo-semiotics, which presupposes complex identifications and relation-
ships in which, however, the sign still remains a meaning-capturing process 
attuned to reality. 
 What are the instruments with which meaning is captured then? Clearly 
they are not only those of perception (that derive from the sequential organi-
zation or elementary complementariness), but also form part of the social 
structure – that is, of the overall relation of complementariness between 
one individual and another according to the phylogenetic differentiation 
of the species. It will be, for example, sexual complementariness, which is 
connected to the “general metabolism of the species” – i.e. to reproduction. 
Obviously the sexual sign is a referential datum that stands out very sharply, 
linked as it is to the exigencies of the species. Thus all sexual signs (odours, 
calls, colours) strictly linked to the environmental complex (seasonal cycles, 
geographical habitats etc.) mark the species. At the same time they are 
signs that reinforce themselves, creating a situation whereby they function 
increasingly as sign references. 
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 An important feature which derives from this is the beginning of an 
exchange regulated by signs – the beginning, then, of the “commerce” of 
signs.
 We have repeatedly stressed that the sign-thing acts as a trigger for 
change, regulating energy exchanges. Likewise the sign-individual (i.e. the 
meaning carried by the behaviour of other individuals) is a trigger for action, 
which is thus brought about by social signs. Life in a community ceases 
completely to be a relationship between structure and objective  referent and 
becomes that between the structures as a whole and the objective referent. 
Clearly, each structure comes to be a referent for the others, so that social 
life is a network of relationships triggered off by the meaning found in the 
surrounding individuals, regardless of whether this triggering is purely a 
reflex, or acquired through learning, or mediated and conscious, or denied 
even. In each case, just as the environment prevails over the single structure, 
so it prevails over the social structure, which in its turn, like a broad environ-
ment, prevails over the single structure, in the sense that the individual is 
largely moulded by the collectivity during phylogeny. 
 As we shall see, it is not simply a matter of phylogenetic dependence, 
but of ontogenetic dependence too, since the first signs to “move” the indi-
vidual are social: it is these which start up the reading machine and bring 
its functions into play. The social structure is held together by a dense 
skein of threads composed of intersubjective relationship of sing-comple-
mentariness. Yet, in spite of the complexity they have attained, there are 
no grounds for supposing that they are in any way new compared with 
the chain of  identification and translation we have frequently mentioned. 
Rather, they can be seen as a prolongation of this chain and its projection 
onto a  multiplicity of individuals. These relationships cannot exist without 
the mobility inherent in an exchange situation which, moreover, they them-
selves bring into being. The whole species in fact is attuned to the reality of 
these relationships (metabolic, sexual-reproductive, competitive) and each 
individual lives the overall reality through the identification of meanings in 
the others. 
 The collective relationship with signs is itself a factor of cohesion and 
exchange and hence promotes an ever-increasing differentiation in the 
reading of signs. In a certain sense it thrusts the individual closer to the 
world, forcing them to adjust more perfectly to their environment. The 
consequences of this are that (A) signs succeed in having themselves read 
more and more accurately and extensively by fostering the development 
of adapted, progressive reading machines, as we have already remarked 
on  several occasions; (B) differentiation evolves in the direction of more 
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 subjective interpretations of signs. Which brings us to the next sections of 
this book which are concerned specifically with man’s interpretation of the 
environment.
21. Sign storage: internal signs and memory
From what we have said so far, evolution could be envisaged as a succes-
sion of individuals developing in the course of time and generations but, 
as single beings, remaining fixed and faithful to their genetic blueprint 
and  maintaining with the environment purely complementary relations 
 depending on the correspondences in play. Once the triggering and the 
transformation is produced by the sign it is immediately lost. The energy 
exchanged by the metabolism of the sign is in fact used for internal  meaning 
processes, for new contacts with the environment, for growth and for repro-
duction, but it is no longer to be found as such in the structure because 
immediately transferred. This is implicit in the concept of translation. Once 
the structure has reached the non-destructive stage it remains unchanged 
and sets up relations with subsequent complementary objects without 
 preserving any traces of them. The concept of information, too, is homo-
geneous with the structure’s “fidelity to its blueprint”. The single structure is 
a-historical, then. And even if the structure is complex it does not preserve 
any trace of the sign relationship, which is dissipated in the maintenance of 
complexity and connections with the environment. 
 However, it will be clear from even a superficial study of real, func tioning 
structures that this is an oversimplified picture of the situation. At most it 
reflects what we find in the most elementary forms where history, in fact, 
is simply wear. But very soon, even at elementary sign levels like that of the 
Protozoa, some degree of “historicization” occurs and internal traces of the 
sign are preserved. Somehow or other the encounter with the sign is pre-
served, and above and beyond the process of dissipation an element is stored 
and accumulates in the individual. The structure changes and remains dif-
ferent after the specific contact with the external referent, whether natural or 
social. In this way the individual becomes “historicised” and, alongside the 
fixed information it will hand down to others, accumulates individual infor-
mation about its personal experiences that cannot be transmitted genetically. 
Since the experiences in question are introduced via entry sections and are 
thus tied to the “fixity” of the structure within the framework of the spe-
cies, the way they are stored will be “specific” – i.e. peculiar to the particu-
lar structure. Moreover it will depend also on the particular history of the 
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 structure – the sequence of encounters and attributions of meaning in which 
it participates.
 It is this, then, which constitutes the field of memory and learning and 
it is now widely accepted that these two structurally-related functions are 
extremely ancient phylogenetically and appear in elementary stages. 
 There are thus two ways in which the individual is historical: as a genetic 
copy or structure it is a result, a product of things (its history, in other words, 
lies entirely behind it); as a single individual in a particular situation it takes 
part in a series of contacts with things, and is never identical either with 
itself in its different phases or with another copy present in the species. How-
ever, these two ways of “being historical” are not independent of each other 
since the second is based on the possibilities provided by the first. This is 
a situation found at all levels, above all at that of man. Man is a historical 
being par excellence because the opportunity to construct himself a personal 
 history is furnished by his phylogenetic progress or natural history. 
 What interests here in particular is the relation between the sign and 
the memory of the sign. A more or less lengthy sequence of ordered com-
plementariness is set up and simultaneously with this an internal analogi-
cal situation corresponding to the sequence is formed. If the framework we 
have developed so far is correct, this internal analogical situation (by virtue 
of which the new state of the structure “stands for” the sign) cannot but be a 
sign itself, an internal sign – that is, like all other internal signs, a structural-
material complex endowed with meaning for its reading structure and thus 
a trigger for changing the latter. This sign “persists”, remaining available to 
the structure for a longer period than that of the sign-interpretation that 
produced it, though there is no need to postulate that it has a particularly 
long time-span or that it lasts throughout the life of the individual. More-
over, since it is analogous and complementary, it has nothing in common 
with the nature of the sign-event from which it derives. It is a completely 
different phenomenon and lives inside and is contained by the structure, 
whereas the sign and its interpretation are, or can be, external, consumable 
and irretrievable. What links it to the sign-event is a process of translation. 
 Since a deposit of this kind is only conceivable as a product of a dif-
ferentiated function and takes place within a complex individual, it must 
presumably be linked up with other internal signs, whether memorized 
or not (together with those that are memorized it forms the memory as a 
whole – the succession of chronological sections of the structure). If it is a 
trigger for change and is meaningful for other internal and external struc-
tures complementary to it, this sign may be introduced into the internal 
routes: in other words it can be evoked. This does not mean we must posit a 
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conscious memory or a consciousness at this stage. All we need argue is that 
when the structure comes into contact with a punctual “exposure” it reacts 
by forming an internal analogical deposit which can interfere with the routes 
and the reactions pertaining to these. 
 At this stage there is no external “projection” of the sign, no “memory” 
of it, which is why we must insist on the fact that the memorized sign is in 
no sense a reproduction or miniature of the sign-event but simply a  possible 
translation situation. It is not as if the individual contains inside it a micro-
world corresponding to the world of things. It would hardly be necessary to 
insist on this point if it were not for the fact that an idealistic pre supposition 
of this kind is extremely diffused, and has directly or indirectly influenced 
the whole history of philosophy – at times even under the guise of realism. 
The individual contains only traces (heterogeneous sign-traces and trans-
lation-traces) of the contacts made via its entry sections, and they are neces-
sarily partial and incomplete. If it so happens that this store then develops a 
large number of connections and becomes forcefully “present” by recalling 
and adjusting behaviour – in other words if it becomes conscious – this 
does not mean a qualitative change has taken place but simply a further dif-
ferentiation. This internal sign situation can take two forms: (A) it can inter-
fere with sign-process routes: i.e. the individual’s past influences its current 
behaviour, thereby laying the foundations of learning; (B) it can be triggered 
by an external event: it seems unlikely, in fact, that each deposit is stored 
in a random manner. It will somehow be connected to the sign-circuits it 
translates, hence it will be called up and activated each time the original sign 
sector is brought into play. 
 These two aspects are open to a vast range of phylogenetic development, 
especially as regards the capacity for evocation. In fact it is possible to arrive 
at a form of internal evocation whereby a memorized sign act as a trigger for 
another memorized sign, the working of this chain being entirely internal 
and without any connection (of an immediate kind at least) with the external 
trigger. This is what takes place in human knowledge, though further requi-
sites are necessary for this. 
 We might ask how deposits of this kind are “historicized”, i.e. arranged in 
a chronological sequence: whether, for instance, this is based on an  internal 
biorhythm, and what the rhythmical unit of measurement is for storage. 
Whilst not ruling out the possibility that this activity may somehow be linked 
to modes of internal time processing (which all structures have and which 
are correlated with phylogeny and external rhythms: heartbeat, breathing, 
length of day and night, seasons, mating period), the problem seems to be 
incorrectly formulated. It is the depositing of the sign-equivalents that gives 
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rise to the time dimension in a suitable structure. If at time t1 the structure 
changes from S0 to S1, and subsequently to S2, S3 at time t2, t3, it is the change 
in the structure which forms the orientated vector that measures time. The 
irreversible flux is measured by facts that are irreversible, and among these 
we may include those that gradually accumulate sign-experiences. 
 It is interesting to note how at advanced levels ontogenetic character-
istics (the “experience of the world” derived from single events and stored 
inside the structure) are linked to fixed characteristics of a phylogenetic 
type. The phenotypic appearance of information storage is possible only if 
the indi vidual is subjected to progressively more complex environmental 
stimulations. This is a common experience in psychogenetics as regards 
human knowledge. Individuals endowed with a set of genes that is com-
plete and efficient as regards the cognitive mechanisms remain idiots if they 
are deprived of the stimulation of the environment; in a short time, more-
over, this situation becomes irreversible. Individual history is possible only 
because phylogenetic history exists, but at the same time the realization 
of phylogenetic potentialities is possible only as a result of the stimuli of 
 individual history. 
 It should be noted that, though particularly evident in the case of human 
knowledge, this situation is quite general and concerns all  individual 
 ontogeny. Normally it is the internal signs that act as a reciprocal  stimulus 
for the genome (as happens, for instance, in inductive gradients of embryo), 
whereas for the processes concerning the organism’s adjustment to the 
world – i.e. knowledge in the usual sense of the word – this function is 
carried out by the sign-data of the world stored in the form of material 
 analogues.
 Here it would be appropriate to examine some experimentally- 
ascertained memory situations and their corresponding structures. On the 
basis of our reasoning so far we may postulate that this translation function 
we call memory occurs via a process and is performed by a structure (or 
rather by a number of processes and structures since various types of preser-
vation of traces are possible). We shall simply mention to systems or func-
tions that could be analysed in this light, without attempting to undertake a 
detailed investigation here. 
 The first, obviously, is the evolution of the nervous system in mammals 
and in man (in all his complexity and for all our ignorance) and the experi-
mental psychology connected with this. The second is the immunity sys-
tem, another memory mechanism built phylogenetically on quite different 
principles from those of the nervous system and particularly deserving of 
investigation from the point of view. 
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22. Segmentation and reading
When we talk about “signs of signs”, what we mean is now the logical sign 
chain (of which stored internal signs form a part) linking the structures to 
the efferent via what is normally called knowledge. Knowledge, in all its 
various phylogenetic stages, is a function of the meaning relationship with 
any objective exploration and any referent-sign. This is why we have called 
the logical relation of complementariness “knowledge” (or material knowl-
edge) from the outset. Knowledge as it is normally understood – i.e. human 
knowledge as interpretation, manipulation and modification of the world – 
is nothing other than the prolongation of these complementary connections 
by the lengthening of the chains of sign analogues. 
 How can we interpret this internal sign, this “turning inward” of the sign 
phenomenon? The complex phenomenon of sign interaction  produces a 
 stable modification of the structure. This must be taken as a micro structural, 
molecular state. We do not need to know here (and in fact we do not know) 
whether the “modification” is an RNA, a protein, a complex of these, or  simply 
a structural state that facilitates neural exchanges. There is no doubt, however, 
that the sign is “re-segmented”. In other words, we must  postulate that the 
contact with the external referent, attuned to numerous routes of the sign 
interpretant, is re-segmented into a finite number of internal material states 
that are in (some kind of) correspondence with it. The  possi bility of seg-
menting and translating certain aspects of experience is already  present in the 
facts and in the structure before any such thing as an “intentional” exchange – 
which is why these aspects offer themselves as potentially “exchangeable”. 
 Of course no-one would argue that the sign phenomenon is  translated 
into a single thing (a whole, an “all-or-nothing”) like, say, a nuclear molecule 
of RNA. The concept of the memory as a kind of filing cabinet is too static 
to be realistic. The sign is a complex structural state capable of entering into 
relationships. It is probably mobile, and certainly partial and labile. Never-
theless it is based on a finite number of correspondences linked – when 
activated – to a finite number of possible behaviours. Which is to say that, 
although we can imagine the retranslations of a stored sign towards the out-
side, there is obviously no “reconstruction” of the objective fact (which is lost 
and no longer has any connection with the individual) but a translation into 
behaviour – the sign being a trigger for changes – which is a sign in its turn. 
We have already seen, in fact, how within a species the display of a given 
kind of behaviour constitutes a sign. What makes com municable, artificial 
signs possible, then, is a situation of internal analogical re- segmentation and 
its exteriorization in corresponding behaviour (though the  exteriorization 
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varies enormously from situation to situation and is  governed by the kinds 
of circuits peculiar to each species). We can thus imagine two  levels: one 
in which a sign enters the circuits and is reflected immediately as action 
(a reflex arc), and the other in which a sign enters, is stored in segmented 
form, and can be evoked as behaviour. In the first case the reaction to the 
sign is total and does not lead to a sign but simply to a sequential process that 
ends where the chain ends, even it can be read as a sign by other  observers. In 
the second case, the external sign is retranslated into an internal one which 
will obviously be very different from the former but will nevertheless be 
linked to it by a long process of translation. Thus the structure’s  behavioural 
display sign “stands for” the sign which this structure once identified, and 
the mediation is supplied by a structurally specific internal analogue inte-
grated in its circuits. 
 Cybernetic analogies are usually rather ambiguous; however, for what 
it is worth, we can imagine the first sign event as being translated into an 
informative diagram, a sort of perforated card that produces a series of 
actions when inserted. 
 This second stage too is susceptible of almost unlimited complication. 
How are the deposits linked up? How are they evoked? The relation “sign → 
deposit → sign behaviour” is obviously a simplification. To many signs (the 
complex of contextual signs and references) correspond a sort of “overall 
world-view” in the shape of analogues and possibilities of reaction to the 
various aspects of the world. If the structure is attuned to the external con-
text, this is because there are connections between the internal signs. No 
matter how segmented they are, they do not form a sequence of accidental 
units; if this were so we would be quite incapable of explaining that connec-
tive function which we call knowledge. Even the evocation of the internal 
sign involves the interference of several translation processes: if we were 
to admit that what goes in simply comes out again without the structure 
“stirring it up” in some original way, we should be faced with a total, even if 
complex, automatism, and adjustment to the environment would be impos-
sible. Human knowledge would be inconceivable in such a framework. 
 What needs to be postulated above all is that since stored signs are 
“meaning ful for”, they carry meaning for a specific connecting appara-
tus that can review them, see which are meaningful in relation to a given 
 situation of adjustment to the environment, and link them together.
 The stored signs, when retranslated to the outside (a somewhat  intuitive 
expression given that what occurs in human beings is prevalently  internal 
retranslation), are reassembled in an original fashion. If their deposit 
is  segmented, they are re-segmented, rearranged in a different form 
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 corresponding to the connecting function of the interpretation and the rich-
ness of the deposits. 
 The sign which is produced and “returns outside” is thus an extremely 
complex analogical construction. Each behavioural sign means something 
more that the sign at the input because it has been mixed with the struc-
ture during interpretation. Thus we should not imagine a situation of rigid 
 correspondences like those found in direct complementariness processes. 
What we have is not mechanical translations but “retranslations”: i.e. inter-
pretations from the overall standpoint of the structure. In spite of this, the 
process remains inelastic. It is simply that it passes through many stages of 
a highly complex interpreting machine. The fact that we do not know how 
it works does not mean we should attribute to it qualities not to be found in 
nature. 
 We have already argued that any referential identification is an inter-
pretation from the subjective standpoint of the entry sections, but it has to 
be added that, at complex stages, both the interpretation that ensues and 
its external projection as behaviour are “manipulations” carried out by the 
structure that organizes what arrives from the objective panorama according 
to the combinatory activities of its species. There is no need to insist on the 
fact that these manipulating capacities are, in our view, strictly bound up 
with the general mechanisms of interaction. However, in order to examine 
the interpretation of the sign and its behavioural “return display” whereby it 
takes its place among things as a sign, we shall have to refer once more to the 
concept of reading levels – that is, progressive structures adapted to  cascades 
of combinatory activities. Let us suppose that external signs are stored in 
the form of elementary segments, in connection with the various circuits 
they derive from. They must be reviewed by a structure and  organized into 
a first-level sign state, which will become the referent of another structure, 
and so on. At each of these levels a re-segmentation takes place, so that 
the output representation, or the corresponding sign at the exit, will be a 
 situa tion of objective correspondence organized subjectively according to 
the non-arbitrary, subjective criteria of the species and the individual. This is 
the postulate upon which we reconstruct the long journey from the  referent 
horse to /horse/. Here we have reached the threshold where it becomes pos-
sible for a sign to move from being a meaningful thing in nature to being a 
behaviour-thing corresponding to a thing in nature, and be seen as an ana-
logue of the thing in the form of a behaviour; its next step will bring it to the 
most complex stage where it will become an artificial object detached from 
individual behaviour and socially constructed and socially exchangeable. 
This is the sign of semioticians. Discourse is made possible by the possibility 
of segmenting and re-segmenting sign deposits. 
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23. Objectifying the referent
To know always means to identify presences, but the recognition of these 
presences is incomplete and subjective. It is only at the highest level of 
 complexity that recognition becomes really precise and ceases to depend 
on a single process of definition. We are not alluding so much to spatial 
definition – which is implicit in the concept of the sign as “otherness” and 
as “belonging to the world”, i.e. distinct from the observer – as to the recon-
struction of the object as an external presence. This is likely an extremely 
complex process that passes through numerous intermediate stages. Nothing 
like a direct contact between the structure and its referent: what happens 
is that contact is made by several entry sections and this is then developed 
as an internal sign and compared with the object. The object becomes a 
source of sign identifications and these are attuned to the object. It is thus 
source (emitter) and goal (point of convergence), and is objective in that 
it is reconstructed and assembled cognitively. Objectivity does not consist 
in “presence” but in cognitive reconstruction. A thing is identified as the 
point of convergence of a sign complex. In this way the indissolubility of 
the sign object and the reality of the thing, peculiar to the earlier stages, is 
reconstructed in a far more complicated manner. We can sum this up by 
saying that we never obtain the full presence of the object, but only a partial, 
indirect identification, as if it were reconstructed from various angles and 
then reassembled. 
 What we wish to stress here is that there exists a certain degree of corre-
spondence between the output behaviour of the internal, memorized signs, 
as described in the last chapter, and the objectified thing. It derives from 
a sign process that starts out from the stored and reorganized data and is 
“aimed at” and attuned to the thing. 
 This process is what forms the “signic” representation of the thing. It 
implicitly involves segmentation, too, since, whereas at lower levels a thing 
interacts with others in its background and is seen as projected onto the 
background  – against which its features emerge without implying any 
assumptions as to whether it exists separately – at higher levels it becomes 
single and appears detached from the others, being represented and as it 
were reconstructed from all angles by means of behaviours. 
 In what, then, does the unity of a thing consist? How is this fundamental 
state of oneness, of separateness, achieved? The answer is precisely through 
a process of convergence and adjustment. The thing is single because the 
 process that represents it is convergent. The process which supplies us with 
the sign-representation of the thing confers unity on the thing and recon-
structs the discrete, particular nature of the representation of the world. 
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Objectifying is thus linked to a reconstructed, complex representation, to 
mechanisms of sign integration, in other words. It is clear that the  subject 
has a very important role in the construction, but this neither endows the 
subject with creativity nor the object with an essence. The connection 
between the external thing-referent and its complex representation in the 
form of a reconstructed sign remains intact, and it is actually possible to 
modify reality by means of this correspondence. 
 It seems unlikely that the objectifying process has suddenly appeared 
in nature in the shape of human knowledge. There are greater and lesser 
degrees of reconstruction of external things. It is certain in the course of 
ontogeny (as the child builds up an image of the world) and probable in 
the phylogenetic stages preceding Man that the objectifying process can 
be realized partially too, and even in fully-formed human knowledge there 
remains a considerable intermingling of internal and external. All we wish 
to assume is that the record of the thing at the cognitive level is transformed 
into the integrated complex reconstructed from its signs. Thus in itself the 
subjectively-observed thing is already a sign, though it is anything but a 
phenomenological appearance, or integument, or illusion. It is centred upon 
the concrete noumenon via a chain of reactions. The a priori categories are 
the circuits enabling the species to assemble the sign. 
 Two aspects of this issue need discussing here. The first is the fact that the 
objectifying process changes the sign-metabolic relationship. Up to a certain 
point a sign is essentially something to be consumed, since it is directly 
integrated into the structure that manipulates it and serves to nourish the 
structure. In the interiorizing and stabilizing of internal signs everything 
combines to “advance” the reading machine in its environment. We have 
already insisted on the structure’s capacity for exploiting its referent by dint 
of the reading advantages it has acquired. The sign is an integral part of the 
interpretation because it is consumed. This happens even in highly complex 
social structures such as those of the insects. 
 But once the objectifying process comes into being, it is possible to save 
the object from being metabolized. Representation requires that the object 
maintain its independence as a source of data and as a site for the adjustment 
of representative behaviour. Thus the representation of the world is made 
up of “objects one alongside the other”. We fit the environment in terms of 
behaviour, whereas in earlier stages matching is simply a matter of being 
actually adapted without any sort of representation whatsoever. When we 
talk about objectively reconstructed referents, we do not of course simply 
mean a spatial and physical representation of things – a sort of premise to 
the scientific analysis of the world – but sign nuclei that act as  psychological 
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“presences” and produce instinct-influenced constructions which are 
 nevertheless equally objective and external. 
 The second aspect concerns the fact that the objectifying process in man 
involves an intersubjective stage. Construction is never purely individual 
but, as we shall see later, makes use of transmittable, elaborated acquire-
ments for the representation of the world, which is largely super-individual 
and cultural, even if necessarily located in the single person. The individ-
ual is geared to inter-individual modes of connection. This confirms that 
commu nicative cohesion is both a product of differentiation and a condition 
that brings about and promotes it. At the human level, the generation of the 
single individual by history can be observed above all in the facilities that 
culture offers man in the shape of language and representation of reality. It 
is nevertheless important to note that the emergence of “exchangeable and 
independent” signs from nature is strictly correlated with the emergence 
of the objectifying capacity. The sign at once bears witness to, and specifies 
the objectifying process, being an artificial analogue of an objective inter-
pretation process; it displays objectivity and exchanges objectivity. Of course 
the objectifying process, as we have repeatedly remarked, is subjective: in 
other words, it works according to the particular modules of the species. 
 In this kind of interpretation of surroundings a psychological dimension 
is also rendered possible, and this goes hand in hand with the transmission 
of signs. Signs are always exchanged in a psychological dimension – but this 
raises issue that are beyond the scope of our discussion. 
24. The hypothetical function
Once it has achieved a high degree of differentiation a reading machine 
reacts in two different ways to its environmental world – via direct reac-
tion chains and via the image of the environment rebuilt in the output. It is 
the latter of these capacities that lays the foundations for sign-based com-
municative interaction between individuals. However, a number of other 
features are required if a reading machine is to become something more 
than a mechanism – however complex – capable of a posteriori behaviour 
but incapable of forethought. 
 What develops in man and characterizes his cognitive process is the 
 ability to make hypotheses. This enables him to imagine possible states of 
reality on the basis of stored data by using the same logic (a prolongation of 
material logic) used to assemble the data. The individual re-segments and 
combines the deposits, adjusting them to reality, we have argued. This gives 
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rise to constructions with a certain degree of analogical correspondence to 
reality which can then be compared with reality via processes of translation. 
In this sense, internal representations themselves are signs and can be trans-
lated into communicable signs. These assemblages can be adjusted not only 
to reality but to other deposits taken as referents, which may be completely 
detached from reality. 
 Adjustment operations can thus be organized either in relation to  external 
reality or to stored data. A purely internal cognitive dynamic arises based 
on the assumption of internal presuppositions. The machine never actually 
encroaches on the future – it does not need anything that has not come into 
existence. It simply uses its material states to hypothesize. i.e. to build, in 
the reality of the present, a new material state of the structure. A hypothesis 
is an operation that in some way takes the shape of a cerebral state. How-
ever, the parallel with objective reality can, at least in certain  circumstances, 
be tested. It is possible, that is, to see whether a hypothesis corresponds to 
 reality. The only way the structure can encroach on the future, then, is by 
experimenting on the present. It is important to note that all future-orien-
tated functions – hypotheses included – remain anchored to the present, to 
the internal  existence and development of material states. 
 This leads to an entirely new situation: the machine turns its attention 
to its own working and reads itself. The constructions this entails are still 
logically elaborated, since the logic of correspondence functions in the re-
segmentation and the operations of the various reading levels too. A certain 
degree of self-reading also exists in the earlier stages in this sense, for even 
during re-segmentation a higher level reads a lower one. But what takes 
place now is a “total” reading. The machine has its deposits available and 
can use them both for external correspondences and triggering, and for 
 constructing internal triggering. It is only at this level of the dynamic that 
we can speak of consciousness. Consciousness is not born automatically 
at the formation of memory, or when the data of memory are organized 
 during output as representation, since the representation of what is external 
in no way implies consciousness of this representation and can be observed 
objectively as behaviour. It is born when the data can be used internally in 
a way not immediately correlated with reality. Consciousness is a construc-
tion of real or possible representations when the logical-combinatory inter-
play of deposits is so vast as to make it possible to bring all the connecting 
mechanisms into a single whole, as opposed to leaving them to operate as 
single circuits triggered from the outside and converging on the outside. The 
machine confronts itself and uses itself continually, and constantly draws 
on the whole of itself. In order to be able to exploit its internal deposits to 
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 trigger and organize data it must be capable of reviewing its entire data store. 
The subject maintains at all times a given general evaluation of both its envi-
ronment and itself and its own history. It possesses, so to speak, an overall 
“bearing” – namely consciousness, which like muscle tone, is a continuous 
background activity. 
 Clearly, the constructions made by the particular type of logical organi-
zation of the memory known as hypotheses are authentic representations. 
They are capable to a certain extent of referring to something, that is. Com-
pared with representations of referents, they are even more incomplete, 
 partial, reconstructed, indirect, and hence “historical” (in the sense that they 
are “peculiar to the history of the individual”). Nevertheless, they have the 
same natural status as representations of objective reality. Though artificial 
internal structures, hypotheses are nevertheless structural states and com-
positions of complementariness. As states of the structure, they too, then, are 
material objects of the world deriving from the combinatory activities of the 
reader. 
 They are thus always “true” in the elementary sense of actually existing. 
But they can also be “verified” in relation to the external world. In other 
words, hypothetical constructions produced by internal triggering and 
organized according to internal parameters (which obviously originate in 
the external world) can be tested against the external world to see if they are 
consonant with the latter. It can be ascertained whether the procedures of 
selection and material logic used to construct the hypotheses are correct. 
 Thus although the construction is not directly adjusted to the external 
world, it can be compared with it. Such, then, is the nature of man’s hypo-
thetical knowledge, even in its most elementary forms. It is by no means a 
purely “scientific” procedure, though the scientific method derives from the 
standardizing of hypothetical activities. Each cognitive interpretation con-
sists of a series of internal adjustments, a series of “as ifs” or hypotheses that 
are put forward and tested.
 This function allows us to make forecasts about events by drawing upon 
data from experience and introducing new conditions – i.e. those connected 
with other experiences that the one in hand. These forecasts are logically 
assembled. It is here, in fact, that we can observe the interdependence and 
contextuality of the logical operations, for although they may form exceed-
ingly long chains thanks to the continual input of the subject they still make 
use of the basic procedures of complementariness and material logic. The 
result is that we can predict the development or regular phenomena by using 
hypothetical logic to foreshadow the logical-material relations between things 
and by aligning ourselves, in our materiality in the exact trajectory of things. 
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 Of course, many hypotheses cannot be tested because they do not corre-
spond to a physical reality. But they nevertheless exist and have a sense. 
Hypothetical connections obviously do not just concern perceptive-spatial 
deposits but also involve data of affective, instinctive, cultural and other 
kinds. They thus give rise to a vast range of possibilities which have nothing 
logical about them in the usual sense of the word but are perfectly logical 
according to our criteria – the logic of correspondences – since they cor-
respond to the structure of the reader. Even such artificial constructions as 
poetry are objects of this kind, in just the same way as scientific representa-
tions. 
 The logical hypothetical function furthers our knowledge of the referent 
and broadens the domain of perceptive data. We have repeatedly remarked 
that the representation “constructs” the object from the point of view of 
the entry sections. But hypothetical logic also increases the number of 
these sections enormously by offering indirect ways of reconstructing the 
object. Verified hypotheses, in fact, become the basis for further hypotheses. 
Although all this takes place within the rigid logical constraints of the opera-
tions of representation and verification, it is by no means restricted to what 
the eye can see and the hand can touch. This, then, is how the interpretation 
of things is carried further and how knowledge deciphers ever “truer” and 
more-detailed parameters of the referent, which Man is thus able to interpret 
and modify. 
 However, we are less interested here in these cognitive aspects than in 
that of the signs as such. 
 If the construction of the object is a “global” sign, so is the hypothetical 
construction. It is a sign which is subject to verification. We can envisage a 
hypothesis about an event as a process that “unifies” various components 
around the hypothetical construction. Man, however, can assemble these 
sign-constructions as he wishes and verify whether they correspond to 
 reality. He can ascertain not only if they represent reality but also if they are 
useful, if they influence behaviour etc. In other words, he can test whether 
they have consequences on reality. Thus the hypothetical activity should 
not be seen as designed simply for the static interpretation of things, for 
interpretations is related to the concept of interference and exchange. These 
sign-constructions are therefore not arbitrary, and extend the human world 
indefinitely. They are veritable artificial objects resulting from assembly of 
other data. Yet they all belong to nature – there is no such thing as a contra-
position between the natural and the artificial. 
 The process of construction, although unitary, is not an “all-or-nothing” 
affair after which “illumination” occurs, but a process with a specific degree 
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of accuracy and reliability conditioned historically by the materials available 
and structurally by logical possibilities. 
 The foundations of the logical procedures of thought were laid down 
during the phases of differentiation that led to the construction of human 
knowledge in nature. What thought work on is data, and it is impossible to 
conceive of a differentiation of the rational activities without the materiality 
of things and environment to manipulate and the structures that manipulate 
them. 
 We have already stressed the importance of the concept of unity as a con-
vergence on a process of communication. It is this concept which enables us 
to reconstruct the discrete character of the original processes and go beyond 
the metabolic and non-objectified approach to the reality proper of the pre-
cognitive stages. At this point, at the level of mental operations, emerges the 
logic of positing and negating, which corresponds to the original situation of 
finding or not finding complementariness; here the problem of “reviewing” 
also arises – namely the operations of addition, repetition, generalization, 
and recognition of equivalences. Signs are the tools with which all opera-
tions of this kind are performed, but these logical procedures remain simply 
a revised addition of material logic in the hands of an extremely complex 
structure. They, too, become the objects of hypothetical constructions: from 
discrete repetition we derive indefinite repetition, from “this thing” we go 
on to “every time this thing” and to “all things”. The construction of totality 
thus never ceases to be a partial logical operation carried out by a structure. 
The concept “universal” is no broader than the structure that builds it. 
 Words as exchangeable signs are hypothetical proposals whose effective-
ness in the world of reality is ascertained by means of an exchange. The con-
struction of a word is an “adjusted project” – a complex interpreting process 
unified by its focus on reality. When we use words we once more exploit 
the hypotheses-making process as a tool for interpreting reality. Words are 
artificial objects because they form interpretative hypotheses. 
 All human signs are hypothetical in the sense that they are mental facts 
deriving from operations connecting things and events. Signs do not exist 
in nature outside of interpretation, and interpretation for complex readers is 
a postulated, hypothetical, partial, temporary and verifiable reconstruction. 
This is why the sign /horse/ is just as hypothetical as /unicorn/. However, in 
social operations, the former is an artificial object that belongs to reality and 
has a unity of its own, which means that it can be used for dealing with the 
real. It thus constitutes a useful operation. 
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25. Intersubjective connections
Another characteristic of the development of Man’s sign knowledge is the 
great expansion of inter-subjectivity. The experiences that can be accumu-
lated from a much vaster store than any individual can hold. The cohesion 
of the species produces an accumulation of non-genetic experiences that 
can be transmitted by learning. The sign function is at once a product and 
a begetter of differentiation. The construction of hypothetical representa-
tions takes place in a much broader sphere than that of the individual, with 
immense possibilities of combination and connection. 
 The stock of experiences is both historical and super-individual. This 
is a specifically human situation which, however, is not simply a matter of 
 learning, this being an earlier function. The historicalness of the individual 
and his collective nature are constitutional. Man’s communicative  capacities 
are inconceivable without actual communication and inter-subjective 
 cohesion. It follows that all hypothetical representations are accomplished 
by the single individual through cooperation with others and are largely 
social products.
 Knowledge is cultural in itself. The materials with which Man builds his 
interpretative framework are those provided by the history as a whole. Thus 
what holds for ontogenetic development holds for knowledge too: the mate-
rials that set the human structure in motion derive from the environment 
and from history. The culturally-isolated man is also genetically mute; his 
informational material fails to receive expression. This demonstrates that it 
is the communication situation which has constructed our modes of knowl-
edge, and that the general observation that reading machines are constructed 
upon their object holds true for Man too. It is this kind of inter- subjectivity 
which gives rise to semiotic communication and from which language, 
myths, institutions and scientific representations derive. It is a mistake to 
think of Man as a universal, for he is made up of innumerable particular “I”s 
whose sum will never amount to any kind of universal.  Nevertheless, Man 
generalizes himself with the aid of culture, that remarkable “distinctive” trait 
based on communication, capable of accumulating and structuring. 
 To say that communication and the symbolic faculty are the “essence” of 
Man, and the Man is such “quia habet virtutem communicativam” is to say 
very little indeed and precludes a very great deal more that can be  discovered. 
The way ahead lies necessarily through the natural recon struction of the 
communicative function. 
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26. The human sign
The semiotician’s sign is not a deus ex machina, then. It appears as an exten-
sion of the natural logic of interaction when suitable conditions occur – 
namely, a multiplicity of points of connection, a “mediation of the sign” in 
the shape of displayed behaviour (i.e. mediated meaningfulness), and an 
analogical activity leading to the construction of complex, artificial objects 
to be used as exchange currency. 
 At the heart of human communication lies the creation of hypotheses. 
Words or symbols, in fact, should not be seen as static, object-like equiva-
lents, since they are in no way mechanical analogues. We have seen that their 
analogical power – which is, in fact, their semiotic function – resides in the 
fact that they are hypotheses about the world translated into an exchangeable 
form and are verifiable precisely because they can be related to the world. 
From this point of view, a sign system is artificial and built by means of 
hypotheses: it is used in so far it is continuously verified as adequate.
 But what is peculiar about this type of translation, which renders the 
human sign so specific, is that it cannot be conceived of as an individual 
sequence initially a “first-degree” sign whereby we make artificial  hypotheses 
and finally an exchange system). The latest sign – in our case the human one, 
the sign of semioticians – completely absorbs the previous ones: they are not 
behind it but within it. Thus at the human level, the sign-as-hypothesis is 
the only mode in which we adjust to reality. It appears to us from the first in 
a hypothetical, communicable form in the sense that it is an element of an 
exchange system.
 The situation has thus come full circle: phylogeny advances towards an 
increasingly complex sign system, but when it reaches the hypothetical level 
and assumes the form of an exchange system it is the system that governs 
transmission and “guides” the single sign in the exchange function, and 
 precedes and organizes signs. 
 As far as ourselves and our consciousness of the world are concerned, 
everything that is introduced has to undergo the mediation of the sign 
process, which is what really constitutes our “entry section”. But precisely 
because it is collective, historical and systematic, this entry section does not 
belong to each of us singly but depends on the whole framework of com-
munication. The entry section is thus the entire communication system and 
the sum of possible hypotheses expressed in the system. We shall return to 
this problem in more detail later. 
 The inversion of the priority between sign and system and the dominance 
of structurality found in human communication are nevertheless quite 
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 natural, in the sense that they display the ever-increasing influence of inter-
subjectivity in the relations gradually set up by phylogeny.  Memorization and 
analogical-hypothetical activity make possible the formation of an exchange 
network that gives the single sign a sense within the overall framework of the 
exchange. 
27. The genesis and the anatomy of the sign
The sign, than, has a dual nature, or rather it is the outcome of two dif ferent 
states of affairs since it is situated at the confluence of two phylogenetic 
movements. It is produced by representation in that it comes at the end of a 
process of identification-recognition, and it is modelled by communication. 
These two aspects –and this is the central problem of the sign – actually 
coincide, for all human representations are established historically (in both 
natural and cultural history) and thus depend on the possibility of trans-
mission and use; on the other hand all communication consists of the trans-
mission of “something to somebody”.
 These properties are extremely ancient, since even the biunivocal rela-
tionship between interpreter and thing-sign amounts to the transmission of 
something to someone. Where something new arises is in the trans mission 
from the thing-sign to the artificial sign, a veritable analogical  driving belt 
developed by the reading machine for interpreting and changing te leg-
ible world. From this point on, then, the problem of meaning concerns 
the  genesis and the workings of the cultural sign which can only be inter-
preted as originating from distant forerunners. Signs can only be explained 
through their physiology, as historical products justified by their function 
in the development of the species. We can only repeat our conviction that it 
is quite absurd to take the sign as an independent starting-point ad see the 
problem of meaning as the primary issue. A sign makes sense only because 
it does not come into being at the human level, otherwise it would be incom-
prehensible – it would not serve for communication, that is. A long, gradual 
genesis of things, a long process of selection, a long, uninterrupted sequence 
of correspondences with things in the horizon – all these have gone to build 
up the sign. At the same time, the use of the sign has gradually moulded the 
machines capable of reading it, because, though artificial, it is a thing with a 
“bulk”, it exists and circulates, selects an stimulates. 
 Thanks to the artificial, human sign, created by human presences, single 
existences and generations are linked up by a different reality than that of 
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genetic information. Moreover, it is the sign that enables genetic possibilities 
to emerge. 
 It cannot be overemphasized – if we are to account for the genetics of 
communication (i.e. the fact that man has the tools of communication in 
his code) – how important actual communication has been in moulding 
the structure via selection, and how this in turn has led to the perfecting of 
communication itself. It is a history of reciprocal influences within a web of 
relationships that extend far beyond individuals and generations. 
 Nor can the extent to which we are formed by others and, earlier still by 
things, be overemphasized, or the fact that our individual capacities consists 
solely in handling tools made by others. 
 Yet the sign has a certain degree of independence. It is a presence that can 
be re-segmented and reassembled. It has an economy of its own. We do not 
intend to try and find a “pure science” of signs, an exchange economy inde-
pendent of the things exchanged. However, since the process that produces 
it is unitary, the sign does have a unitary function in communication, and 
this function is so far reaching that it practically coincides with knowledge, 
of which semiotics is a synonym. 
28. General features of the sign
Let us now examine a number of characteristics of the sign in human com-
munication. These are to some extent already explicit in what we have said 
in previous chapters. 
(1) The conventionality of the sign. What we mean by this is that the sign is 
not absolute. It is not the same for everyone, nor is it predetermined from 
outside, nor is it produced by a universal adjustment of all possible speakers. 
A product of history, it is a partial adjustment that arises and prospers within 
a given group, and can be translated into other contexts only by means of 
appropriate operations. 
 Its conventionality reflects its genesis and its use, exhibiting the history – 
the limited history of single communities – out of which it has developed 
and carries the imprint of the sphere in which it has currency by dint of 
being used there for communication. Its use, of course, can be extended, and 
it is possible to find signs whose range of use is extremely vast or which are 
valid for everybody. Even in these cases, however, processes of specifi cation 
and translation are necessary, and these confirm that it is  conventional. It 
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is the mechanism from which signs derive that is general, given that the 
 horizon is largely a common one and that the important features of the 
 species are common. Hence the logic of which contacts are born is the same 
for all men. 
 Nevertheless, the historical products of various contexts are in fact the 
result of evolution in a single, circumscribed context. The conventionality 
of the human sign is its particular mode of being logical – just as, thanks to 
a general principle, the subjectivity and partiality of sign recognition is a 
particular case (or perspective) of the objective, relational texture of things. 
(2) The use of the things. Signs are transmitted and carry meaning, and are 
useful, obviously, because they mean. Use moulds and adapts them just as 
water smooths and transforms pebbles. The existence of a sign is not fixed 
once and for all but varies and is shaped by use. Its variations reflect varia-
tions in cultural and environmental relations as well as expresses – at least in 
the case of some classes of signs – a gradual improvement in its capacity for 
describing and manipulating the world. The sign is at once the instrument 
and the symptom of this improvement. It is clear that the “mobility” of the 
sign is no more arbitrary than its conventionality. It is possible to conceive 
of cultural history precisely because signs change in correlation with the 
intersubjective context and themselves manifest this change, which is con-
stitutionally – and not secondarily or super-structurally – semiotic. 
 Use is linked up not only with the change but also with the economy of 
signs. An exchangeable sign must be adapted to communication. It must, 
that is, possess those features best fitted to ensure brevity and clarity and its 
development must lie in the direction of increasing efficiency of use. In this 
sense we can see signs as subject to a process of selection: the fittest survive – 
i.e. those which are least ambiguous and which best represent the specific 
fields of reference. 
 The problem of the distinction between signs (which has led to so many 
controversies between structuralists and dialectics, between totality and 
opposition) is essentially a matter of use, in the context of the  sociality 
and physiology of the exchange. It is quite natural that signs that can be 
dif ferentiated one from another should be selected by communication 
 situations, but this characteristic does not derive from a structural property 
 existing prior to their formation. 
(3) The logic of the sign. We have already seen how this derives from the 
material, manipulating logic of exchanges. At the human level, this takes the 
shape of a set of operations (addition, inclusion, comparison etc.) based on 
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the hypothetical activity and on generalization, which are themselves always 
operations on signs. Signs come into being and are used within this logical 
system, and at the same time they give expression to it. They are not “given” 
first and then manipulated logically. They grow out of the logic of Man’s 
cognitive operations. This logic is defined with a greater or lesser degree of 
accuracy essentially according to the kind of use made of signs. Since these 
constitute a real historical fact that serves to determine behaviour, this logic 
will not necessarily always be so precise as formal logic. And even the signs 
developed by formal logic for its operations will reveal varying degrees of 
definiteness – i.e. more or less precise outlines. However, we should not 
forget that signs form the bond between man and his context, and that this 
bond is in itself logical. Which is to say that signs both derive from it and 
enable it to function, and will be geared to the degree of “penetration” of our 
knowledge of the context. 
 In the sphere of human operations, a word denoting a myth is just as 
logical as an equation of mechanics. It has its own particular function in 
the logic of exchanges and representation in a given context. Outside this 
context it loses its logic. This shows that logic and use coincide, and that use 
is the movement of logical operations. 
 The logical operations that form signs are, of course, always those of the 
logic of classes. Signs are processes of convergence, are finite in number, and 
some are interchangeable in certain contexts. On their inter-changeability 
depends the Inter-changeability of the operations, which reveal themselves 
as equivalent by this means. 
 Thus signs are not only finite in number (though numerically indefinite 
as regards their possible combinations), but each one also expresses a finite 
number of operations, processes or things. 
 The logic of sets and the concept of class derive from the definition of 
signs. The sign is the symptom of the logical use of the world. It is impos-
sible, moreover, to imagine a logic without some kind of sign system. 
 It is worth stressing that the most formalized signs – those that are most 
general and least ambiguous – are not the only ones “authorized” by the 
“supreme logical function”, according to the Platonic ideal of formal logic. 
They are simply the most useful, usable, general and least contradictory 
tools so far devised. Of course, it is part of the dynamic of hypothetical logic 
at some point to posit more than one logic and to raise the problem of con-
tradiction. But to claim that this means a contradiction between Man and 
his genetic area and his own structure – in other words to hypothesize a dra-
matic rupture in the course of his development – is quite absurd. Logic can 
contain logics and contradictions as one of its logical developments, in other 
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words as the extension of operations which will never be in  contradiction 
with the structure that performs them or with the world from which they 
arise. 
 The problem of contradiction poses itself to the extent that one believes 
(consciously or unconsciously) in a preordained unitary world corre-
sponding to a scheme or set of laws. Laws are not internal rules or the soul of 
things. They are a way of representing the regularity (or non-preferentiality) 
of events with the aid of our own parameters, and they vary historically as 
the latter vary. 
29. Sign systems and codes
Operations of “sign identification” of reality does not occur haphazardly, 
nor are they repeated in an arbitrary manner. They are directed, above all, at 
the reality which is responsible for the generation of the signs, and are per-
formed by a finite number of individuals for concrete ends. Their union with 
the particular context in which they are used is, as we have seen, something 
more than merely “occasional”, since they are exchanged in so far as they are 
historically and culturally created. 
 Clearly, in a situation of this kind, signs do not form a disorderly 
sequence but a system. A sign, in fact, does not come into being in isolation 
but uses other signs to define itself and corresponds continually to a world of 
signs, organizing itself in relation to this and in logical correspondence with 
this. There are, normally, two aspects to this process: one is historical, its 
 factual explanation or description, the other logical, its corre spondence with 
the demands of use and its organization according to functional principles. 
The sign exists in a sign context or system, just as an objective description 
is always built on a rational basis. Thus the organized set of signs corre-
sponding to a given sign function (e.g. verbal communication) forms an 
organized system which is the sum of all the foreseen uses of the signs in 
question. These uses thus define the area in which the signs can be employed 
in the sign context. This confirms the concept according to which not only 
the signs define the system but the system also defines the signs, and shows 
that the link between the single unit and the system is provided by the func-
tional logic of communication. 
 The logic of the substitution of equivalents in operations defining classes 
aims to define both the single sign and sign organization. This delimits the 
inside and outside of a given set – what is included and what excluded – and 
within the set defines the subset. The criteria of membership are functional 
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criteria – namely, what the single sign serves for, and what class it belongs 
to In this way, according to its various functional aspects, an organ or a 
structure is defined, whose single elements can be manipulated with the 
same manipulatory logic with which we explore the world and foresee regu-
larities of behaviour. We shall examine this issue, with particular reference 
to language. 
 The presence of a system and thus of “rules” entitles us to speak of codes – 
in other words of references in relation to which the single sign units receive 
their meaning in the particular historical system being  studied. Never theless, 
in our view it is necessary to be extremely cautious when using terms whose 
scientific analogies are appealing but which can get out of  control and come 
to signify far more as we go on than they did in the initial stages.
 The most delicate issue here is the concept of system – often used as 
a synonym of structure. It is quite natural for a communication complex 
of a given means of communication (for instance, the spoken language) 
 eventually to become a structure in which the single parts are functionally 
correlated. If the coordinated reader confronting a referent is a structure, 
then so is the complex of historically-developed artificial constructs that 
he can use. We have seen how convention, logic and the use of the sign all 
contribute to this end. However, the concept of structure we have adopted 
here is a factual one, namely that of order accumulated during a history of 
options, and not an order imposed on things from outside nature. This is the 
concept of structure that must be retained. 
 The sign system, then, is order accumulated by use, and is always “order 
for” and “order in relation to” something. The degree of order, of course, can 
be rendered observable and measured by comparison with random con-
figurations. But these measurements tell us nothing, in themselves, about the 
genesis of order. What we need to do is interpret the genesis of order as the 
selection brought about by use and see it as promoted (or foreshadowed) by 
hypothetical possibilities and by the construction of artificial objects, whose 
resistance and fitness is subsequently tested. 
 It is during use that individual features set up relationships with the other 
features of the system – like pebbles which are shaped not only by the water 
but also by knocking one against the other. All too often this situation is 
turned upside-down and the “empty” system taken as primary, as if the struc-
ture were somehow independent of the materials it is built out of, or, rather, 
gradually filled up with. According to this approach, what “determines” or 
“explains” the structure is simply its internal rules, the inter relationships, 
from which thereafter the single elements acquire their  meaning. 
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 Structure, on the contrary, is a material fact. It is inconceivable apart 
from the things that go to make it up, define it, and are defined by it. The 
rules do not belong to the structure but to the logic of exchanges that has 
built up the structure in the course of history. The “soul” or explanation of a 
structure lies entirely in its genesis. 
 It should not be forgotten, though, that there are clear priorities even in 
this kind of joint formation of structure and signs. It is things which make 
themselves felt via modes of reading, which means that the signs and system 
thus form a single pole, the other being the referent from which they derive. 
To contrapose a single sign and its system is a false dialectic, explaining in 
terms of oppositions what is interwoven and can have no other explanation 
than that of interconnectedness. The only real contraposition remains that 
between the world and the reader, and it is not a dialectic, but a matter of 
sequence, genesis, operations and interpretations. 
 In this sense, it is things which build interpreting codes and have them-
selves interpreted. An ordered structure exists only in relation to the things 
it has to represent and communicate. Any investigation of communicative 
structures must be based on earlier, internal – historical and logical – ele-
ments. It cannot simply be based on the purely analytical examination of the 
terms as given. A synchronic structure devoid of connections with logic and 
history, which merely organizes signs in relation to one another, is simply a 
verbal expression. 
 One more remark is called for here. There is a tendency to abuse the 
analogy between cultural and biological systems. Though the former are 
built upon the latter, the machinery of their genesis being basically the same, 
this does not mean that they are not profoundly different in their results. 
Biological systems are codes in the true sense of the word – they are fixed, 
transmittable structures varying only due to the selection of accidental 
errors; cultural systems, on the other hand, can be modulated, and are not 
selected by the suitability of the function but foreshadowed by the hypo-
thetical activity.
 The rules for the transmission of natural and cultural codes are radically 
different, and it is illegitimate to push the analogies further than the limited 
sphere in which they are valid. 
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30. Spontaneous vs. constructed systems
The distinction between spontaneous and constructed system may seem 
ambiguous, given that all systems in culture are in some way constructed. 
Yet we need to draw a boundary between fully historical sign systems like 
language and truly artificial systems such as the highway code constructed 
for limited and well-defined circumstances of use, if we are to make research 
methods appropriate to each of these. Here again, it seems strange that 
 semiotics should offer itself as the unitary science of such diverse and hetero-
geneous situations. There are codes which are descriptive – and hence inter-
pretative in the broad sense – and codes which, for example, are  prescriptive. 
The latter, of course, depend for their codification on the logic of communi-
cation, but this is not their real goal; actually they are constructed in order 
to produce certain kinds of behaviour in a particular sector of reality, and 
are thus systems of norms. The overworked example of the highway code is 
a case in point. Its signals consist of a series of prohibitions and permissions 
laid down by an authority for the road-user. Obviously the most appropriate 
and comprehensible iconography is chosen for this purpose. Never theless, 
it is somewhat arbitrary to call these signals a system. Their system is that 
of language. The same holds for those so-called codes which are simply a 
variation of the mechanical means of transmission. It is hard to see how the 
Morse system can be considered a code, or how it differs from the  verbal 
code other than at extremely superficial levels of the linguistic system. 
Where, in this case, are we to find a “structure” if everything boils down to 
the mere transcription of single letters? The situation is quite different, on 
the other hand, in the case of an iconic code that translates the spoken word 
graphically, as in ideographic languages. 
 Similar observations can be made about the meaningfulness of man-
made objects as studied by semiotics. They are certainly signs in the sense 
that they bear witness to the history that has produced them, but to tran-
scribe them into a structural limbo seems something of a divagation. As 
signs, they are not set up in contraposition to other man-made objects but 
form part of a general historical context. It is at this level that they fit into 
the discourse that represents them and links them. 
 Semiotics today seems to be afflicted by a very market degree of reduc-
tionism: shunning pre-human antecedents, it grows barren by con fining 
itself to conventional human products. In this latter area, on the other 
hand, its activities tend to be all-embracing. This is the exact opposite what 
 semiotics ought to be doing – namely to return to the origins on the one 
hand and to make very sharp and accurate distinctions in the field of human 
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semiotics on the other. Communication situations are extremely diversi-
fied and should be studied with due allowance for the conditions of use out 
which they arise. Since knowledge is above all a technique of identification, 
these situations should be studied with different techniques for each case. A 
universal semiotics seems doomed to be a somewhat fruitless enterprise.
 Science as a sign system or discourse in progress aimed at defining the 
referent and involving a significant hypothetical and self-correcting element 
requires separate treatment and will be dealt with later on. 
Second Part. 
From the side of Culture
The characteristics of human communication and 
 language are examined in relation to the concept of 
 gradually more complicated systems of deciphering 
 external and internal meanings.

1. Relationship between natural and cultural semiotics
The first part of this book has been occupied by outlining the natural  history 
of communication – the phylogeny of reading machines. In its later stages, 
this natural history has turned into cultural history and the history of human 
communication. 
 From the standpoint of the doctrine of sign and sign system, the approach 
followed so far may well appear improper. For the semiotician, in fact, the 
starting point of each enquiry begins with the analysis of language as an 
already given system. It would not matter if reference to natural antecedents 
was simply a debt to be paid to custom or a ritual gesture. But the ques-
tion we have to ask is of a different kind: namely are these forebears simply 
shades of the past which can be forgotten, or are they an intrinsic part of the 
problems facing us today? Is phylogeny a purely chronological succession, 
or is it a sequential history in which each stage is subsequently included in 
the next? 
 Scientifically speaking, there can be little doubt today that the second of 
these interpretations is the more valid. Each structure contains the whole of 
its past history in its present working. 
 The delimitation of the field of semiotics constitutes a crucial issue. As 
founded by De Saussure, semiotics is a science of artificial and conventional 
systems, such as language, of course, and all the other inter-human exchange 
system governed by rules (e.g. rules of politeness, the highway code, mili-
tary signs, etc.) In this respect, the general system outlined by Peirce may 
also be non-human, since the process of semiosis occurs wherever there is a 
mediation between an interpreter and a thing by means of an interpretant. 
But in Peirce’s framework, and broadly speaking in Morris’s too, the only 
possible domain for this kind of semiosis is the human one; at least, they 
both conceive interpretation in an anthropomorphic and anthropocentric 
manner. Unlike the De Saussure’s demarcation, Peirce’s does not need to 
postulate either intentionality or conventionality (i.e. the artificial nature of 
semiosis). Nevertheless, in his approach to the problems of semiosis, the sign 
is something already given as a mediator. It is already inserted in a semiotic 
function whose origins thus remain totally obscure. What we must do is to 
go a step further and eliminate not only intentionality but also mediation in 
the most elementary stage of meaning. A sign is not something that officially 
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represents something else. It is a natural object that corresponds to (and is 
a function of) something else. When we use the expression “stands for”, we 
really mean to allude to a material function, even if the term seems to carry 
a highly metaphorical aura. 
 Initially the poles of the semiotic relation are two. It is the thing, which 
is sign in the first place, since it is both interpreted and consumed by a 
reader. Mediation – the sign as an independent entity – comes later, but it is 
important to go back to this biunivocal origin because, in such a perspective, 
the sign no longer refers to an indefinitely long chain (in which one sign is 
explained by another and so on) but to a chain of interactions which are 
finite in number, however many – in other words to the meaning of the sign 
in the sphere where it is used by a reader. 
 The mediation and independence of the semiotician’s sign come into 
being gradually during the process of differentiation of reading machines.
 The most advanced problems – the crucial and basic issues of  semiotics – 
can hardly be tackled without being reinterpreted on a natural basis. 
 Normally, however, they are treated as new problems peculiar to human 
communication, so that, after a specific investigation of their characteristics, 
attempts are made to explore them in depth with the methods of philosophy, 
and semiotics becomes a sort of philosophy of language. Even references to 
history tend to become references to philosophy, and point out, somewhat 
obviously, that present-day problems have their forebears in philosophical 
reflection and can be interpreted as elements of philosophical reflection. 
The training of those involved in the controversy typically, if not universally, 
suffers from this “short view” of history as the dimension of culture debated 
upon by cultivated men. 
 We are not, of course, suggesting that current semiotic research be 
replaced by other kinds of research, or that the field of enquiry be changed. 
Very little, in fact, has been achieved in the way of experimental results in the 
area we have called “natural semiotics”, which could replace cultural semi-
otic research. Moreover, there is no doubt that the continual  refinement and 
systematization of the latter is thoroughly justified in the sphere of  cultural 
analysis.
 What is important is to extend the field of semiotics: we need to dig 
deeper to may uncover what precedes. This task is simultaneous and 
 coextensive with that of institutionally-established semiotics, and ought 
not to be allowed to suffer from possible preclusions against the open and 
experimental nature of its research.
 The scientific point of view we are proposing, then, is not an alternative 
to, but, if anything, an integration of current semiotics. It is worth  specifying 
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here that the term “scientific point of view” is meant to exclude two atti-
tudes which, whether they are scientific or not, are not suited to the type of 
 analysis in question. 
 The first consists in assuming that a researcher, simply by virtue of 
belonging to a corporation that uses the methodology of research, has a 
special title to tackle these problems. Competence can only derive from the 
confluence of an experimental training with a cultural training in the field 
of semiotics in the institutional sense. 
 The second consists in assuming that experimental science has objectively 
obtained results capable of resolving the ambiguities of semiotics. Science 
is very far from doing so, and we have repeatedly pointed out the enormous 
gaps in the phylogenetic framework as regards the level of the organization 
of complexity and communication. Even from the strictly methodological 
viewpoint the contribution of science hardly appears decisive. The definition 
of a method in the outcome of the interpretative activities as a whole, and 
not just of the so-called experimental science. Once physics was supposedly 
the fount of methods: it set out to represent all things in their modes, and 
not just in the modes of the analysis of the physical world. Nowadays, how-
ever, it is generally agreed that no single discipline is delegated to fulfill such 
a demanding task. 
 The scientific point of view consists rather in making the outlines defined 
by the various perspectives of investigation coincide, and in identifying these 
with the outlines of our single world. It consists in giving priority to the 
objective problem of communication rather than to our cultural tastes and 
ideological pretensions. 
 The tendency automatically to split the planes of our horizon into two 
is so deeply-rooted that we really do imagine that there are two worlds, the 
physical and the mental (natural/cultural, material/spiritual) and we reason 
and build our social behaviour on the basis of this assumption. Nor is this 
tendency anywhere near being eliminated by simple convictions, since it is 
more deeply-rooted in us than our convictions, and will only be changed 
by history – in other words, by an evolution of equally concrete social 
 conditions. 
 Our investigation must start from the premise that we are always  talking 
about the world we are immersed in, and that we cannot change registers 
at will when our listeners change. Our problem is to render a single  register 
adequate without changing it, and to use techniques or translation and 
standardization when these are necessary. 
 We must also neutralize the conditioned reflexes of our cultural back-
grounds. The theory of the two cultures (with its associated exhortation to 
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glance occasionally at our next-door neighbour‘s garden) is a symptom of 
our backwardness in this respect. There are n cultures and all are contained 
within a unique complex of things. Their variety coincides with the oneness 
of the horizon in which they have developed, and their interpretation is 
rendered possible, as an operation of translation, by the fact.
 Semiotics too, then, as the science which aims to systematize the opera-
tions of communication and translation, must expand as far as possible and 
try, as it were, to “flatten itself ” against the whole of the horizon, leaving no 
reserved areas unexplored – at least if it wants to live up to its claims to be a 
unifying discipline.
 With these convictions to back us up, we shall now try to explore a num-
ber of general problems of semiotics in its institutional sense. Many of the 
points made in the first part of this book will be returned to: the reader may 
get the impression of something “déja vu”. This impression is quite justified – 
in fact we want to go back along an already-beaten track. This time, however, 
we shall travel in the opposite direction, so what we have to say will be both 
old and new at the same time. 
2. Opposition and universe
The typical procedure used for discovering the universe of commu nication 
is that of constructing, or simply hypothesizing, an overall semantic  system 
governing all kinds of semiotic contact. From this basic assumption are 
derived the descriptions of the single domains and the general modes by 
a process of definition. The characteristic “primum” of many definitions 
is the concept of Opposition, that strange instrument which only makes 
sense within a system itself begotten by opposition and which is to be found 
nowhere else in the world. The operations of distinguishing, associating, 
existing, cancelling or comparing can be found in many fields, but there is no 
trace of opposition except in semiotics, where it seems to be an  inescapable 
heritage of dialecticism. The fact is that opposition can only exist inside a 
system, or closed construction, in which the reciprocal roles have already 
been definitively assigned and where there is no exploration but only the 
confirmation of what is already known. The concept of opposition breaks 
down automatically in a semiotic world where deciphering also means 
exploring and knowing – in other words, the continual appropriation of the 
world. It then remains only as the mode of functioning or as the relation of 
the reading machine with the world and ceases to be the rule of the universe 
of signs. We can go further and say that there is no such thing as a universe 
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of signs, not even in the sense of a construction necessary for controlling 
semiotic behaviour. All this exists is systems of signs, and these are neither 
definitive. The universe is something for which there is no need whatsoever. 
It is simply a name that enables us to invert the terms of the problem and 
deduces from the obscurity of the system what we really ought to construct 
empirically, in a semiotic world where there is no lower threshold and no 
ceiling, no accepted starting point and no pre-ordinated destination.
 A feature of the Platonism of much semiotics is the tendency to do away 
with the referent, constructing a semiotic kingdom and exemplifying com-
munication with abstract reading machines – authentic automatons  capable 
of behaving in a purely, totally “signic” manner – i.e. interpreting and emit-
ting signals on the basis of a conventional framework. What fails to be 
noticed is that these automatons do not actually exemplify anything – least 
of all a universal situations – for they represent the most specific, charac-
teristic creation of natural structures and natural languages in the field of 
semiotics. We fix its categories to the machine and demand that the machine 
itself explains the universe of the categories. 
 If anything is common to systems of human communication, it is 
 neither universal nor systematic, but simply general or functional. Com-
munication processes correspond to inter-subjective requisites and thus 
may, and  perhaps must, be built to some extent on common modes, even if 
they explore different areas of reality. This means that the reconstruction of 
what they have in common is a generalization from the particular, a process 
justified not only by comparative analysis but also by the criterion of the use 
and usefulness of signs. If, therefore, we want to reconstruct general features 
of systems, the first thing to do is to analyse how they work. General semi-
otics, from this standpoint, is a comparative physiology of communication 
systems. 
 As we often remarked, the semiotic activity coincides with the cogni-
tive ones. Meaning – within the approach we have adopted throughout this 
book – emerges from a process of contact, of which the existence of code is 
a facet. Codes are the resultant of the processes that precede them and these 
processes – univocal and standardized as they are (and geared as they are to 
that well-defined species called Man) have been made up uniformly and are 
orientated towards exchange. There is thus no division between the theory 
of codes and communication, and the mode of production of signs. It is a 
single process that deciphers what can be deciphered and exchanged (with 
itself and with others) and constantly links together individual,  col lectivity 
(remote generations of forebears included) and things. When, here and 
now, we choose a specific mode of communication, we make use not only of 
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materials collected by experimental knowledge and then encoded, but also 
of the experimental and hypothetical modes peculiar to the human species. 
Hence, if I choose a word and then combine it with other units of  meaning to 
form a larger unit, all I am doing is using materials established and selected 
in a  logical, adjusted manner, and comparing them hypo thetically with the 
reference situation I want to communicate and understand better or clarify 
or falsify. Codes are an “available” world, a factual one, in the sense that 
they have been created by and are employed in the sphere of human inter-
action – a sphere which functionally expresses the process of knowledge and 
is a function of things and men in contact. To communicate means to be 
inter-dependent with a world which is in itself a semiotic world, given that 
we derive from it phylogenetically. The only way we can see it is through our 
entry sections and internal routes – and these are linguistic ones. This does 
not mean that the world vanishes if we do not read it. It remains  perfectly 
whole but for the possibility of being read by Man. The noumenon is thus 
what comes before, which is what we see phenomenologically and semioti-
cally. Cultural semiosis is no more than an extension of a simpler, natural 
type of reading. The continuum between things and their interpreter,  culture 
and nature, noumenon and its semiotic-phenomeno logical observation, 
is the foundation of all knowledge and can be defined by saying that the 
reader derives from his world he reads. We constantly experience the world 
in communicating it; we constantly create sign situations that become part 
of the world – concrete connecting things which function in  accordance 
with the material logic of exchanges. In short, to communicate does not 
mean to intrude into extra-semiotic areas, but to immerse ourselves in a 
world in itself semiotic, given that it has generated us as its readers. It means 
 immersing ourselves actually and genetically, and retracing the steps of code 
formation, and, further back still, of the formation of natural structures as 
they increase in complexity. The perfection of a purely theoretical  semiosis 
is a residue of the philosophical concept of an all-embracing system, a 
universal key that makes us lords not only of everything we behold but of 
all that it is possible to see. This powerful animal instinct – an instinct of 
possession, however intellectual – goes hand in hand with the instinct for 
purity, whereby we shun contact with others who have not been suitably 
“refined” and seek only “men” – those novel creatures begotten miraculously 
by philosophy and communication. But this is not a scientific attitude. It is 
sometimes argued that the scientific attitude consists of a detachment from 
phenomena and an accentuation of universal operations, in a self-contained, 
typically human sphere. On the contrary, the scientific attitude consists in 
immersing oneself in things, in accepting all the consequences that derive 
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from this, and in admitting that formalization and conceptualization involve 
mingling with things and lead us to feel increasingly bound up with and 
permeated by things rather than detached and pure. 
 Hence, from the standpoint of the need to know (which is just as concrete 
and deeply-rooted in man as the need to eat), what point is there in a “theory 
of semiosis” as such, other than that of excluding a part of our background 
we find unpleasant – though it happens to be our source – and of enabling 
us to reason about the pieces that are left, to which we give the name of 
“Universe” or “Whole”?
 Our need to know is better satisfied by leaving everything open and, 
rather than setting ourselves problems of general theory, by exploring the 
field of communication in functional terms, studying the logical-experi-
mental formation of codes and how these are used in connection with 
an environmental world. This functional field coincides exactly with 
 knowledge. 
3. Concept of communication system
The reality we must start out from, then, is the existence of actual exchange 
systems, which observation and use offer to us. These are of various kinds – 
scientific, linguistic, esthetic, behavioural – and apply to different territories: 
according to their referential and functional domain, they affect behaviour, 
everyday life, objective investigation, the rules governing our relations, 
mythical beliefs, social values and so on. 
 Each communication system enables us to explore a sector of the world, 
or rather, to participate in inter-subjective exchanges relating to a given 
sector of the world. These two formulations are not essentially different – 
simply, the second is more complete than the first. The concept of inter-
subjectivity is in fact implicit in exploration. As we have seen, the linguistic 
character of communication is not something appended to our knowledge 
of the world or its particular objects: knowledge is an objective exploration 
carried out via linguistic and inter-subjective modes. The communication 
system is not a timeless machine that reflects the self or reality according to 
our whims and propensions; it is itself an artificial construction that exists 
objectively because it has been constructed. It is in this sense that it is inde-
pendent of the single speaker and susceptible of becoming itself an object of 
analysis. 
 Thus we must first observe single communication systems and only then 
generalize certain of their aspects, without expecting to be able to extract 
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the Essence of Communication from any or all of them. What we can do is 
study how the various systems coexist and the resultant of their coexistence. 
The object in question is the product of social construction and is geared to 
the capacities assigned by phylogeny to the human species. These consist in 
being able to build artificial communication systems – cultural machines for 
reciprocal connection. Man, in fact, is differentiated precisely as regards the 
expansion of his cognitive area or realm of discourse. 
 We have already stressed the fundamental concept that man is  specialized 
phylogenetically in making connections. The cognitive function is the 
expression of this specialization. Each system of communication, being a 
constructed object, is a product of biology in the broad sense: it is the out-
come of an extensive evolutionary time-span. More specifically it is offspring 
of a history and a geography. Its domain is a given setting in space and time. 
A system is valid within its own genetic area and this is made up of the 
sequence of its constructors, for whom, in the various phases of its evolution, 
it has proved meaningful – i.e. has been used and at the same time trans-
formed by them. Its overall meaningfulness derives from its having been 
continually exploited for precisely that purpose for which it has evolved – 
the inter-subjective exploration of that sector of the world with which it is 
concerned. Its coherence – the de facto coherence of a machine whose vari-
ous parts function unitarily in relation to its environment – is a combination 
brought about and continually modified by use. Unity is adaptation. We can 
thus construct a cultural phylogeny for a communication system and study 
how it has developed in the course of time – not simply in the succession 
of generations, but also in those critical, single historical vicissitudes that 
have occurred, in its contacts and convergences and conflicts with other 
systems, in the pressures and emergencies to which it has had to respond 
with  concrete adaptations. 
 Its coherence is obviously not that of an organism designed as such 
from the outset but that of an object that wears and is renewed, that is 
 contaminated and purified, that recovers from corrosion by means of use. 
It is constructed by the need for communication and by the practice of 
 communication, in keeping with the modules of the species. Coherence 
is thus always incomplete, being limited to the purpose it serves. Contra-
diction, on the other hand, would lead to non-use as well as to the definitive 
decay and disintegration of the system. 
 The historical dimension of a system is thus a metabolism of its single 
elements – that is, of signs and their relations. Behind every system lies the 
multiplicity of individuals that has constructed and developed it. The rules 
governing a system are thus none other than the directives laid down by his 
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history – those points of least resistance along which the elements of the 
system aggregated in order to further inter-subjective communication. 
 Needless to say, the historical dimension so evident in all cultural 
 products is bound up with their geographical setting. The area, or geography 
of the system includes its users – i.e. those who can make sense of and utilize 
the system. But above and beyond a certain number of individuals whose 
reciprocal contact is made possible by the system, the geography embraces a 
sector of the world which the speakers interrogate thanks to the mediation 
of the system. Knowledge is indissolubly tied to this referential world: it is 
necessarily “knowledge of something”. It can take the form of knowledge 
of individuals, in which case the system is not merely a network of points 
of contact but also a vehicle of self-analysis enabling subjects to talk about 
themselves as objects. Or it can be from the outset a discourse about things, 
whether these are seen instinctually as sustenance or scientifically as objects 
of analysis. Both forms, however, share a common feature: the relationships 
set up are always discursive and are achieved through a communication sys-
tem. Clearly this geographical area (the network of communicators and the 
humus of “things” on which they thrive) – which appears to us in the here-
and-now – is actually a cross-section of a flux. If we go back in history, we 
can make any number of sections in the flow of time and each of these will 
constitute the map of the linguistic territory – its geography in the shape 
of its two interdependent elements, speakers and world. If the connecting 
relationship – i.e. the linguistic system – changes, it does so because the 
terms of its geography change. Each “cross-section” at time t shows us the 
machine coherent with time t, capable of carrying out the tasks required of 
it with greater or lesser precision. It is constructed by the individuals who 
have inherited the system from the immediately prior phase, adapting it to 
variations arising in things or in the world of the speakers, and transmitting 
it to those who come after them. But this map also includes the territory that 
has been explored, and this differs from section to section as well as being 
itself in motion. 
 Sometimes the area broadens and the system expands, affecting other 
individuals and other zones of reality. Sometimes it is deflected by the large-
scale input of elements from other systems.
 History, then, is simply a succession of geographical cross-sections, in 
each of which, it must be repeated, the map is not the territory, since things 
are always explored via indirect, intersubjective operations. 
 We must now pause to examine the concept of the historical vari ability 
of a system. Its instability and its dynamic have nothing indeterminate about 
them, even if it is impossible to make forecasts about its evolution. The 
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dynamic is in fact historical and cumulative and is based on processes of 
collective memorization in which earlier stages measure themselves against 
later demands and change the system in an orderly fashion. Here too, how-
ever, we must avoid the temptation to hypostatize the mechanism and to 
argue that “nothing is lost” and that “everything necessarily tends to per-
fection”. In practice, since the process is a historical one governed by reality 
and not by myth, it is subject to all kinds of contingencies and vicissitudes. 
Many things are lost, then, as is testified by time’s immobile sphinxes that 
gaze into the mist of dissolved meanings. And because history is concrete, 
wars, reversions to earlier forms of economy and obsolete forms of  society – 
all these and many other events have affected and continue to affect com-
munication systems, arresting, distorting or accelerating their evolution. 
Nevertheless, on the whole we may say that the march forward of time and 
generations is the march forward of systems of communication, provided 
we employ “forward” as a purely “vectorial” term, purified of all positive, 
progressive connotations. 
 It follows that the term “system” as it is used here has nothing in common 
with the term as it is used in philosophy. It is neither a cerebral construc-
tion nor a definitive systematization. It has nothing to do with a conceptual 
activity aiming to give a description of or precepts for the world. It is simply 
something that functions. If anything – to use a rough analysis – it resembles 
an organism seen at a given point in its development. 
 So far we have examined the evolution of the system from the outside as 
a unitary flux; we must now explore it from within. This means enquiring 
into the single operations that go to make up the network – in other words 
from a historical standpoint, the individual acts that modify the network and 
have combined to set up the communication system. The individual has to 
relate the two terms: the communication system he is capable of mastering 
(the artificial object whose functioning he understands), and the reality he 
can interpret and segment with the aid of the former (a reality whose ambit 
is defined for the individual by the system itself, given that it has been con-
structed for that specific area). He masters new things by means of already 
known discursive techniques: things are predictable, they fall within the 
horizon of competence of the system developed. The individual can segment 
them and then interpret and transmit them inter-subjectively by applying 
the techniques perfected by those who have gone before. However, he does 
not always encounter phenomena homogeneous with his system, nor do 
these always grow into harmony with it – whether because it is incomplete, 
or because things are not necessarily predictable, or because he comes into 
contact with objectively new areas thanks to the increase in the system’s 
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powers of description and manipulation. Thus, however marginal compared 
with the broad stream of its activity, confrontation with situations unfore-
seen by the system occurs – whence the need to adapt these situations to 
render them adaptable to the terms of communication already existent. This 
requires the admission of new elements able to interact with the earlier ones 
and modify their relationship. The expansion of the objective area of inquiry 
and the rearrangement of the communication system therefore go hand in 
hand. It is still the system that mediates the contact since it is the protagonist 
of the process of knowledge. 
 The rearrangement of the system produced by the contributions of new 
situations is possible, however, only because the innovations enter into 
 circulation and the complex absorbs and assimilates them. The overall varia-
tion is extremely small in respect to a single event and can only be per-
ceived by summing the discontinuous events. In other words the coherence 
of the system is automatic, since the only innovations that can penetrate it 
must submit to its logic and measure themselves against the system. They 
become communicable only if accepted or tolerated. In this sense, a coherent 
system must necessarily remain such during the course of its evolution. Its 
mass prevails sharply over the single events that gradually cause it to evolve. 
The philosophies which extol the merits of those capable of a new vision of 
reality and of surpassing the existing system are falsifications: if anything, 
it is a matter of detecting new possibilities hitherto unexpressed, or new 
connections. No one can step outside a system by inventing a new one, for 
the simple reason that any such invention is by definition a non-individual 
operation. 
 What is more, even the unforeseen occurrences faced by the users cannot 
be considered new and unpredictable. What we might term “catastrophic” 
situations can certainly exist, but catastrophes are such for the individual, 
and no communication system is ignorant of these, since they in fact formed 
the original fuel and the foundations of communication – death, dangers, 
the unpredictability of nature. The system functions in spite of and thanks 
to catastrophes precisely because it has to talk about them and provides the 
individual with the linguistic, relational resources of commiseration, grief 
and desperation. The new elements move in the direction laid down for 
them by the communication system. Men focus their attention on what they 
are told to, and is language that tells them where to direct their gaze. What 
they find is not what they, but what the language expects to find. 
 Perhaps this assertion sounds idealistic, suggesting a view of the com-
munication system as an immobile mechanism for constructing destinies. 
But this is by no means the true picture. It is the interpretation of things 
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by means of the linguistic system that brings about the circularity. The 
exploration is guided by discourse and the things encountered modify dis-
course. Thus, one by one, things are transferred into discourse and become 
as exchangeable heritage. The modes by which this transfer takes place are 
those processes of translation of complex signs of which we have spoken 
earlier. 
 When the “new” things encountered are inherent to man, the system may 
undergo profound changes. Yet man in these grafting recognizes – howbeit 
in different shapes and contexts – analogies with his own constitution or 
the underlying logic of his construction. Even here, then, the basic tenet of 
coherence holds: data are transferred in so far as they maintain and con-
solidate the coherence of the whole. This can be expressed directly in terms 
of selection too: that which is not useful is not accepted. If the system as a 
whole were to accept something capable of undermining its functionality, 
it would cease to be an object. This is why there are no cases of incoherent 
systems. 
 So far we have talked about the communication system without speci-
fying further and have used the terms “language” and, more vaguely, “dis-
course” as synonyms. If we are to render the study of the system more con-
crete, we must examine single languages and the way they are spoken and 
written, single scientific languages (including mathematical and  logical 
formalisms), esthetic languages (music, painting, etc.), systems of social 
meaning expressing authority, acquiescence, subordination, etc., systems of 
norms, systems of meaning developed through myth, and collectively estab-
lished modes of psychological meaning of a non-linguistic kind connected 
with pain, love, hate and so on. 
 From this list – which could obviously continue – three types of com-
munication system need to be excluded, for reasons already touched on. 
(A) Those that are totally conventional, i.e. not developed collectively 
such as the Highway Code, the Morse Code or computer code. We are not 
excluding these because they are different from those considered above, 
but because they cannot properly be considered autonomous. The High-
way Code with its system of road signs is simply the last stage of formula-
tion – in a totally conventional and easily standardized form – of a normal 
discourse  involving a situation of inter-subjective exchange and the need 
for rules. To assign it the status of a particular “type” of language and set it 
side by side with natural language hardly seems justifiable. In so far as it has 
been developed historically, it belongs to linguistic and normative systems; 
purely as a set of signals, it would be unintelligible. In fact it is a synthetic 
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and visual mode of discourse. The same holds for purely normative systems, 
such as the Civil or Penal Code, in which a degree of coherence is achieved 
thanks to language in its normal sense. Nor can the language of computers 
be con sidered  autonomous, since it is simply a formalization of a scientific 
language adapted for machines. But this point will be taken up again later. 
(B) A number of systems whose status as communication seems dubious (for 
example the system or code of fashion). Although many ingenious attempts 
have been made to formulate these as systems of communication, it is not 
possible to detect in them any real process of meaningful communication. 
What they reveal, rather, is the display of individual attitudes or social con-
ditioning, in other words, only a preliminary level of the exchange process. 
(C) Social and political institutions. In structural anthropology it is the 
vogue to consider all human products as linguistic, even those which  simply 
require language to be constructed ( in which case it is banal). Yet the best 
will in the world can hardly make human institutions assume the shape of a 
linguistic type of exchange system. No matter how conditioning the social 
nature of the institutions may be, they remain extremely superficial com-
pared with language. It seems puerile, therefore, to propose a horizontal 
connection between the two (for instance, to present language as an author-
itarian social system, and other such Barthesian flights of fancy). More 
 generally, semiotic investigations will do well to resist the temptation to see 
everything “sub specie sociologica”, for the simple reason that it is necessary 
to stress the real social dimension of language. 
Basically, the requirement of a system are dictated by its physiology. The 
analysis of a code in itself does not define the system, just as it cannot be 
defined by the pure reality of its users or by its abstract evolution.
 Three common fallacies are to be found as regards this issue. 
 The first consists in analysing the system as a pure construction (given, 
not functioning) in its various parts and symmetries and establishing its 
“rules”, which also become the rules of the code. But these no more define 
what a system actually is than Pythagoras’s theorem elevates the triangle to 
the status of a system. It is matter of logical formalism and the syntactical 
analysis of language, and concerns the relationship between logic and semi-
otics. This, too, is a problem to which we will return later. 
 The second fallacy consists in taking the users alone as the basic reality of 
the system, reducing communication to a purely synchronic social mecha-
nism in which discourse is created out of nothing and speaks of nothing, 
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ignoring what is outside them that they talk about and what is “behind” 
them that causes them to speak. Communication is the Word in itself: it is 
this which creates the soul of things because in communication it gives them 
an existence that would be otherwise unattainable. The social dimension 
itself disappears completely if we reduce it to the mechanism of the modes 
of exchange in themselves. We end up by presupposing a social texture in 
the abstract. On the contrary, a system, valid within a given area, is used, in 
practice, differently and with various degrees of intensity and efficaciousness 
also inside this area, according to the training and competence of the indi-
vidual users. A language can be exploited to the full as regards its powers of 
expression, or simply used for its minimum denotative function, according 
to the capacity of the speakers. 
 The third fallacy consists in confining investigations merely to the mode 
of evolution, neglecting what has stimulated it (actual inter-individual 
exchanges and collisions with the world outside) and contemplating the 
 system as some kind of extraneous embryo or collective animal which 
can only be defined and rendered intelligible by recourse to some strange 
 philosophy of history (e.g. language as the spirit of a nation). 
 The system is certainly an object in the sense that it can be analysed in 
its components and that it has an existence which is independent of (or pre-
dominates over) the individual, but if it is to be analysed objectively, it must 
be approached via its function, in other words via its connective role in the 
four relationships that constitute it: that between individual and system, that 
between individuals within the system, that between the system and reality 
and that between the system and itself in its various parts and phases. 
4. Signs and system: meaning and context
We started out with an analysis of the sign as the basic element. In elementary 
conditions, the sign is a meaningful object and the process of  deciphering 
is a metabolic exploitation. Hence, in a complex machine that deciphers 
meaningful surroundings, interpretation is the sum of, and the interaction 
of, atomic interpretations. The communication achieved by this interpreta-
tion in the collectivity of interpretants establishes itself as a system thanks to 
an enforced integration of the elementary interpretations. These create a de 
facto situation which in turn affects the reading structures through selection 
and convenience. The complex of relations continually adjust itself, shaping 
itself in situations of compatibility. Nevertheless, as long as signs are pro-
cesses of metabolic exploitation, they maintain their priority. It is only right, 
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then, in a phylogenetic analysis, that this priority be stressed, as it was in the 
first section of this book. 
 However, once signs become fixed as autonomous, exchangeable objects, 
they are composed on a level which is autonomous and pertains to them 
alone, namely on the specifically semiotic level. A system with its own over-
all organicity is developed, subject though it is to historical variations and 
influence. Thus, at the specific level of human communication though we 
must recognize the genetic role of single signs, it is the system as a whole 
that gives meaning to the signs and governs the process of communication. 
We were led to this conclusion by following the “natural” development of 
the discourse. It must be stressed that the material interdependence between 
reading machine and reality does not cease, because the reader still remains 
restricted to the interpretation of his own genetic area. However, in the case 
of Man, objective reality is exchanged though language in its aspect as a 
system of segmentation of reality for the purposes of interpretation and 
exchange. Interpretations is simultaneously knowledge and language: it is 
impossible to separate these two aspects. The language thanks to which and 
through which we succeed in knowing is the cumulative, orientated con-
struction of linguistic experiences, which constitute exploration or, in other 
words, knowledge. 
 Thus the expansion of knowledge which is typical of Man – the  widening 
of his area of competence and the world he is able to interact with – leads to 
the construction, renewal and connection of linguistic systems. We have seen 
how it makes no sense to speak of a sign in itself. A “thing-sign” is meaning-
ful for the machine that reads it – it is a “sign for”. But the human machine 
itself is linguistic, and in Man, a sign is such for a pre- established complex 
which is a coherent system. It is this which is the medium of  knowledge – not 
in the reductive sense that we use a language for the purposes of  knowledge, 
but in the physiological and operative sense that it is knowledge itself which 
constitutes a linguistic segmentation and  procedure. If, as we have  repeatedly 
argued, each structure knows its environment through its own parameters, 
the parameters of human knowledge are essentially those of linguistic seg-
mentation and re-composition. Thus each process of cognition that shows 
Man’s attunement and reactivity to his environment is in practice the attune-
ment of the single datum to the complex of previous, collectively constructed 
data. It is the exploitation and experimentation of the system as a whole in a 
single existential occurrence. 
 What happens in the case of the cognition of a single object, which is 
interpreted within the framework of Man’s objective characteristics (that 
range from perception to the operations of logic), is what happens for the 
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sign in relation to the system of discourse. It is not a matter of parallelism 
or analogy between these two aspects, but of identity. The sign is a real-
artificial object incorporated in the framework of language by means of the 
same indirect, reconstructed mechanisms as those involved in knowledge. 
Of whatever sort, knowledge is a coherent set of data that extends beyond 
the single interpretation enabling us to identify the “sense” of an object. If 
we are inclined to emphasize the particular nature of what happens to us, 
to stress the novelty of the things we encounter, whether they be objects or 
signs, minimizing what is inter-subjective and systematic, this is because 
our standpoint is inevitably partial. In order to reconstruct language and 
its function in communication as a whole, a simple intuitive observation 
will not suffice: what is required is a scientific procedure. Everything of a 
collective nature is overshadowed by subjectivity and has to be recovered by 
knowledge. 
 Thus a single sign is such in so far as it is compared with the collective 
character of its genesis – with the reading machine on the one hand, and 
with the particular sign complex for which the machine is competent, i.e. a 
specific system, on the other. It is this process of integration, in all its histori-
cal concreteness and relational objectivity with respect to the referent, that 
endows the sign with sense. The sign is a “sign for” a systematic machine.
 There is a tendency – especially in linguistics – to concentrate on a par-
ticular typology of signs and classify them either in themselves or according 
to their relation to the immediately contiguous or according to the possi-
bility of anatomizing them into simpler signs: in other words, to treat them 
as elements in some way autonomous that can be analysed autonomously – 
for instance, as regards their genesis. This tendency is not essentially dif-
ferent from what might seem at first sight an opposite approach, consisting 
in considering signs simply as epiphanies of a fixed structure, namely the 
system seen as an ideal machine of oppositions and symmetries. 
 At every moment of the reading carried out by an interpreting machine, 
the real, mobile relationship between sign and system is meaning. Many 
philosopher-semioticians aim to set up a theory of meaning. This would 
appear to offer a unifying “point of view” capable of supplying an explana-
tion for the entire communication process. 
 Our position is that unification consists in finding a relational collo-
cation – i.e. that it implies an extension of all connections and not the search 
for an interpretative key. Unification is the process that reveals the continual 
compatibility between the sign and the system that interprets it. The reading 
machine constitutes the mediation of this compatibility. 
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 In the sphere of meaning, the first temptation that lies in wait is that of 
idealism. It magnifies the reading machine and instead of treating it as a 
product of nature, sees it as a kind of priest that consecrates nature. The most 
semiotic version of idealism is phenomenological intentionality. Through-
out Husserl we find the plane of experience separated from that of mean-
ing, the latter being at all times a step beyond any possible experience. The 
rooting of interpretation in the context of the interpreters is foregone. The 
attribution of meaning is seen as the creative intention of the subject. The 
fact that Husserl specifies that he does not mean the intention is creative in 
the sense of absolute idealism does not alter the situation. On the contrary, 
the necessary correlated of this phenomenological type of communication 
is a strictly objective idealism – i.e. a framework of essences – since it is the 
reading machine that discovers its connaturalness not with the world, but 
with something essentially diverse, “outside the world” and “equal to itself ”. 
The non-homogeneousness of the plane of communication is elected to a 
basic principle or point of view. 
 Those who take the code as the generator of communication follow 
 similar procedure. In a sense, code stands for “system of communication”, 
but whereas in our sense it is system of functioning, for the absolute semi-
ologists it is a philosophical system, a generator of meaning. In this case 
meaning is not provided by the individual or by the whole, but by an imper-
sonal entity upon which the individual draws. Individual interpretation is a 
“comparison” of the event with the code, a movement upwards to the level 
of the code. There is no doubt, of course, that this comparison takes place, 
and we have already insisted on this fact. However, in our particular context, 
“comparison” means insertion, i.e. functional translation, the code-system 
functioning on the same plane as things and being a compatible and utiliz-
able set of things.
 After the semiotic reference (when the object is “intentional”, that is), an 
extra-semiotic relation of empirical verification is supposed to take place. 
In other words, it is implied that there are two stages: first a stage involving 
comparison with the code and the intentional attribution of sense, then an 
extra-semiotic stage of verification. This is tantamount to saying that there is 
an illumination followed by a verification of the illumination. In this version, 
the code has all the appearance of a new edition of the Holy Spirit. To sepa-
rate semiosis from knowledge is idealistic. The fact is that they form one and 
the same procedure, and the semiotic attunement to the codes implies all the 
operations of empirical verification. Meaning is in no way detached from the 
operations themselves. Interpretation goes hand in hand with verification. 
The collocation of a datum in its background of meaning embraces all the 
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operations that sanction the collocation itself. A collocation is always mobile 
and has always to be demonstrated. Meaning must always be conquered as 
a connection between the terms of the communication process. 
 In theories of a unifying type, it is always possible to detect a conscious 
or unconscious striving after a universal grammar or supreme codes. This 
leads to a radical split between semiotics and knowledge, with the result that 
we no longer know what semiotics is. 
 An “optional” aspect of this kind of approach is that of  conventionality. 
The process of attribution of meaning takes place through the selection of 
meaningful features and presupposes the existence of an entity “already given 
by others” called the code. What is forgotten is that the process whereby 
the interpreter selects the meaningful features is at all times a process con-
ducted on a thing: it is the thing that filters our modes of conceiving it and 
lets through those that are adapted for communicating it. To be adapted 
expresses a clear-cut concept: the phylogenetic adaptation that has taken 
place during the formation of reading machines.
 It is true that these selected and standardized modes form an opera-
tive unit, namely that which we call the system. Nevertheless, this is quite 
 incapable of acting on a purely conventional basis without the direct inter-
vention of things. The biunivocal relation between Man and codes is illu-
sory. Codes as such are always part of the process, which is not a private 
transaction between codes and readers. We cannot relegate the relationship 
with things to a lateral activity called knowledge. Codes have been con-
structed by things, which is the reason why they serve to handle things. They 
are not ghosts of things, but are related to these by a complex mechanism 
of translation. What difference does it make if, instead of describing the 
code in all its articulations (which include the typology of signs, the rules of 
the grammar and the manual of instructions), we opt for an elastic code in 
which each sign sends us to another sign? If we explicate these links in terms 
of conventionality, we shall never escape from the vicious circle of the code 
as an immobile machine. 
 If we turn to the radical versions of conventionalism so often formu-
lated in the realm of logical neo-positivism, they appear completely incom-
prehensible. How is it possible to communicate by means of a stipulation 
that speaks only of stipulations? It is hard to see where objects have finished 
up, and where the language that enables us to use them has gone. 
 Faced with the difficulties of conventionalism and the myths of idealism, 
the more realistic of the semiologists have countered with a behaviourist 
approach. The response is the meaning. To ask ourselves about the nature of 
meaning is a scientific non-sense. All we can see is a sign and the response to 
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a sign. The response is the only document that enables us to say that a sign 
is such, that it has meaning. 
 This is the attitude of the most illustrious founders of semiology. Peirce 
tells us that the meaning of a thing consists of the habit that it implies. In 
the pure Pavlovian system we see the saliva of the dog; here we see more 
 complex responses to signs which are far more closely interrelated, but 
the meaning does not change. Morris’s position is basically the same. In 
the domain of scientific discourse, Bridgman’s operationism and Skinner’s 
psychology have developed in the same direction. Even logical positivism, 
though in some respects it represents an opposite viewpoint (it cannot be 
denied that logical neo-positivism has a touch of idealistic Platonism), has 
certain connections with this line of thought.
 The pragmatic approach is undoubtedly a methodological advance on 
semiotic Platonism. However the “pragmatists” – to use a loose term for the 
rather heterogeneous category mentioned earlier – reject Platonism on the 
basis of the assumption that an explanation of meaning cannot really exist. 
To say that meaning is simply what we observe to be generated in a  situation 
(which we term “signic” [segnica] for this very reason) means, in other 
words, that it is futile to raise the problem of the black box. We can simply 
record the relational effects and on the basis of our observation assign the 
name “meaning” to this relation. This attitude is widespread in science today. 
It is nurtured by a reaction to the shadowy concepts of  philosophy that has 
driven scientists to take up a diametrically opposite position and become, 
in a sense, more Catholic than the Pope. Ultimately, what it amounts to is 
the concept of explanation. It is true that, if we exclude occasionalist-type 
isomorphism, there is a real correspondence between  certain things and the 
effects they produce, in other words between signs and induced  behaviour, 
and it is equally true that we observe behaviour as an effect. But the prag-
matists maintains, broadly speaking, that the only pos sible explanation 
consists in observing the correspondence between stimulus and response, 
whereas it is possible to push explanation much further and deeper whilst 
remaining within the immanence and identity of planes linking the sign to 
its effects. Isomorphism must be explained in genetic terms. A theory of 
meaning, therefore, is possible, and must be sought at the roots of the com-
munication process. To explain meaning consists in  finding out how the 
correspondence between thing-sign and the effects on the  reading machines 
arose. 
 The marxist interpretation of Schaff comes closer to the point of view 
adopted here. It stresses the sign’s character of a social relationship and social 
construct. The genetic root of the meaning process, that is, is found in the 
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practical social activity of Man as it has developed in the course of history. 
It does not simply resort to the black box, or give up the attempt at explana-
tion, but tries to explain the correspondence between linguistic systems and 
codes on the one hand and language users in their practical manifestations 
on the other. The explanation is the process in which the two protagonists 
have historically modelled themselves up to the resultant observed in an 
instantaneous cross-section of time. 
 Nevertheless, this view is incomplete. If meaning is a social product, how 
have men managed to become social? The origin (the explanation) should 
not be sought in men’s sociality, but in their becoming social. In the  process 
of formation of social man, the sign system has had a central role and the 
whole of society has been moulded by the evolution of inter-subjective 
 systems which have played an active part in determining man’s characteris-
tics, orienting these towards inter-subjective connection. Man should not be 
seen as a social being who produces language, but as a being that becomes 
social by means of language. It will be clear from what was said in the first 
 section of this volume that this linguistic “self-creation” is none other than 
the continuation of a biological self-construction begun far earlier. The field 
of semiotics is the process of humanization. 
 Thus it is legitimate to pose the problem of meaning, going beyond the 
mere study of its effects, provided we approach the issue in genetic terms. 
This leads to the interpretation which is at once historical and synchronic 
and which can be summed up in a single statement: meaning derives from 
context (or: meaning is position in context). This holds both at the level of 
the here-and-now, when we examine a sign within the background in which 
we have interpreted it (the word in the sentence, the sentence in our attitude, 
etc.), and at ever higher, “historical” levels – the meaning of a word in the 
context of operations that have generated and established it culturally, and, 
going back still further, the context formed by the system of things and inter-
preters and by their natural and cultural parameters. Meaning is precisely 
the possibility of creating references and expanding the context. The singe 
sign is inserted into the complex of surrounding signs and gives it meaning, 
and these signs in turn are sanctioned by every-widening contexts. But this 
should not make us lose sight of what is “the meaning of meaning”: attune-
ment to physical and cultural reality, both our own and that of others. In 
the process of meaningful communication, we retrace in the opposite direc-
tion a path of collocations that starts from the origins in order to identify 
something that lies ahead of us and that, in this sense, we do not yet know. 
In order to know the future of interaction in the exchangeable form we 
must resort to the past of interaction and compare the new with a series of 
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 established contexts. It is this kind of operation which makes the new inter-
pretable as a sign and exchangeable. Meaning-context represents the varying 
range of application and use of a given term in the  physiology of linguistic 
communication. There is a denotative use that refers to a  certain context, 
and there is a connotative use in which the context broadens and references 
change, and this can sharply modify the former or even be entirely dif ferent 
from it. There is no doubt that we need to know the terms of contextual 
reference if we are to understand connotative meaning, and this confirms 
how the physiology of meaning works in a continual process of adaptation 
between sign, system and the things meant and referred to. 
5. System and referent
In the outline we have traced so far, the close relationship between these 
two terms is clear. The system exists in so far as it is a mechanism capable 
of effectually manipulating the referent, without which it would be devoid 
of sense. It can do so because it is on the same plane as the latter and has 
material existence and bulk: i.e. it is itself a referent endowed with particular 
properties. The last reason – so to say, summing up – for the homogeneity 
between the linguistic system and the things of which it speaks, is that the 
system derives from the things, and consequently the way it speaks derives 
from the reality about which it speaks. What makes it possible to commu-
nicate is the connatural relationship between system of reference and its 
reference, between interpreting structure and things, established genetically 
through evolutionary processes. It does not seem necessary to insist further 
on the overall phenomenon of communication with its historical hinterland 
and its present exchange network. On the other hand, an aspect that does 
deserve attention here is the role of mediation of the system in the process. 
 We know – and we have discussed this issue in detail elsewhere1 – that 
knowledge consists of a series of identifications of the environment which are 
“centralized” or channelled to the structure, which is capable of  examining 
them in perspective and stripping the reference of any immediately meta-
bolic overtones, objectifying it by means of a kind of attention or intention. 
Here the role of the self consists above all in not intruding too much and 
avoiding making its influence felt above and beyond the limits laid down by 
cognitive techniques. 
1 La scienza, il potere, la critica. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974.
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 However, the framework of a biunivocal relationship between reality and 
the adapted structure is too confining. In certain circumstances, a response 
is in fact triggered off by a stimulation to which the individual reacts. The 
response may be extremely complex from a physiological point of view, it 
may even be socialized, and it may be based on a certain degree of learning. 
Nevertheless, it remains immediate, in the sense that it is not based on the 
mediation of a system of artificial objects, i.e. on the mechanism of linguistic 
communication. 
 We have seen that in a structure with a narrow entry section – in other 
words, one that derives from and is adapted to a limited, uniform  ecological 
niche – sign and referent coincide, and that the problem of the organiza-
tion of signs does not exist in itself. The presence of the thing means that 
the structure recognizes the thing and is modified by it at one and the 
same time. The various signs organize themselves because they are so to 
speak  “assembled” on the thing. The identification of the thing grows more 
 complicated to the extent that structures arise, adapted to this degree of 
complication or multiplicity of sign and reference. The materiality of the 
interpretation coincides with the materiality of the exchange. However, 
when structures acquire the capacity to replace direct sign interpretation 
with a trace, the system necessarily gets under way. This is because the 
 problem arises of arranging the traces within and reproducing internally 
the various operations of physical identification that formerly took place 
materially during the contact with the outside. 
 This does not alter the biunivocal relationship, since what was instanta-
neous in the reflex to the referent is simply memorized and protracted in 
time. Nevertheless it forms a phylogenetic condition open to further devel-
opments. We have already pointed out that the mediation via sign traces, 
which become internal signs, maintains the physicality of the process as well 
as its link with the referent. Obviously the imprecision, ambiguity and extinc-
tion of traces forms part of this connection. And there is no doubt that this 
translation into an internal operation leads to the subjective identi fication 
of the objectivity and reality of the thing. Yet this process of  interiorization 
does not go ahead intransitively, as if it were a private matter between struc-
ture and thing. It is a public event into which the collectivity enters in many 
respects. The things recognized and memorized are objects of convergence, 
consent and competition for a plurality, and are objective terms of a number 
of structures. This is because each objective identi fication is accompanied by 
a change in the reading system and this change may be felt – and suffered, 
too – by others, since the relation between a single structure and a sign 
increases its material bulk toward other structures.  Moreover, the  capacity 
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for interiorization is itself a cause of selective preference in  evolution and 
hence, as we have repeatedly stressed, serves to mould the collectivity in 
which such capacities develop. In short, the relationship between referent 
and structure at a certain degree of complexity is necessarily a network that 
involves a collectiviy. At this point the sign becomes a trace which can be 
rendered manifest by a behaviour recognized as a display by, and valid for, 
the collectivity that uses it. The behaviour itself is a material fact which 
can be traced back to the environmental complex by means of a series of 
intermediate operations. The behaviour indicates the things by means of an 
 attitude. Reception-display forms the groundwork of subjectivity. It is on 
these that animal learning is based. 
 However, all this does not yet amount to a communication system. This 
can arise when two facts occur: (a) when the reception-display network is 
translated into a mechanism that persists beyond the immediate behaviour: 
in other words, when we get an analysis of objective conditions and they are 
segmented into standardized, reproducible behaviour units – i.e. when the 
situation of “words” arises; (b) when the hypothetical faculty comes into 
being, whereby possible situations can be proposed on the basis of past expe-
riences and then checked to see if they correspond to real states of affairs 
(and once again it must be stressed that hypotheses are material states of the 
structure). It is clear that the second of these situations has generated the 
first, since it is impossible to conceive of a mechanism for the segmentation 
and standardization of behaviour other than on a hypothetical basis. This 
has taken place as a social fact, since the force that urges on functional dif-
ferentiation is the attunement of a plurality of individuals to things and to 
each other.
 What this amounts to is that connections with the referent are entirely 
mediated by the system, which comes to be an attuned complex of sign 
 presences referring to things.
 The implications are obvious: there is no knowledge other than linguistic 
knowledge, because language is born of the relationship with others. And 
there is no knowledge other than that which is concrete, bound up with the 
referent, because language is born of the relationship with things. 
 Language, knowledge, and the presence of things are mutually inter-
dependent. At the inter-subjective level, the linguistic system is what we 
have termed the “entry section” and “paths” at the individual level. Each 
instance is subjectively available through the specificity of the structure; in 
other words, through the state of affairs that make the structure fitted for 
what it recognizes. If reality is interpreted in a complex, inter-subjective 
manner, it cannot be grasped other than through communication systems. 
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These are in particular organs with which the interpreting collectivity – a 
cultural complex at time t1 – is endowed. 
 The genesis of the communication system is no different from that of 
individual entry sections and paths. We have already insisted on the fact that 
the system is not superimposed on natural evolution like some sort of con-
ventional process, which would be quite inconceivable in the initial phase of 
cultural development. It has grown out of natural evolution, simultaneously, 
determining structures marked by the natural capacity to make these kind 
of connections. 
 Thus all systems, for all their variety and particularity, share the property 
of acting as inter-subjective attunements to reality (including, of course, the 
reality of the elements of the collectivity itself). They change and evolve 
without losing their raison d’être: to communicate something to someone. 
 It is precisely their function of material intermediation that prevents 
them from ever transforming themselves into Systems with a capital S – i.e. 
systems with internal rules independent of their cognitive purpose. This is 
why their coherence is a necessity deriving from the fact that they serve a 
purpose, and not from their supposedly being obedient to universal rules. 
 In other words, the relations between things and the structure that  utilizes 
them remaining “rigid” or “inelastic” in the sense that it is the structure 
which recognizes the incidence of reality through correlated changes. But 
when the incidence is collective and communicable and takes the shape of 
an inter-subjective exploration, the inelasticity obtaining between interpreter 
and referent, though conserved, expands over the network of referents via the 
system of communication. There is no point in insisting  further on the sys-
tem’s status as a material, physical, really existent object: it is  literally a con-
necting machine developed through use by a collectivity of users, and it pre-
serves to the full the material of its past history. The system is the proof that 
the experimentation carried out on things is not an individual and instanta-
neous matter, but a collective and historical one. We shall  analyse later the 
linguistic system whose domain is the relationship with the  referent – i.e. 
science – and deal there with the specifically semiotic aspect of the problem. 
 What needs stressing here is the objective-referential character of system 
and signs. The system too is a reality, a referent. It is not the interaction in 
itself that constitutes sense, but the social operations that have produced the 
system and made it into a concrete presence. The intention is only the act of 
concentrating on a specific communicative event; meaning is an objective 
condition independent of intention. If a sign can give rise to ambiguity, this 
is not a proof of its intentionality, but of its “thingness” – that is to say, of the 
possibility of an erroneous collocation of the thing in its interpreting system. 
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6. Existential situation, knowledge, language
A situation A is defined linguistically as the communicability of A. By 
 “communicability” I do not mean a technical phase of “setting in shape” 
what is to be communicated, or of pure exchangeability. I mean above all 
communication to myself, setting-in-shape for myself, categorization. And 
this is nothing other than exploration in terms of knowledge-and-language. 
The setting-in-shape of communication must therefore have all the features 
of exploration. It must:
(a)  identify me as subject,
(b)  identify the terms of the framework,
(c)  identify the relations of mutual transformation (activity, passivity).
This is the syntax of the cognitive relation and it necessarily informs any 
“discourse to myself ”. For reasons given above, knowledge is in itself inter-
subjective because it has developed phylogenetically in the basis. This syntax 
will thus never be a private matter, but will be syntonizable and exchange-
able. Thus my “subject” includes my being an object for other my being 
native includes others’ being passive; the object implies being seen by 
 others. All this forms part of the syntax, which is transformational in the 
sense that it constitutes the scaffolding of reciprocity. Furthermore, in the 
expression that defines subject and direct object and reciprocal terms, lies 
also the “dynamic” or “technique” of the exploration operations. Syntax is 
never  simply a general and purely categorial-rational setting-in-shape of 
 experience. It is not a static arrangement of a representation but a shaping 
for operative purposes. 
 If the object-term is not known and we want to define it, this implies 
the interrogative form as a resultant; if the object-term is still uncertain, 
this implies the hypothetical-conditional, and so on. All these constructs 
derive from an existential position and correspond to actions that are 
 particular-of-everybody. This is the first cognitive-communicable aspect of 
the  syntax of relations with the world; in it, it is possible to recognize the 
surface structure of a language, or sentence, retranslated into deep structure. 
The logic of syntactical operations makes more detailed identification pos-
sible. This too remains a general operation. From the general we descend 
to the identification of meaning according to our specific historical con-
formation (historical-natural and historical-cultural). Thus categorization 
and naming are simultaneous operative processes. If I identify an object in 
my existential collocation, I identify it as object of the syntax of knowledge 
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(i.e. “there is an object”) and at the same time as object of the logical use of 
syntax in the specific circumstance (“this object, here”). 
 This operation, however, is not one of “pointing”, otherwise the object 
would be incomprehensible. It is a reference to a category established within 
the cognitive-inter-subjective situation of the individual, and this is defined 
by the system. The act of categorization is mobile and is carried out in order 
to interpret the situations in which I am immersed and to link them via 
knowledge-and-communication. I find the name by means of categorizing: 
i.e. connecting the specific expression with a stock of “encoded categorial 
experience” which is an a priori with respect to existential situation A. This 
complex store of experience is organized in categories precisely because it 
is organized naturally, in a form that can be used for communication. The 
entire cultural a priori is already so in shape in a cultural manner, not, how-
ever, for extrinsic reasons of exchange but for intrinsic reasons of the gen-
esis of language. Categorization is thus a function by means of which we 
face the world on each occasion. That is, it is a process by its very nature 
mobile, dynamic, and exploration-oriented. To find a name means carrying 
out this operation using nominal categories until we have “filled them” with 
the experience and the syntactical “setting-in-shape”. Naming operations are 
thus logical. To find a name means admitting a complex of perceptions to 
internal circuits of equivalence, inclusion, comparison, i.e. using the ana-
logical function which is at the basis of categorization. This is followed by 
an outward movement that makes use of a series of retro-active evaluations 
to see if the name has been correctly chosen, if the categorizing operation 
fits the description of situation A. All this clearly implies the hypothetical 
function: it would be incomprehensible were it not for this new phylogenetic 
condition peculiar to Man. 
 To categorize also means to use categories experimentally, inserting them 
in the circuit from which they once emerged. They involve at all time an 
operative utilization, entailing operations of inclusion-exclusion of internal 
analogues orientated towards the external world, true or supposed as the 
case may be. If we examine the procedure whereby we explore cognitively 
the existential situation A, what we observe is the identification of an x. The 
syntax is filled by the categorization. All logical operations are categorial 
identifications, and identify the “particular” as the object of the discourse. 
 It is this which constitutes the “deep structure”, which is a cognitive cat-
egorial situation already set up, cognitively, in discourse terms. Chomsky’s 
deep structure is less true at the technical-linguistic level than a profoundly 
discursive-cognitive-interpretative level. It constitutes the exploration- 
143Second Part. From the side of Culture 
identification of situation A by the cognitive inter-subjective means of a 
subject S who can exchange things with other subjects. 
 The transformational component is implicit in this operation. It  consists 
of a another series of attitudes (of a specifically linguistic-phonological kind) 
by means of which the known and communicable situation A becomes 
 actually (technically) transmittable to other Ss through a concrete  language. 
It is not a conventional translation, however, because all languages are born 
of an inter-subjective condition which remains always the same, and are 
born to achieve knowledge of the various situations A which remain always 
the same. Thus the various languages represent the same deep structure and 
the differences between them derive from their particular history. Each his-
torical and cultural path is peculiar to a group and shows a certain degree 
of differentiation. Languages may differ both phonologically and as regards 
their surface syntactical construction, but they all display a subject, an object, 
certain basic relative situations (e.g. to be inside, outside, near or far, to go 
away and to enter, etc.) in which the framework of objective  reference (the 
horizon) fully participates. They all have an interrogative form, a  dubitative 
form, a past, a present, a future etc. and they are all based on the identi-
fication of data through an exploration that utilizes the past experiences of 
knowledge.
 The whole process is operative: history is always called upon in the 
interpretation, and it is attuned to the specific situation A. The relationship 
between existential situation A and the phylogenetic and cultural history 
which creates the possibility of interpretation, is a linguistic one. 
 Thus it is by means of these constants of language, or syntax, that we 
insert existential variables in a uniform logical process. The operative 
process inserts existential situations, categorized into types, into syntactic 
manipulations. 
 What distinguishes the various languages, then, is the way the experience 
of the group is translated into categorial terms. It is partly a matter of purely 
phonological differences (the choice of one or another term to represent a 
category) or superficial syntactic structures (one construction or another for 
the interrogative, for example), and partly of a (limitedly) different area of 
categorization, to the extent that the experience of the group is peculiar to it. 
 What I do, then, when I try to detect a deep structure beneath a  surface 
structure (a sentence in Italian, for example), is to discover not the  sentence 
set in form, but the cognitive exploration set in form, and this in itself 
is  linguistic. To look for the deep structure thus means to discover the 
 syntactico-logical processes that enable to explore the world through that 
sentence. The sentence, then, is the symptom of my exploration of the world. 
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 Knowledge is always discursive. This fact has profound and widespread 
implications. Given the abuse of terms, it is perhaps advisable to render the 
idea by turning the sentence round: all discourse is cognitive, is an opera-
tive exploration, and consists in the hypothetic interrogation of the world by 
means of inter-subjective instruments.
7. The linking function
Having examined the relationship between signs and system, and things and 
system, we must now turn to another connective aspect of communication: 
that which links individuals via the system. Taking it for granted that the 
system realizes an object of convergence, and that we can only communicate 
with others with its mediation (as we have repeatedly demonstrated) we 
must now examine the operative aspect of the problem, namely the mecha-
nism whereby inter-individual connection is brought about. 
 The point on which the process is based is the homogeneity of the group 
as regards the particular mode of communication, the specific system, that is. 
It is this which identifies operatively those that are homogeneous by means 
of its capacity for being utilized. This is a fact of considerable importance: 
homogeneity does not exist prior to the system but through and within the 
system. This means that since systems are multiple and variable, there can 
be no such thing as an overall Homogeneity; in other words there is no 
such things as the Group, much less the privileged Group. What we find is 
an aggregation which, case by case, defines itself in practice by the use of a 
particular system. Its homogeneity must thus be continually demonstrated 
by the use of common instruments and may be disintegrated or continually 
expanded. It follows that, given the collective aspect of these instruments, 
the group forms itself upon them, so that the instruments of communication 
constitute the historical definition of the collectivity that creates them. This 
once more confirms the operational and immanent character of this inter-
subjective machine. Thus the area of use is the area in which homogeneity is 
identified, as well as being the genetic area. At the human level, what holds 
true for the sign in general comes to hold true for the system. The reading 
machine builds itself upon things which become signs by this token. The 
collective machine forms itself by attuning itself to the complex of things 
shared, and these, by dint of being shared, constitute the system. 
 Of course, given that the operation is a cultural one, mobility is greater, 
and the time required for development is shorter than that purely natural. 
Moreover, the complex of things is due to a large extent to the enormous 
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mobility of other subjects. Nevertheless the dynamic of the situation remains 
the same. 
 Let us consider, then, a group which can be identified as homogeneous 
in relation to system n1 at a time t1. A member m1 tests his homogeneity 
to an m2 making use of the intermediary, n1. But he has to start from a 
 single situation and check the reaction of an m2 to a situation transmitted 
to him through the system. This signifies that homogeneity is not only rela-
tive to the system, but also that it is continually tested against the particular, 
in other words, by the use of the system in a specific referential situation. 
It is true that the system is general in nature in comparison with a single 
identi fication: one of its linguistic expressions: i.e. an operative schema – 
permits the connection of an indefinite number of situations and leads to 
a typi fication and standardization of situational possibilities. Nevertheless, 
the direction of the process remains that of defining more accurately the 
concrete, single operation in question. Once again, then, generality appears 
as a device for penetrating the particular more effectively, and the logic of 
communication systems consists in being ever attuned to the particular 
by means of operations which for this reason are general. Generality is a 
 product of logic and is defined historically by use and by users. Thus the 
system is simply a complex of standardized routes for transferring situa-
tions meaningful for the whole inside the whole. These routes do not exist 
if “empty” but only if filled and concretized by the referent. This is obvious 
at the level of language – a particular language at a precise moment of its 
evolution. Syntactical structures do not exist unless filled by their objects 
(words); they form types of connection for many different words and are 
thus modes of standardization. They correspond in turn to real operations. 
Words, too, cannot exist unless they refer to something – not in a directly 
denotative sense but in a much broader sense: they arose as a reference to 
something and for handling something. Language, then, constitutes itself as 
a system in which references to environmental realities unite and combine 
by means of syntactical modes. 
 It is worth noting that from this standpoint the opposition between word 
and language, or word and syntax no longer subsists. Syntax is not a combi-
natory device that comes into play once words have been produced in order 
to combine them and put them together. Rather, it is manipulatory in itself, 
since it reflects referential operations and combinations like the single things 
and actions that fall to words. The latter, moreover, do not come into being 
in isolation but in operations, and therefore are born for communicability. 
They arise inside the syntax. Words cannot but be exchanged, and exchange 
cannot exist without words. Each system is such in so far as it has a syntax; 
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but the latter is not general: it depends on the semantic elements connected 
with it. Syntax and signs depend on, or are relative to, a reality they serve to 
connect. 
 This is not merely the physical reality or sensorial identifications, of 
course, but also that established by other linguistic operations and that 
takes the form of statements, behaviour, etc. Even the most extreme form of 
 mathematical formalization is a thing that is communicated. It is the reality 
of constructed operations and of the “text” in which they are encoded. 
 Thus – to return to the mechanism of inter-subjectivity – the system is 
a “filled-in” syntax which permits the circulation of operations defined by 
the hypothetical mechanism as probable or possible on the basis of contents 
of experiences elating to environmental circumstances. This is the  linguistic 
exploitation of reality in which the individual participates actively. The 
inter-individual relationship mediated by the system, then, is a process of 
translation and attunement. This process is made possible by the fact that 
the system itself has been selected by use for this purpose. The problem of 
how to define a kind of intentionality for use, whereby, given a certain set of 
environmental circumstances, we must demonstrate why these are translat-
able and which system is the optimum one, is a badly formulated problem. 
 In any case, the system allows the translation of things into behaviours 
that signify things. These behaviours are not analogues of things, but of the 
attitude of reception of things. They therefore signify things by means of a 
translation which is a behaviour and defines itself as a sign. 
 Nor is this a “behaviour in itself ”: it is a behaviour received. Both in 
the case of things and of signs, what are translated are operations of identi-
fication of things and of interpretation of behaviour. It is precisely this 
sequence of translation processes that forms the relationship and the 
exchange. We have already mentioned the fact that, no matter how long the 
chain and how complicated these correspondences and their physiology in 
terms of cerebral processes, the operations are extremely inelastic. We have 
also noted that linking operations are efficacious because they possess a bulk 
and a physical influence. The system is thus an object that can be examined 
like a thing. We must avoid the mistake of seeing it as an abstraction, as if it 
had been generated outside its natural environment. 
 It should be remembered that systems may be very different and reveal 
very different degrees of complexity. They do not link one component of 
Man to another. They are thus not “rational”, for example. Their functional 
character is a practical outcome of the exchange, and has nothing whatever to 
do with our concept of rationality or rigid categorial divisions. What we may 
say is that they have their own particular logic, and this remains  basically the 
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same whether intellectual or emotive communications are involved. Their 
inter-individual itineraries may be extremely brief, but their mediating role 
remains. We may cite mimicry as an example of an  apparently direct form 
of communication. 
 The conclusions to which these observations on the linking system have 
led us may appear, at this point, extremely mechanistic and deterministic. 
How can we explain “non-natural” rationality if everything depends on the 
connections of the elementary material model? 
 Apart from the ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with terms 
like “mechanicism” and “determinism”, we shall see later that a mechanical 
composition does not necessarily give rise to a mechanical system. Man is 
inside the system, but he has an extremely broad view of it; moreover he can 
trigger off his memory deposits internally, construct those artificial objects 
we call hypotheses, and come to grips with reality. His linking system is very 
vast indeed. Man’s freedom is not a vague new property. It does not come 
into existence with him, but arises in nature through him, out of previously 
existing materials. Freedom constantly measures itself against data, and is in 
itself a relational capacity. In this respect, the ability to construct hypotheses 
(freedom) is the foundation of rationality.
8. System as compatibility
The connective character of the system is evident not only at the level of 
the link with the referent, or between individuals, or between the parts that 
make up the system, but also in the connection between the various phases 
of the system itself. In other words, in its continuity, a continuity which is 
functional.
We have already drawn attention to the following points:
–  all systems evolve;
–  evolution depends on the expansion of the interpreted area (that is on 
the extension of contacts with the referent and on the complication of 
inter-individual discourse, which is based on the hypothetical activity). 
Each of these two aspects stresses the coincidence between knowledge 
and the communication system. All acts of cognition are brought within 
the domain of discourse because they are carried out by, and implicate, 
the system. It is not only a matter of acts of cognition of what is new – i.e. 
those related to areas explored for the first time (by scientific research or by 
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specifi cally linguistic tools such as poetry). It also holds for the  knowledge 
normally employed for everyday actions, whose operational logic is con-
stantly confirmed, together with the system (or language) that makes it 
possible. In fact this latter use of knowledge is obviously the main one. It 
is this which forms the real internal coherence of all system which, as we 
have made abundantly clear, exist and operate because they serve a  purpose. 
There is thus a predominance of discourse and knowledge inherent in the 
accustomed panorama and the ordinary operations. This displays what is 
in a sense the static, predictable aspect of the system’s adaptation to the 
 environment, though this too remains at all times an operative activity. 
 It must not be forgotten that the real stability of a system consists of its 
normal, routine performance of known and repeated operations. It is this 
dominant mass of connections that ensures sufficient inertia for the sys-
tem to be able to absorb, in addition, whatever it can “pick up” during its 
exploration of the hitherto unknown. This process is similar to that of the 
onto genetic formation of the intelligence, during which the acquisition of 
the new is subordinated to the continual recycling of the pre-existing; acci-
dental, sporadic contacts are treated as devoid of sense and left out. It reflects 
the overall adaptation of the operative system to its situations, which is what 
constitutes its logic. The system shapes itself on the surface of things and 
continually maintains its adherence to them. It registers new things because 
it is capable of fitting them into its syntax and naming them with the means 
at its disposal. The new elements admitted to discourse in correspondence 
with new areas are not new in the real sense of the word, since they derive 
from pre-existing linguistic combinations. What is new is the combination 
or connection, the operation carried out according to the physiology we 
have repeatedly illustrated. It might be objected that we must nevertheless 
postulate some kind of starting point of discourse in the first place – in other 
words something “totally new”. To this we can reply by observing that all 
modes of connection derive from pre-existing modes and that, in general, 
discourse derives in a linear way from non-discourse. Nothing suddenly 
appears all of a piece as a ready-made model. This can be observed even at a 
very high level in the specification of the meanings of many terms  deriving 
from the combination of elementary terms brought together to update 
language to new cultural situations. From this point of view, everything is 
cultural. It is impossible to imagine an exploration or a logic that are not 
cultural (in the sense of “artificial-human”). This may sound rather like one 
of those pan-linguistic, tendentially idealistic assertions in which language 
appears as a primum or a specific entity. 
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 Actually, when we maintain that everything in a human activities is 
mediated by the system, and ground the system in evolution, what we admit 
is just the opposite – namely that the system itself is nature and grown out 
of things. Culture means equally “artificial-human” and “natural-human”. 
 A number of evolutionary characteristic are implicit in the genetic of 
the system. In the first place, a system does not move towards a state of 
com municative perfection where it would become an autonomous “thing 
in itself ”. Like knowledge, a system is a real fact which connects specific 
occurrences and consists of generalizing operations, but this does not make 
it “universal”. Its perfection is simply a greater degree of coherence – in other 
words a greater adaptation to what is particular in the situation, and to the 
kind of particularity represented by the new as it is gradually discovered and 
never ceases to be particular even if reiterated indefinitely and interpreted 
on a statistical basis. 
 The generality of discourse – whereby we name all the members of a 
class with a single name and define unique events by a single operation – 
is an adaptation to the particular. It is clear that neither discourse nor 
 knowledge is possible without generality. But this thrives entirely on the 
particular  operations and things to which discourse is adapted. The process 
of  adaptation is a continuous one and the reason the system remains stable is 
not that it has attained an ideal state but that, being based on the particular 
and yet both generalized and endowed with a considerable mass, it cannot 
waver at every single impact with the particular. This is because it is not just 
words or constructs that come into play in the particular discursive mode 
by which we come into contact and communicate, but all the behaviour of 
those who have come into contact and communicate, but all the behaviour 
of those who have used the words and constructs and found them experi-
mentally valid in the single circumstances. 
 Linguistic operations, like mutations, grow out of the particular, but they 
are rendered generalizable – just like mutations that are not eliminated – by 
a uniform environment. If a linguistic element is not useful for the whole 
of the environment, if it cannot be generalized, that is, then it serves no 
 purpose and is eliminated. It is selected by the environment as a whole. Its 
utility is tested by the exchange, by meaningful transmission and reception. 
 Thus, unless conventional rules applying specifically to the system 
intervene, the system is exposed to all kind of vicissitudes. Not only may 
it change, but it may also regress, as well as come into contact with and 
 mingle with other systems of the same type. This happens, for example, to 
two  different languages. 
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 This also signifies that meaningfulness can be lost if a system finds itself 
faced with a reality that does not understand it and from which it is not used 
continually. There exists, in fact, an archeology of communication systems.
 Thus at a given time the system contains a certain body of information 
expressing the communication operations that the system makes possible. 
These form a collectively constituted “order” (whose roots go far back in 
time) which is never purely formal – comparable, for example, with the 
fixed combination of phonemes in words, in their “non-accidentalness” 
in a language at time t1 – but genetic. Of course a word is distinguished 
from another by “permitted dispositions” of a phonological type, but this 
is a  marginal aspect. What matters, rather, is that a word is different from 
another because genetic exploration operations have actually shown it to be 
distinct and indicate it as distinct every time it is used. The distinction that 
counts is not the linguistic one (/horse/ or /cavallo/) but the cognitive one, 
though this of course has never existed without a linguistic support. The 
need to make operative distinctions has led to the need to make phono-
logical distinctions in some way. Those who reduce linguistic structure to a 
matter of mere positional classification cannot really face the problem of the 
genesis of the order and are compelled to accept an ineffable “Order”.
 A system, then, whether rich or poor, is coherent with itself, with things 
and with the subjects who use it. Yet there is a constant tendency to see it 
as “detached organ” – structure analogous to a man, a kind of “vast nervous 
system”. This is by no means the way things are. The analogies between com-
munication systems and organic systems will not stand up to scrutiny. The 
connection between the two lies on the plane of evolution, not of analogy. 
We know that there is a correspondence between the cognitive structure and 
the communication system because the former grew up from and through 
systems. If man communicates it is because he has practised commu nicating 
and been selected by communication itself. Of course, communication was 
never something existing in itself beforehand but grew up hand in hand with 
the structure capable of developing it, in a physically complementary and 
not analogical relationship.
 The system’s powers of connection, then, are sustained by means of the 
individual’s powers of connection. The system does not function outside 
us like a model, but acts internally via its capacity to be used and assimi-
lated. Our term of reference, of course, is not the isolated individual, but 
the single being as moulded by a collectivity, both naturally and culturally. 
The nervous structure of reception with which we are equipped has a cul-
tural type of structure superimposed upon it. During ontogeny, it is essential 
for the nervous structure to be stimulated by the system in order to begin 
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 func tioning. Only a particular system can do this, by constituting it intrinsi-
cally. Obviously it is not a matter of an abstract sort of functioning, but of the 
insertion of the structure in a social and existential situation. 
9. Uniformity of the constitution of systems
Systems are adapted to specific modes of communication  – language, 
 science, music, bodily communication, mimicry, and many others. Each of 
these has various particular forms (the different languages, single scientific 
disciplines, etc.) which are adapted to the specific situations and things to be 
described and communicated as well as to the aims of the communication.
 What is general about, and hence common to, all systems, and what 
model of a “System” can we propose? In a sense that is general about them 
is their particularity, their specific history – i.e. their interaction with things 
and individuals seen from the standpoint of what they have thus far accumu-
lated. Hence there is no System in the shape of a rule underlying all systems, 
but genetic uniformity due to the fact that they serve a purpose. It follows 
from this that they are of a connective nature, and their connectivity in each 
particular condition must be adapted to its function. 
 In their diversity systems are uniform. They are equally connection- 
making machines constructed historically by operations of adaptation. This 
is only universal feature they possess. 
 We might add, here, that all systems share the common trait of being 
logical, since they are fitted to the situation that created them and hence not 
contradictory in their various articulations and communication functions 
examined in relation to the specific areas they are used in and to the modes 
they are used for. 
 This type of logic, obviously, is inherent in the operations of generaliza-
tion. A syntactical construct is logical not in itself, nor even when compared 
with a single situation of connectivity, but insofar as it can be employed in 
all situations of that type. It is employable because it grew out of these. 
 In ordinary language, the proposition /and/ corresponds to the need for 
addition (and is adapted, in some way, to all the situations in which we must 
express addition). It expresses linguistically the operation of reviewing and 
adding, without further specification: it covers adding sequentially or adding 
quantitatively or considering two parts statically (in which case it means “to 
be made up of ”), etc. At the ordinary linguistic level its operative function 
is extremely ample, but it remains logical and non-contradictory in relation 
to the language as a whole and the things the language expresses. If there is 
152 GIORGIO PRODI. The material bases of meaning
a cerebral function that enables us to conceive of addition, it is not detached 
from /and/ but is the very function that makes us say /and/.
 The concept “one” and “one thing” derives from the “this thing here” 
linked to addition and analogical operations in which we can put “that thing 
there” – i.e. “any” thing – in the place of “this thing here”. These examples 
could be multiplied and analysed further, but they will suffice to show how 
the internal logic of discourse arises, rendering this continually attuned to 
the situations that have given rise to it and transform it.
 Clearly, if we need to specify the concept of addition further than in the 
ordinary scheme of language, we will have to enter into another scheme 
that is more precise, but that still has the same logic, though with narrower 
 conditions. When I replace “one” or “any” by “a” or “x”, I specify what I 
mean by addition, and set out on a mathematical discourse, or else I examine 
/and/ meta-linguistically in its linguistic contexts and try to define linguistic 
laws. The system is mobile for this reason too: at a certain point it has to 
hand over to another system more adequate for given operations but not, 
however, more logical than the previous one. If the first, which is apparently 
less logical, reveals contradictions, this is because it is being examined in the 
context of a system with different and bigger claims to coherence. Yet this 
greater coherence is rendered necessary by the desire to adapt ourselves even 
more to reality. 
 The logic of rough and ready attunement as expressed in ordinary 
 language is as complete as formal language examined in its context. 
 Formalization can be examined not as a change of logic but as the intro-
duction of ever more precise conditions into the concept of logic – in other 
words into the exploration of the referent. This exploration is never, at 
any stage, promoted to “Logic”, but remains a product of the things of the 
 structure and is always translated into a discourse. 
 The system can obviously be used badly and illogically: in given cir-
cumstances it may be ambiguous because contextual elements capable of 
con ferring meaning are lacking, or it may be inadequate in a new, more 
developed context. But is neither illogical nor inadequate with respect to 
its origin and its use. It cannot be “wrong”. The way the individual uses it 
and the  conclusions he reaches may be wrong, but the system functions 
and gives him what is asked of it, translating everything that has been put 
into it during history. This does not mean there is a “truth of the system”; 
it is neither true nor false, and does not confer any prestige on the things it 
 communicates.
 The previous remarks might seem to suggest that since all discourses 
are logical and self-compatible, they are all equivalent, and that the choice 
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of one or another is a matter of convention. This is not the case. Discourses 
are adequate in relation to their contexts. We cannot choose an approximate 
discourse for a scientific context. In this sense we may speak of a march 
forward of discourse under the influence of scientific research, where the 
object of investigation imposes its choices. The logic that gives  conformity 
to discourse through coherence with the object also requires that these 
be  chosen according to the demands of the exchange (both as regards the 
 people  spoken to and the things spoken about). 
 But here too we must reflect on the logic of the system: it is not a device 
for “picking up” and manipulating things (such that if it picks the right 
ones it arrives at true results and if it picks the wrong ones it obtains false 
results). The way it takes up things is in itself linguistic. We interpret the 
world through signs, and a system of signs is necessary from the outset for 
 defining things. This means that we conceive things as they are presented 
to us by the culture we live in. Only things immediately physical and in 
themselves incommunicable (pain, hunger, fear, anguish) receive an inter-
nal, non- linguistic identification, but even these can circulate only by virtue 
of culture. Thus truth or falsity are determined as the coherence of a view 
mediated by a discourse, and are in fact coherence or incoherence within the 
discourse itself. We can take entirely mythical objects and make a logical dis-
course, just as we can take real objects and make an incoherent discourse. It 
is the linguistic attunement to reality that makes it necessary to fit language 
to the referent taken as object. This is how science is born. It is not born 
because a higher aspiration at some point turns into a language, but because 
there is a necessity for greater coherence both in the identification of the 
referent and in its communication. 
10. The composition of systems: culture
If the organization of communication – the system – were a perfect machine, 
an a priori whole, it would be difficult to imagine relations between dif-
ferent systems, since each would be a monad. The system, however, is only 
an a priori if compared to the individual. As regards the genesis and suc-
cession of the collectivity it is an a posteriori. The system, then is an Id in 
which the Ego is largely submerged – just as the hand and the eye are an Id. 
Given that the individual inherits both cultural and physical things, the Ego’s 
claims to being a intentional force acting through consciousness are  puerile. 
Consciousness, which grows upon a vast humus of objective  presences 
not directly perceivable, presupposes a texture of non-consciousness, of 
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 impersonality (in the sense of “beyond my individual range”). The Ego is 
built on the Id, not opposed to it. If we want to look deeper into the Ego and 
see it not as an ineffable intuition but as something with a real origin, we 
must  penetrate zones where consciousness cannot help us, where we must 
 reconstruct objective relations, where the Ego can be seen as part of an Id 
that upholds it, in the current that goes back without interruption to the 
origins. 
 Every system, then, is deeply rooted in the predominant imperson-
ality of things, and is a system because it is the means of translating this 
imperso nality into a certain degree of exploitability and familiarity. Knowl-
edge, in fact, is the rediscovery of our connaturality with things. It follows 
that the idea of a system-monad as a kind of network of circuits capable of 
 handling any entity inserted in it, is false. Its logic originates long before 
logical  formalization, which is merely a consequence of impersonal logic, 
though this would be more appropriately termed “collectively originated” 
or “historico-social” logic. 
 If this is how things stand, the real problem of the relations between the 
various systems in action is not that of a “System of Systems”, but that of their 
interdependence, since each system is moulded by reality and this reality 
includes the reality of the other systems. There will thus be no absolute point 
of view but the coexistence and mutual attunement of all the communication 
systems. Even if there is no single, final-resultant (or “composition” or sum), 
their utilization will be unitary, since all the systems have the same point of 
departure and arrival – namely, the things to which they are adapted – and 
the same dynamic, i.e. the history that has produced them and the single 
individuals that use them.
 This “unitary character” of the use and compatibility of systems is  culture. 
Culture grows out of single contributions and is thus dependent both on the 
historical period and the geographical area. There is no such thing as the 
“Civilization” or the “Culture”. What exists is a culture conquered by ances-
tors and utilized by descendants. It is made up not only of objective condi-
tions but also of the efforts and commitment of individuals. It is important 
to note, in fact, that what enters culture has to be produced. The fact that 
we see culture as largely impersonal in no way diminishes the responsible, 
active role of its members. As well as receiving it they promote it. 
 Culture is always a set of modes of exchange, that is, of communication. 
There is no such thing as non-linguistic knowledge, and this is valid for cul-
ture too. Systems are forms of adaptation, and so is culture. It has adapted 
itself as a whole to things in the course of its development. Thus culture 
is a system of coherence linking the terms of the communication process, 
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 similarly to the communication system itself. But it includes the commu-
nication systems, and these cannot be considered as a primum with respect 
to culture as we have hitherto done for convenience’s sake. Just as the system 
comes before the sign, so culture comes before the system. In both cases, 
however, the two are strictly interdependent. 
 All cultures are thus equal in that they form conditions of compatibility 
between the systems of communication. There is no such thing as a better 
or a worse culture; at most there is a degree of evolution. This of course 
does not mean that cultures are not different. There is no doubt that the 
particular blend of the various languages affects their formation. The posi-
tion of science – the language specifically concerned with the problems of 
the critique of attunement – is particularly pertinent in this respect. In fact 
the various languages may behave “spontaneously” and cumulatively, but 
non-intentionally, or they may combine in a systematic, conscious man-
ner, thereby influencing all the other systems, given the interconnections 
that exist. And since an adapted system is also one that manipulates reality, 
the scientific system, which aims at a systematization of attunement and 
hence of transformation, can modify the whole of the surroundings and of 
 coexistence, assuming a sort of leadership and profoundly influencing the 
culture. It is worth stressing, however, that science is not opposed to the 
other systems. In the long term it is able to achieve homogeneity even with 
systems held to be extraneous. Science, then, introduces the possibility of 
a more extensive use of communication and culture, whilst remaining an 
integral part of these. 
 Culture is bound up with problems of translation, whether of one type 
of language into another in the same area, or of the same types of language 
in two different areas – i.e. between different cultures. Translation within 
an area is the process that defines concept itself of culture. Translatability of 
an ordinary language into a scientific one, of family and social relationships 
into emotive and normative terms, of linguistic situations into esthetic codes, 
etc. And alongside the systems, there are the documents of the  systems – the 
comparative literature of systems.
 Culture is a dynamic of “translatability”. Translation, as we have 
 repeatedly remarked, is a process, and not an indifferent convention. There 
is no such things as a reality that can be expressed indifferently in dif ferent 
languages. Systems have zones of competence. In each translation, the objec-
tive x is considered from a different standpoint and is a reality with many 
cultural facets. Thus the same “state of affairs” – a type of social relation-
ship, for example – can be reported in ordinary language as a reality,  studied 
and  criticized in a scientific language against a background of objective 
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considera tions, inserted into moral codes or collective normalization, or 
recognized in emotive or esthetic terms, these two forming self-compatible 
systems. 
 There are also processes of translation between different expressions of 
the same type of system – the various languages, for instance. As we shall 
see later, translation, outside of well-defined denotative areas, is a complex 
process that involves retracing the genetic development of the system. The 
translation of the connotations of a poetic text is not a direct transfer from 
one language to the other; it demands the consultation of the historical 
 heritage of each. Languages of the same type reveal a high degree of particu-
larity in two different cultures. This is a point that needs taking into careful 
consideration if we are to avoid misunderstandings – such as assuming that 
certain languages are universal and do not require translation; for example, 
music. But music is not built of pure sounds or of the notation that makes 
these reproducible. This is merely the phonology of musical language. This 
music has been constructed by the accumulation of deposit of meaning in 
the course of history. 
 One language, however, is immediately shared from the outset: the 
 language of science, of which we will speak later. The birth of science as a 
language that does not require translation between areas is another reason 
for its powerful capacity to influence the world.
11. Language and science
What we have previously maintained about the general physiology of com-
munication must be tested on concrete systems. The two languages we will 
examine here in this light are ordinary language and science. Of course there 
are other languages, but these two undoubtedly cove the major part of the 
area of human communication. To examine these, then, is not simply to 
exemplify a general situation – especially as they are not separate, or  parallel 
systems but form part of a series. The language of science presupposes ordi-
nary language just as scientific knowledge presupposes ordinary knowl-
edge. Scientific language is a specialization of ordinary language. Language 
transforms itself into science for the purposes of a more precise exchange 
 concerning a referent defined by standardized operations, but it continues 
to use the same basic means of inter-subjective contact and of testing against 
object reality. 
 The range of application is extended but not changed. As we have 
 repeatedly remarked, translation from one language to another makes it 
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 possible to widen the area in which things can be manipulated. It is never 
 simply a matter of manipulating the same area from equivalent and indif-
ferent standpoints. Each translation functions and has a particular  purpose 
vis-à-vis the referent. When scientific language perfects and specializes 
ordinary language it brings about an expansion of the exploitability of the 
 referent, going beyond what can be grasped by direct intuition, or com-
mon sense beyond the macroscopic scale to which we are geared. The area 
expands. Both the adaptation and the coherence of the description are 
 augmented, and with these the inter-subjective objectivity of the framework 
via which we look at the world. This does not mean we will ever arrive at a 
super-language: there is never any qualitative leap forward. What takes place 
is a translation inherent in the physiology of communication whereby our 
 adaptation to our genetic area is improved. 
12. Language. Logic in the construction of language. 
Invariants
As we have frequently remarked, the logic of a system is a state of affairs 
the key to which lies in the system’s genesis and its adequacy to the context 
from which it arises. The application of this concept to language leads us to 
the much-debated question of the relationship between logic and language 
and subsequently to that of the “function” of language in the representation 
of the world. 
 Since the context is anything but arbitrary and conventional, the logic of 
language will not simply be a matter of internal coherence or non-contra-
dictoriness. It will also take the form of an invariant state of affairs –  invariant 
in the specific sense of equivalent in all possible languages to the extent 
that they express the same situations. The problem of logic and linguistic 
 invariants is thus basically an existential collocation seen in its genetic devel-
opment up to the situation of the specific collocation of the single individual 
in his particular context. 
 What are the invariants of the setting which require us to postulate 
 linguistic invariants in order to cope with them? Which are the constant exis-
tential situations whence the logic of language arises? In the first place, they 
include the things we speak about. Whilst we agree that cultures are diverse, 
we totally disagree with those who see this diversity as being radical. Men 
are more or less alike as regards their basic make-up, and cultural diversi-
fications do nothing more than organize these basic facts. Languages are 
different in so far as their basic material is the same. Man is always  subject to 
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death. All men age, and this, fundamentally, is what gives rise to the reaction 
of fear which, in its turn, is balanced by reactions of hope. Human desires are 
basically identical: being born of a mother, and having children are facts that 
are not in the least affected by any kind of conventionalism. The basic need 
for food and rest, and the tendency to avoid suffering are universal. These 
are the constants about which we constantly speak. Even structural situa-
tions with a certain degree of variability (the family, kinship relations, vari-
ous types of interpersonal relations) have a unitary matrix, since they simply 
give different arrangement to terms from an identical horizon. Language as a 
differentiating phenomenon has its roots well within the horizon. The things 
about which linguistic exchanges are made are those we actually do wish 
to exchange in reality, as well as being those which have phylogenetically 
determined possibility itself of exchange (including  linguistic exchange). 
 This is less obvious than it might seem at first sight, if we recall those 
ideal istic intellectual constructions according to which language  recreates 
reality, which thus becomes a sort of simulacrum shored up by words. 
Things, however, are very definitely present inside words, in whatever way 
we interpret the mutual relation between the two. At every level of linguistic 
expression we refer to the genetic context of the language, and this context is 
the same as that of the things named. If we speak of death in terms of a deno-
tative observation (as an obvious event), or in emotive terms (an event that 
affects us), or in poetic terms, we use different linguistic modes but what we 
are talking about remains death, and our language simply expresses, case 
by case, the different guises in which death appears to us. All this squares 
with the referentiality of language upon which we have insisted on various 
occasions. Of course, the way in which language is organized are always 
social, and this means that a high degree of variability derives from the con-
stants: whence the various cultures, the different lines of development and 
the diverse heritages. Hence also the different languages and the possi bility 
of comparing them. Nevertheless, it would be quite impossible to com-
pare them if it were not for the fact that behind their diversification lies the 
 preponderant presence of the basic constants and the existential  invariants.
 Next comes another set of invariables: what we might call the “technical-
inter-subjective” aspect of language. However much situations differ one 
thing cannot vary – namely, the fact that the individual speaker must char-
acterize himself and construct a subject that speaks to another about others. 
 The invariable nature of the “particularity” of communication also has 
its operative equivalent in language. We have emphasized that the logic 
of communication is general, not universal – in other words, it sets up 
 conditions whereby the particularity of a construct can be expressed in an 
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indefinite series of situations. Clearly, the existence of a particular subject 
is a  general situation that finds expression in language as a “subject” whose 
char acteristics are univocally defined. 
 In short, the constants are the things talked about and the terms of the 
exchange. We thus have a nominal, or identifying, logic, and a syntactical, 
or orientating, logic. These two aspects are clearly inseparable in discourse, 
because we always talk about something, and we always talk to one another. 
Nominal logic has been constructed syntactically – i.e. according to a certain 
perspective – and syntax has been filled up with the concreteness of nominal 
logic. 
 With the term “nominal logic” we refer to the situation of corre spondence 
and adaptation between words and context. We have already discusses the 
associated genetic processes when dealing with the general logic of commu-
nication systems. What we have, however, is not a system of fixed, conven-
tional correspondences whereby the name is nothing but a reproduction in 
miniature of its corresponding object. Rather, the name, as we have seen, is 
the very process of identification and segmentation. The name sums up for 
me all the operations that I carry out in order to indicate the referent. These 
operations are the same as the ones used to take discursive cognition of the 
referent by those from whom I have inherited language. In this sense, since I 
can identify, know, and name it, the referent has become meaningful for me, 
and joins the complex of referents that makes up the setting both of my life 
and of my knowledge and discourse. There can be little doubt about the fact 
that words continue to carry with them all the processes out of which they 
have arisen, and that this is what forms their constant meaning in discourse.
 All names, then, correspond to series of identifying operations. They may 
refer to similar, partially-overlapping operations and thus generate various 
kind of synonymy. Or they may refer to operations not susceptible detained 
specification, and hence remain imprecise or ambiguous. They may also be 
overloaded with references, worn out by use, or so complex as to become 
unserviceable. I think I have already sufficiently demonstrated why it is 
illogical to assume that a genetic-referential theory implies that names are 
somehow precise equivalents of objective things. Identification by means of 
names is an operation involving the system. 
 As “discursive exploration of things”, names can refer to things or opera-
tions, and thus be nouns or verbs, or represent processes of further defini-
tion of things and operations, and thus be attributes or adverbs. They can 
also express generalizations of unspecified range, and so on. This is how 
the grammar of language comes into being; its structure of invariance 
 undoubtedly lies in the identification of things, states and actions in the 
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world. It is beyond question that every language, in one way or another, 
expresses movement toward, movement away from, the act of speaking, the 
sun, the mother… and that all these elements come to represent the bulk 
of every single language, the rest – what is peculiar to a given language – 
 deriving from these. If actual grammatical structures are in practice dif-
ferent one from another, this only goes to confirm the fact that languages 
as a whole have to achieve the same goal of identification – in other words 
accomplish a process that I must be able to communicate and account for. 
If, for example, it is necessary to indicate a plurality of a significant datum, 
one language may choose a single noun preceded by a prefix marking its 
plurality, another may prefer a suffix, etc. But there is not a single language 
that fails to express this general logic through its own particular grammar. 
 The series of constants that a language must in any case account for is 
extremely vast and to exemplify it would be an almost interminable enter-
prise leading to a banal affirmation – namely that a language is so con-
structed as to account for the position of things and the operations relating 
to them. 
 But, of course, if names are processes of identification, they are at the 
same time the result of the exploration of things and the use of names – in 
other words of a process that leads to their definition and use and is itself a 
discursive process, a link or relationship between names. This, then, is nomi-
nal logic. During the development of a language a name identifies a plurality 
of objects which I can “singularize” at will but which is general because is 
linguistic. 
 By providing general identifications, a language also provides logical pro-
cesses of intersection of classes whereby we can pass from the generality of 
all nominal constructs to the singularity of their use in a given situation. 
Any sentence can be examined as an operation of classes with which we 
pursue the identification of things in the existential process where we use the 
language. The generality built on the genesis of the language is a  generality 
attuned to the particular, and the operations that lead us back to the par-
ticular are as logical as those that have formed the general. They are the same 
operations of segmentation, rearrangement, and intersection. 
 Thus we must once more reject the fallacy of an abstract, purely formal 
logic that directs the operations – whether of the language, of mathematics, 
or of any other expression of thought. Logic arises together with the opera-
tions, transfers itself into language, directs this in so far as it is directed by it, 
and is the state of affairs in which interactions stabilize themselves. 
 Discursive relations are necessarily a logical structure of compatibility 
which is operative and defined by use. It is thus not correct to try and set 
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up a formal logic which directs language, or to see the logic of classes as 
the principle of language, or to maintain that language can be purified by 
analysis into mathematics. Logic is inside language itself, and if there is such 
a thing as purification, this comes from the use of language inside language. 
Mathematics and formal logic are not external principles for removing the 
incoherence of language. They are principles internal to the genesis of lan-
guage and evolve alongside language as it sharpens its focus on things and 
on itself. Thus formal logic is not the purifying principle of language but a 
consequence of language. Mathematics, then, is the daughter of language. 
 It remains to be clarified that a dynamic interpretation of this kind 
rules out the possibility of distinguishing qualitatively between a series 
of  lin guistic structures for handling indication – i.e. nouns – and another 
series for handling operations on nouns – i.e. predicates, as if there were 
two  distinct  levels of linguistic approach. Everything is operative, in the 
sense that the noun includes the operations for identifying it (Man’s subjec-
tive operations) and can be predicated of anything on account of its open 
nature – in other words it can be investigated further and identified further. 
Moreover the noun does not define a closed situation and is not a definitive 
label, since it is always open to further attributes and operations. It consti-
tutes a segmentation that expresses the direction in which the observation 
is orientated. Clearly it is defined to the extent that it is distinguished from 
all the other simultaneous operations that define the horizon for us. 
 This logic is what determines “grammatical forms”. Subject and direct 
object, dative, vocative etc., as well as attributes, transitive and intransitive 
verbs are logically determined by the context of inter-subjectivity. The par-
ticular ways in which this “logical necessity” finds phonological and graphi-
cal expression are certainly various, but they remain secondary compared 
with the logical framework that gives rise to a deep structure in every spe-
cific language. And it is this complex of invariants that renders one language 
at least partially translatable into another. If we analyse the genetic devel-
opment of my language, what we find is not the evolution of phonology 
according to general rules (as if these existed before the language), but the 
development of general logic through the particular phonology. 
 The logical constants are the phylogenetic a priori for handling reality 
and are at the same time linguistic a priori. 
 We must now explicitly discuss a number of views on the relationship 
between language and thought, word and concept. 
 According with some scholars, language is the original, authentic mode 
of exchange, and thought is simply a consequence of this. In this sense, 
logic is particular as language is particular. A person who reasons simply 
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 interprets the world through linguistic parameters. Peirce wrote: “the analy-
sis of sentence in subject and predicate is certainly the manner in which we 
Arians think, but it is not the unique one”. 
 This view is then extended from logic to the reality of the world, which 
ends up as a purely linguistic reality. We believe we are establishing some-
thing objective – in the sense of “independent of the way it is commu-
nicated” – whereas we are merely creating an optical illusion: what we are 
handling is neither things nor concepts, but simply words. If we change 
these – by changing languages – we will change everything we are commu-
nicating. 
 It is clear that what we have said so far goes against a concept of this 
kind. Language is not a primum; it reflects the concrete circumstances out 
of which it has arisen. These circumstances are to a large extent constant, 
and all languages in one way or another are informed by them. The world 
described remains the same, at the level of linguistic expression that speakers 
have reached. There is no point in continuing to repeat this. However, the 
simultaneity and interdependence of language and logic does not mean they 
are identical. We are prepared to admit that a thought is such in so far as it 
is expressible and communicable, and thus that it is necessarily a thought in 
a language. We have sufficiently emphasized the logico-operative structure, 
or thought-structure, of language. However this interdependence does not 
mean that one term is entirely identifiable with the other. The relationship 
in question can be reconstructed by analysing the beginnings of discourse in 
a child: psychogenetics has shown that the child starts thinking in distinctly 
pre-linguistic operative modes, yet these are clearly modes of connection 
and communication. 
 The logic of operations, then, is born before language and constructs 
language, of which it remains permanently the inner texture, the deep struc-
ture, the operative justification. It is true, of course, that when language 
arises, it defines itself in its inter-subjective terms and nothing can ignore 
it. Nevertheless, even at this stage, it is going too far to identify thought 
with language, since thought is undoubtedly more embracing than language 
and anterior to it. There is a tendency, moreover, to extend the meaning of 
(ordinary) language to cover the whole area of language. No matter how vast 
it is, however, it is only one mode. To say that we necessarily think through 
a particular language is extremely limiting. It would be more correct to say 
that we communicate by a series of languages and that all linguistic commu-
nications are pervaded in the same way by that logic of contact and opera-
tion we call thought – where the term thought has a broader meaning than 
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usual, signifying all exploratory activities (even those going beyond rational 
operations) and includes the sensation of one’s own collocation in the world, 
even if purely existential, affective or instinctual. 
13. Formal logic and operative logic in language:  
syntax and semantic
We have seen how formal logic defines states of non-contradiction, and that 
these are expressed linguistically because operative logic translate into lan-
guage. Formal logic is thus not a game or a convention, but is bound up with 
the phylogenetic operations that have formed it out of the operations proper 
to the “logic of things”. 
 We must now see what traces of this origin are to be found in language. 
⸧ ∙ Ⅴ ⁓ are clearly present in all languages. They are linguistic constants, 
in fact, and not feature of any particular language. Their symbolic, formal 
definition is the result of an operation on the language objectively in use. All 
that has been done is aim at the degree of precision (i.e. a type of use) not 
found in ordinary language. But everything, even formalization, is already 
contained in the operations of language and above all in the genesis of 
 language. We have already stressed that scientific knowledge is not different 
from ordinary knowledge but simply a deeper stratum within the latter. The 
same holds for formal logic in relation to language. This term needs strip-
ping of the connotations of arbitrariness usually attributed to it. It is not for-
mal logic that becomes labile and nuanced when transferred into discourse, 
but discourse that defines itself in its real structure with the precision and 
inelasticity of formal logic. The sign ∙ or the particle /and/ both indicate the 
act of reviewing: formal logic, language and operative logic are mutually 
interdependent in application, and are interdependent with the world too. 
If I review and am in a world of things that I can review, it is I myself who 
am capable of doing so because I am homogeneous with the operation and 
generated by it. Thus I must be able in one way or another to express this 
fact or operation, and in so doing I recognize my collocation. I can do this 
because I have eyes, memory, and above all the possibility of segmentation: 
it is /and/ which defines the segmentation for me, indicating the presence 
of one thing next to another. The operation is mediated; it does not refer to 
eyes or hands, but to a type of cerebral and mental development which is in 
itself linguistic and at the same time physical and thus non-contradictory 
vis-à-vis the things which have produced it. 
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 Inclusion and exclusion are based on the same operative procedures with 
which we identify the meaning of terms in language. The type of cerebral 
development itself implied is modelled on including and excluding, on com-
paring with a reference that which is being reviewed case by case. The word, 
then, is determined in the same way as a class is determined. Operations on 
words (i.e. language) are, as we have said, operations on classes. 
 However, it is worth repeating here that the type of operation carried out 
is, in principle, the same as that performed by the enzyme when it reviews 
the outside world to find its substrate: all molecules it can bind with in suc-
cession “comparing” them to its specific site, constitute “the class” for the 
enzyme, just as the world, in the long chain od mediations that have taken 
place, constitutes the class for Man. Each of these are essentially operations 
of a structure face to face with the environment. 
 Linguistically, these are operations occurring within a structure that at 
time t possesses n data about experience of the same kind. These data are 
obviously not indifferent in the process of comparison and reviewing, for 
even the data of experience are words and the confrontation with things is 
also a confrontation with discourse. 
 In other words, if we call the linguistic relation between word and thing 
“semantic”, this cannot be divorced from syntax – i.e. the operational and 
discursive logic that enables me to identify the thing. Syntax and seman-
tics cannot be separated, according to Morris’s tradition. In this kind of 
approach, there are certain correspondences based on rules of meaning and 
subsequently – as in chess – logic intervenes with its various syntactical 
combinations. Semantic meaning, on the contrary, is the set of syntactical 
combinations. The same mistake is made by those – like Ajdukiewicz and 
Russell – who see designation as a separate problem from identification. 
For them, too, designation is totally semantic and precedes syntax or logical 
operations. But logic is not brought to bear on pre-existent language: it is 
logic itself which identifies meaning and designates. 
 In short, f we analyse a logical proposition of the type “if no A is B, then 
no B is A”, its linguistic truth coincides with its logical truth for the simple 
reason that As and B are not empty, even if they can be filled with anything. 
A and B are real, and the sentence is true because it corresponds operatively 
to the reality of As and Bs. The very structure of thought has been formed 
phylogenetically in this way by the As and Bs. 
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14. Invariants and the historical dynamics
The fact that language is based on constant patterns (the constants of the 
horizon and inter-subjectivity) needs squaring with the equally evident 
fact that there exists a plurality of languages and of their historical dynam-
ics. The last two aspects are interdependent. The historical dynamics is a 
source of differentiation and thus generates plurality. We can take it that 
in history many languages are totally extraneous one to another with no 
 cross-communication –in other words, closed words of contact with reality. 
Each develops in its own way and gives different accounts of reality. But how 
different? If there is a “mechanics” of languages (if they serve a purpose), 
then even in historically and geographically diverse situations each will 
organize itself according to a common model, reproducing a basic pattern. 
Each will then act on the variables (for in our scheme all contacts, including 
linguistic ones, act on and within the particular) to make them serve the 
basic purpose of exchange.
The constants, as we have already said, are: 
(A)  some common basic things;
(B)  the sound element and related structures – i.e. the physical modes and 
the mental modes behind these;
(C)  inter-subjectivity, or the perspective in which the exchange is con-
structed – an “I” that speaks to another by things.
The variables are:
(A)  some particular things; clearly, in Man’s horizon alongside birth and 
death and other typical constants, there is also a high degree of vari-
ability in environment; deserts, forests or mountains must have played 
essential roles in all communication;
(B)  the specific individual shape of the sound element, in other words the 
different phonology. 
If we combine the constants and the variables – each of which operates 
within an isolated system roughly identifiable with the group in which a 
given language arises – two concrete facts emerge.
 
(1) The uniqueness of the “assembly” of the components – in other words 
the individual languages. This is not due to a mingling of logic and actual 
states of affairs, but is the way in which the need to communicate develops 
in a particular situation. Logic and actual states of affairs are the same thing, 
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and languages resemble each other to the extent that the protagonists are 
similar, and differ to the extent that the latter differ. Nevertheless the diver-
gences are extremely small compared with the resemblances. Who would 
deny that somehow a language must produce the interrogative as a request 
for data, or hypothetical clauses or similar structures to express supposition, 
or reported speech, and that all these follow from the need to have a subject, 
a direct object and so on?
 These are intrinsic necessities of communication in any language. Each 
language in its process of linking individuals elaborates its phonological 
materials and syntactical constructions to achieve the results of commu-
nication requested. These results are obviously particular, but common to 
a large extent to all situations: they express information, influence, com-
mands,  persuasion, etc. From the grammatical and syntactical point of view 
all this is accomplished by different methods. We thus find languages with 
profoundly dissimilar structures. In spite of this, however, they can be trans-
lated. If we could introduce the situational variable (those inherent both in 
the particular environmental world and in the particular culture), we could 
even argue that languages are fully translatable.
(2) The type and the phase of cultural development in which we consider a 
language.
 We have repeatedly observed that the composition of the elements 
 forming a language is brought about by its being used in a given circum-
stances. In other words its logical development is also a historical develop-
ment. It follows from its internal logic – which is a logic of the particular – 
that a language differentiates itself along the lines of least resistance that it 
finds in a single situation – i.e. in the single group in contact with a single 
environment. Linguistic development is cultural development, it consists 
of differentiation and singleness. Hence language takes on the meanings 
conferred on it by the operations of those who have used it and modified 
it by use. Each linguistic structure alludes to the choice that have gone to 
 making it, though it is important to note that this particular feature in no 
way implies arbitrariness or the impossibility of translation. 
 A language is the logical product of the group in which it has taken shape. 
It reflects the life of the group and sums up its culture. Some of its aspects, 
as we have seen, are general, others particular, specific of the group and 
linked to the transmission of variables or “internal constants” of the group. 
This is the sense in which culture is tied to language. A language is not 
variable because the phonological, grammatical, syntactical structure of the 
constants is different from case to case: if this were so, its translatability 
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would be immediately perfect, with our needing to introduce any promise 
to the rules of transformation. It is diverse because, in part, it communicates 
different things specific to the group. A language, then, sums up what is cul-
turally specific. The differentiation of a language takes place throughout the 
history of the group and represents the whole of its anthropological, literary, 
religious, historico-politic, economic, and subsequently, philosophical and 
scientific evolution. Each of these aspects is, as it were, immobilized in the 
language so that if we want to understand the culturally specific character 
of the language we cannot make a horizontal, mechanical translation, but 
must tempt a vertical, historical one, retracing its linguistic evolution and 
discovering the cultural conditions that have led to its diversity, exactly as we 
do in a phylogenetic study. It may not always be possible to do this in prac-
tice for lack of the necessary documents, but this does entitle us to speak of 
“incommunicability”. In fact, when we try to penetrate an “anthropological 
black box” – a hermetic, mysterious civilization – we do so in the first place 
through the language, which explains its specific origins to us. 
 The logic remains the same. A language must be used by  individuals 
to talk about individual things, so it is necessarily non-universal. The 
 physiology of a universal language would be incomprehensible and unnatu-
ral. Actual languages talk about particular things common to everyone: this 
is why they speak in a general and translatable way. The translatability of a 
language is an aspect of the inter-subjectivity of communication. We can 
translate what we can understand and share with others, in other words, 
what is basically common to mankind.
 The problem emerges with particular clarity in connection with the 
conno tative aspect of words and syntactical structures touched on elsewhere. 
Connotation, however, is not some kind of mystical aura. Like denotation, 
it is a historical, logical and functional product. It is a deformation and 
extension of sense, or a combination of meanings, or a creation of connec-
tions – in other words, a linguistic exploitation of a previously-constructed 
language that makes use of the latter’s material according to the overall logic 
of its make-up. Connotation is not built on different (deep) rules from those 
of language in general. We have already remarked that connotation always 
“denotes” something, even if it is complex, cultural and not “horizontally” 
translatable. Connotation is utilizable for meaning exactly like denotation. 
It is possible to carry out entire operations of a connotative nature – com-
bining the “historical” auras of words – and to subject the results to control. 
This is the problem of poetry. But even here, must we consider connota-
tion as a kind of “special reserve” of language? What sense could connota-
tion have without the support of the structure that has generated it? In the 
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last analysis, the whole of language evolves via a dynamic relation between 
denotation and connotation. Meanings which are mobile and linked to new 
circumstances of use – what we might term experimental ones – are subse-
quently established inter-subjectively as denotations and serve, in their turn, 
for connotative experimentation in connection with other denotations of the 
language. 
15. Experimental and attuned uses of language
Everything we have said so far confirms the hypothesis that a spoken 
 language is not a translation of something previously existing into code but 
a part of the exploitation of the world. Every time we speak we confirm 
the instrumental and operative function of language. The basic  feature of 
spoken communication is the possibility of using a limited number of con-
structs to communicate an indefinite number of situations. What  governs 
use is the particular circumstance. It imposes choices, makes us select 
from the  repertoire what is adapted to the circumstances. The repertoire 
itself is formed by the various circumstances, hence repertoire and single 
 circumstances are on the same plane. This leads to a fundamental conclu-
sion, namely that speaking consists of a continual testing of the validity of 
the linguistic instrument and its interdependence with the horizon whence 
it has arisen, in the new circumstances that occur and have to be com mu-
nicated. The relationship between speaker and language is governed by a 
continual attunement to things. In what other way could we conceive of the 
unlimited expressive possibilities of languages? Human language of all types 
has grown out of the hypothetical activity – that is, out of the possibility of 
setting up verifiable analogues of reality. These form a sort of memory of the 
future which remains empty until it is compared with the reality of things. 
This activity is by no means limited to science, but is an extremely gener-
alized kind of cognitive operation and one that is used even at very short 
range. Speaking is at all times a process of attunement to reality through 
the reality of experience and the availability of linguistic instruments (the 
 latter, too, depending on experimentation). In a new situation, the first place 
I choose words to communicate with, and in so doing I link up with the 
whole network of correspondences that has taken shape in the course of his-
tory. Thus, in my inter-subjective aspect, I attune myself to things by using 
instruments that I share with others and that others have supplied me with. 
I “anticipate” the situation with words and then check to see if my forecast 
is correct. Thus the linguistic validity of the description is verified after its 
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attunement, and confirms whether the mechanism set up during history 
works. 
 It is interesting to note how the opinion of those for whom the sentence is 
a mechanical decoding process – a sort of complicated reflex manifested by 
linguistic behaviour – coincides with that of those who conceive of language 
as a fixed structure in which meaning derives from some prior non-histori-
cal and non-linguistic property whose origin lies in a supposed absolute 
specificity of man. The extremes meet: if the linguistic response is that of a 
robot, it is necessary to set up the rules of the robot. 
 Language actually is a particular interpretation performed by means of 
a highly complex, even if rapid, hypothetical-experimental sequence. Since 
this is characteristic of all knowledge, it follows that knowledge in itself is 
made up of linguistic behaviours. Knowledge as an attempt to test the scope 
of our attuned constructions cannot be make use of our inter-subjective 
equipment, and hence, chiefly, of language. What comes later – scientific 
knowledge – is simply a further differentiation of this linguistic charac-
teristic. 
16. Precision and logic
When we talk about language, the terms precision and logic are usually 
intuitively associated and considered as near-synonyms. If this is logical, it 
is also precise, univocal and unambiguous. If, as it is easy to show, language – 
at least in its ordinary form – continually produces ambiguities then it is 
denied logical status. In order to purify it, we must resort to logical prin-
ciples, which are thus necessarily held to be external to language and not 
historically determined. Only if we draw on these can a language become 
precise and be used without ambiguity. 
 This cultural attitude is built on a fallacy. Language has the degree of pre-
cision that corresponds to its use. Imprecision may be one of its functional 
elements. In ordinary communication, there are imprecisions that amount 
to blurring compared with the univocalness of denotation but which are 
functional because they give prominence to other aspects of the construct. 
There are other situations in which a high degree of precision is not needed. 
Language has been selected by use in actual circumstances. We must there-
fore assume that certain terms we might otherwise define as imprecise are 
not so at all in relation to given circumstances. Logic and precision do not 
coincide. We are continually mislead by a fallacy of formal “logicism” which 
today has become the ally of a certain kind of cybernetic mechanicism. For 
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the majority, logical means perfectly adapted to pre-constituted connections, 
a sort of ideal structural-formal correspondence in perfectly established 
framework. 
 Actually, however, this framework issues from a history of reciprocal 
adaptations and an evolution that can only be judged in terms of its devel-
opment. Only if precision is necessary will a language be made precise. And 
this obviously depends not only on the circumstances but also on the degree 
of cultural history – i.e. on the quantity of the heritage already stored in the 
language. This brings us back once more to the problem of scientific knowl-
edge, which is a refinement of ordinary knowledge and presupposes the 
 latter entirely. Likewise, scientific language is a refinement – though partial, 
for particular uses – of ordinary language and presupposes it entirely. The 
link between the two is homogeneous, evolutionary, progressive, whereas 
common opinion sees them as opposite poles, as if scientific language has 
developed only thanks to the introduction of a heterogeneous principle 
(logic, or that quid named “scientific method”) into ordinary language. 
 This “principle”, however, is homogeneous with ordinary language – that 
is, with the life of contacts with the world, and with common knowledge. It 
is the same logic that develops in contact with needs that arise, within the 
framework of what has been so far accumulated. This latter point should not 
be overlooked. When we speak of “accumulation” we intend to refer to the 
fact that every increase in precision takes place in a theoretical framework 
that guarantees the continuity and compatibility of what we find and what 
we produce – a continuity and interdependence with the immanent frame-
work that no “logicism” succeeds in preserving. Thus a way of proceeding 
that might be defined as empirical (in the negative sense of the term) actu-
ally emphasizes everything that is theoretical, namely the network previously 
acquired through which we look at the world. This outlook is not  arbitrary, 
nor does it depend on one language rather than another. It has grown up 
through language in an objective manner, in contact with the world the 
 language represents and manipulates. Language is thus a complex tool that 
has formed itself in contact with the world, and it is language itself that, in 
this process of accumulation, constantly forms the theoretical framework of 
our knowledge of the world. If this knowledge is scientific, the theoreti-
cal framework will be the complex of scientific language at a given stage in 
 science. Language, then, is what constitutes our framework of interpretation, 
ensures our collocation in the world and provides us with our scaffolding 
of categories. We need not insist further on the fact that it is rooted in our 
interaction with the world and logical – adapted to our structure, that is. 
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 It is interesting to observe how the imprecision – the supposed inade-
quacy – of language is emphasized with equal energy by two opposite schools 
of thought. By the formal logicians, who aspire to a fixed super-language and 
super-universe, and by the idealists and subjectivists who rule out the pos-
sibility not only that the framework can be uniform but also that it can be 
translated; in this latter view the world is seen through the arbitrary eyes of 
single words, and even thought is a reflection of the phonological system. 
Fundamentally, the two attitudes are the same: they exclude any logical-
evolutionary development of language and any contact with or knowledge 
of the horizon. Yet it is only these aspects that are capable, in our view, of 
explaining the interdependence of thought and language, communication 
and the logic of communication. 
 The argument that linguistic imprecision is such because it causes misun-
derstandings, can easily be parried by observing that all kinds of knowledge, 
given that it is mediated and indirect, are subject to uncertainties, and that in 
any case a fact has to be verified inter-subjectively. Imprecision in this sense 
is a necessary feature of a language in a state of development. And those 
who insist on misunderstandings, citing the historical damage caused by 
the ambiguity of words (e.g. analysing the words/symbols that Man has used 
for all kinds of controversies), commit a glaring error, for in this case the 
ambiguity does not lie in the words as they have been generated historically, 
but in the historical operations (operations of power, economic interests, 
ideologies) that deformed them when their meaning in relation to their use 
had already been defined. Here the interpretative key is no longer the word 
and its historical setting, but the subsequent historical setting, where it does 
not undergo any further development for the purposes of communication 
but is used with a completely different logic. It would be quite misleading 
to claim that the analysis of the ambiguities of the word “democracy” can 
be performed within the realm of linguistics. Even if there existed a word 
expressing the concept in a much more detailed fashion and susceptible of 
precise formalization, it would still be used in the same way and exploited 
by the same groups for their own, contrasting ends. To argue that the greater 
precision of words would have caused less damage to humanity is naïve. 
The precision of words is an outcome of human events and bears witness to 
these. It is hard to see how this historical dynamic could be replaced by the 
legislation of some kind of Royal Society bent on purifying the language of 
imprecision. 
 It is true, of course, that connotation often masks social deceptions. This 
shows that there are social forces that exploit the margin of  imprecision of 
words for their own purposes. It is an issue that certainly merits  investi gation 
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in order to discover how language lends itself to deception and how it is 
capable of being “ideologically deceptive”. However, all this confirms that 
language is a part of the whole system of human knowledge. If the word 
“negro” has a pejorative sense, in other words, if it carries a negative emo-
tive connotation above and beyond its denotative function, this means that 
a sector of humanity uses it in this way. The negative association will dis-
appear only when this sector has made other steps forward in knowledge, 
and these will certainly not be related to the mere utilization of the word in 
question. The evolution of man moulds words, and the evolution of language 
is a manifestation of the evolution of culture as a whole.
17. Language and the transformation of the world
Knowing, at the first instance, means to transform oneself and others, in the 
immediate sense of interacting; the higher, ethical or philosophical, concept 
of knowledge is not the primary one. Language and knowledge overlap to a 
great extent, since historical knowledge is “accumulated” in the world and 
necessarily translated into a linguistic form that expresses “that” particular 
knowledge of the world. Because this constitutes the theoretical scaffolding 
for specific interpretations and hence action, it also becomes the tool for 
transformation. This does not mean we must rashly assent to those various 
mystical outlooks which view the word as an autonomous creative force, 
rehashing the old concept “In the beginning was the Word”. It is enough if we 
claim an active role for language in the process of transformation, and reject 
the widely held view of language as a passively reflecting, immobile entity – 
speech opposed to action. If knowledge is inter-subjective, its  immediate 
expression is language. Up to now we have emphasized, in a general  manner, 
how the process of human communication is attuned to reality, but the most 
important reality is other human beings, as well as the communication pro-
cesses themselves. Language to a great extent speaks about itself: one way 
or another, precisely because it is inter-subjective, it attunes itself to previ-
ous language which represents the sum of accumulated facts and the over-
all framework of interpretation of reality shared by the group. The work of 
interpretation-transformation that language-and-knowledge perform can be 
seen as the advance along a broad front of a collective nature. The strength of 
words (whereby they are instruments, though not in the emotive sense that 
alludes to their powers of persuasion or to rhetorical techniques) lies in the 
fact that they are inter-subjective points of convergence. If they are capable 
of modifying the environment, this is because they have accumulated in 
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themselves all the operations of analysis and penetration of the environ-
ment from which they have arisen. Each modification of the surroundings is 
 necessarily a collective achievement brought about through language. More-
over it is language which makes possible the insertion of the individual, the 
new datum, the specific modification of a particular  situation, and active 
intervention. 
 The collective origin of linguistic operations on reality in no way dimin-
ishes the individual’s role and responsibility in applying them. To say 
that there are no such things as individual instruments (constructed by a 
 single self) is not in contrast with the fact that they are employed in single 
 situations. On the contrary, it is the individual who is responsible for using 
a common heritage to transform the world. 
 This amounts to saying that language is the most direct evidence of 
the fitness of the human structure in relation to the environment. In the 
face of theories which emphasize the importance of language as a primum 
that somehow constructs reality (in an idealistic view of the assignment of 
 meaning), the material existence of a concrete and exchangeable phonic 
object like language – which connects the various pieces of reality by means 
of its action and interpretation – testifies the degree to which it is an integral 
part of the world and how it derives from the world of things and others 
and is moulded and adapted by use. It is precisely the materiality of this 
exchange and inter-subjective-objective connection which reveals the con-
tinuity between nature and culture. Functionally, human language as a tool 
for action and transformation cannot be explained without a prior evolu-
tion: its homogeneity was established at the very outset long before human 
 languages) between reading machines and the things interpreted. On the 
other hand, it is the phylogenetic sedimentation of the modes that gradually 
build up a language which confirms how language use is never a  random 
reflex response (even a complex one) but an integrated interpretation, 
a  theory of the world whose concrete application lies in the hypothetical 
 activity. In other words, language is an object and an instrument of connec-
tion, but this basic characteristic cannot be explained simply by the evidence 
of its use in single situations. Rather, we must recognize its function as a 
theory of general framework. The demands of this unitary outlook cannot 
be met by idealistic conceptions (i.e. the a priori unity of linguistic struc-
ture). What is required is the reconstruction of the historical background of 
this unity arising from the interdependence of world and interpretation. It 
is this background that has built such highly complex exchange systems as 
language – the most important, common, flexible and serviceable of all. 
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 Thus two characteristics coexist in language, and the investigator must 
take both into account: the languages receptivity towards the environment 
to which it is attuned; and the internal compatibility of the linguistic instru-
ment as a whole – its theoretical or structured nature. Normally it seems 
to be assumed that these are mutually exclusive, a position which explains 
the birth of the structuralistic approach whereby each element is opposed 
to others and everything derived from a dialectic enacted in the intrinsic, 
magical coherence of language. The result is that the things acted upon, 
the objective information exchanged, and the world modified by words, are 
reduced to vague shadows in the background. Of what use are words then? 
Simply to talk about things that are indifferent. The only reasonable way to 
consider “structure” (seen simply as an actual arrangement of the various 
parts of the instrument) is as the organized mode whereby we can under-
stand the “openness” of language – its availability for use and its capacity for 
connection and transformation. 
 In a structural investigation the key lies not in the structure itself (for it 
is just this which has to be demonstrated) but in the function. A functional 
approach cannot avoid examining the genetic relationship between language 
and material context. Thus language is the cognitive mode uniting the vari-
ous experiences in which man and the world (subjects and objects) have 
come into contact. It is the exchangeable, verbal knowledge of the world. 
 By way of a footnote, it must be added that the physiology of language 
is made up of a great deal more than its use in behaviour related to circum-
stances in the here and now. It is not simply description, or information, or 
a command, an exhortation or a request. It is not even simply the  refinement 
of description sub specie scientifica, an aspect we shall explore later. It is, 
above and beyond all these, a means of independent enquiry, in the same 
sense that if – as we have argued – each word carries with it the entire his-
tory which has gone into its making, then by acting on words (i.e. merely 
by combing them) we can make the roots of human, cultural-existential 
experiences from which words have arisen clash, mingle, melt together in 
a way that goes far beyond the merely operative use of words in immediate 
circumstances. In other words, language is the material of poetic experiment 
and the instrument of political expression: these powers, too, derive from 
language’s collective genesis. A more specific discussion of this aspect is to 
be found in my book “La scienza, il potere, la critica” mentioned earlier on.
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18. Scientific language
It is not our aim here to carry out an analysis of scientific language but 
 simply to pick up out those aspects relevant to the general problem of 
language as presented in the preceding chapters. In particular, we wish to 
remain faithful to our assumption that scientific language is a particular type 
of ordinary language subjected to a number of rules related to a “rigorous” 
verification of reality. All languages are adapted to reality and depend on 
the degree of historical development of contacts with reality. Thus scientific 
language corresponds both to a certain kind of methodological area and to 
a certain phase in the development of a language – in the precise sense that, 
as we have remarked, there is no discontinuity, but on the contrary a logical 
evolution from ordinary to scientific knowledge. 
 By way of premise, it must be stressed that when we speak of “refine-
ment” and “further development” we do not intend this to carry any hier-
archical implications and wish to steer clear of such empty controversies as 
whether science is positive or negative, or whether it represents the peak or 
the depths of culture. It is certainly a phase that cannot come before certain 
others and presupposes results achieved in a previous stage. This is all we 
need to assume here. 
 Our discussion will take the form of a brief investigation of a number of 
key aspects.
A. Standardization
The feature that gives rise to the differentiation of scientific language from 
ordinary language is inter-subjective standardization. The cooperation 
between subjects purely for the purposes of ordinary operations no longer 
suffices. For an exchangeable and efficacious knowledge of the object it is 
necessary to reduce the area of uncertainty inherent in transmission and 
its instruments to the minimum. What was valid and suitable at one level 
reveals itself immediately as inadequate at another. This is a general lin-
guistic necessity when we have to deal with problems of reproducibility. If 
we want others to repeat an operation of any kind (and this holds outside 
the domain of science too), the instructions must be such as to rule out indi-
vidual oscillations. The prescriptive-normative function of language is one 
aspect of the process of standardization. 
 It follows, then, that scientific language arises outside the science, since 
the latter has not yet taken shape. It arises out of ordinary operations where 
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the need for reproduction and precision occurs. Science, in fact, is the off-
spring of calendars and the measurement of fields – in other words, of prac-
tical, ordinary, concrete operations for which it was necessary to achieve 
 regularity. It is usually maintained that its technological origin demon-
strates the economic, productive nature of scientific activity, which thereby 
is presented as linked from the outset to the world of production and tech-
nology. Actually, it merely shows that science arises together with all the 
other aspects of culture, as we would expect. What from a methodologi-
cal point of view distinguishes the calculation of the area flooded by the 
Nile or the measurement of time of the Assyro-Babylonians from any other 
operation is precisely the emphasis places initially on measurement – i.e. the 
 standardizing of the operations. Not, of course, that this is absent  earlier: 
we have insisted continually on the fact that scientific knowledge is  simply 
ordinary knowledge refined. In fact, standardization is present in the con-
struction of any instrument as well as in the regulation of all aspects of 
the life of primitive communities. But refinement arises in order to render 
standardization more cautious and regulated.
 The terms of standardization are obviously operative in nature, and this 
point should not be overlooked. It is not possible to conceive of any opera-
tion of inter-subjective attunement to reality outside of those operations 
in which standardization manifests itself. This means that, as it develops, 
the language that sets up this kind of standardization (scientific language) 
 rigidly conserves the historical and adapted features peculiar to every kind 
of language, and thus remains firmly rooted in ordinary language. Scientific 
language, too, from its outsets, includes the history of all the operations that 
have gone to form it and change it. 
 Standardization arises from a basic cognitive situation. Each act of cog-
nition of the object is performed subjectively, through the subject’s entry 
sections as established by evolution. These are shared by others, both in the 
sense that all possess the same entry sections and in the sense that cognitive 
description is linguistic, that is, cultural and inter-subjective. The two modes 
are clearly closely related, since it is not possible to know independently of 
the structure that knows and of the culturally developed language. 
 Standardization, then, is an operation consisting of the subjective identi-
fication of features of the object in such a way as to make it possible to 
communicate the identification inter-subjective and to eliminate purely 
individual oscillations. Standardization is thus based on the existence of the 
object, and on the objective general framework upon which we have insisted 
in the first part of this book. Obviously it does not arise from a single need or 
situation but from a theoretical framework in which the presuppositions of 
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“objectification” and of the permanence of the object are firmly established, 
and already present in the language in operation.
 Scientific knowledge is born, therefore, in opposition to a vision of the 
world as continually unstable, subjective, exploitable at will, subject to the 
constructive and destructive caprices of the myth. 
 The problems of seeming and being, the fallacies of perception, the entire 
question of truth, which at times leads to scepticism and solipsism, are the 
philosophical basis of scientific interpretation. In the first place, we must 
obviate the fallacies of the senses and of thought. 
 The first fallacy is obvious, but hard to eliminate: perceptive evalua-
tions differ from subject to subject and are tied to particular environmental 
 circumstances, although they share a basic uniformity that makes commu-
nication possible. We all know what length means because we continually 
perform ordinary operations that refer to this concept and define it. It forms 
part of our environmental relations of operative interpretation of the world. I 
can say that a given length A-B is five hundred paces if I want to give a rough 
idea, but if I want to measure the length of a field or the shadow of a pole I 
must say something more – namely how long a pace is. Thus an operation 
which I want to fit the thing with precision automatically implies an opera-
tion of reference which is inter-subjective and conventional. 
 The kind of standardization simply amounts to subjecting subjective 
operations of interaction with the world to definite and communicable 
 criteria. This is essential feature of all measurement operations. Any scien-
tific procedure, no matter how complex, is based on a series of standardiza-
tions of this type. Logically, however, all operations, if they are to be com-
municable and inter-subjective, must be linguistic. The expression in which 
the measurement is manifested includes the operations of standardization 
on which it is based, though in an extremely synthetic form. 
 Measurement is at the same time also the standardization of a sign. The 
spoken and written expression takes on the same degree of rigidity as the 
operations from which it has arisen; it includes these in itself in just the same 
way as ordinary words include the operations from which they originate. 
The words of the ordinary language are elastic and imprecise from a certain 
standpoint, since they derive from “rough” attunements. The problems of 
constancy are not felt as primary. Scientific expressions, on the other hand, 
include operations in which problems of constancy, reproducibility and 
 precision are primary. 
 It should be noted that, although its most salient aspect is of a quantita-
tive type and involves measurement in the proper sense of the term (the 
unit of measurement, the instrument), what we have been discussing has a 
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broader compass. Measurement, in fact, is but one aspect – and not the most 
important – of inter-subjective attunement. There are attunements which 
cannot be translated into measurement operations and yet equally syntonize 
the object of observation with the category of its observers. This is why we 
do not feel that there is a real difference between the science of nature and 
the science of man. There are many cases in which it is impossible to transfer 
data into numerical terms and yet which form a legitimate part of scientific 
discourse. 
 The second fallacy is not merely perceptive. It is illustrated by the 
 example of the stick that looks as if it is broken if dipped in water. Here it is 
not merely a matter of seeking a shared mediation but of setting up a frame-
work that will explain the fallacy. The second presupposition of scientific 
discourse is thus that reality may be very different of indirect reconstruc-
tions based on standardized operations that “reconstruct” the object in a way 
that at times is beyond the powers of perception. This, in turn, postulates 
the homogeneity of the horizon. Even this reconstruction, however, though 
outside the range of ordinary, direct observation, remains discursive and 
linguistic because it respects the fundamental presupposition of language 
that consists in  carrying with it the operations out of which it has arisen. 
Thus if a scientific statement is, as we expect, expressed in terms of scientific 
language, this will be the operative definition of the process. It will not be a 
kind of summa of protocols, because scientific language (like ordinary lan-
guage) develops out of the linguistic tissue thus far woven – in other words 
out of the general theoretical context whence the operations derive. 
 The third fallacy is inherent in the logical structure of language. We have 
established that all types of languages are constructed logically, in the sense 
that they correspond to the reality from which they have arisen and which 
they serve to connect. But here too, real logical attunement, in ordinary 
use, serves only up to a certain point. In spite of its origin, language can 
afford to be used to some extent illogically, imprecisely. As we have seen, 
the operations that give rise to syntax account for certain basic situations 
of approximate attunement of reality. We have posited that the instrument 
works rigidly, i.e. absolutely logically, in the sense specified for the phylo-
genetic origin of a structure capable of language. Nevertheless, the use of the 
instrument is logical only to the extent that is necessary for the operations 
requested, without any waste of energy. 
 A greater degree of rigidity, in other words a more conscious and precise 
syntax, is required in the realm of reproducible observations of the object. 
Scientific language has the same syntax or logical connection as ordinary 
language because the operations from which both derive are the same and 
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equally logical. Its formulation, however, is less equivocal, for reasons of 
coherence, representability and reproducibility. Both ordinary and scientific 
language give an account of the world, and there is no question of there 
being two different worlds. It is the angle of vision that determines the lan-
guage, and this angle of vision is, in the last analysis, a level of use of inter-
pretation. Take, for example, the scientific-syntactical concept of implica-
tion. Ordinary language expresses it in any number of ways, fairly rough and 
ready but more than adequate for its purposes. There is no need to specify it 
any further than in the spoken or written expressions that display it with the 
meaning conferred by its use in the world and known to everyone. But if we 
want to render this concept in scientific language, we have to specify it, and 
in so doing we realize – precisely because we must refer to all the operations 
and circumstances with great precision – that the concept in itself dissolves, 
or rather, is reconstructed through the operations as a state of constant cor-
respondence. Thus it is that I become aware (thereby solving a glaring  logical 
fallacy) that what I consider basic and definitively accepted in ordinary lan-
guage (as if it were a category that organized the whole for me) can only be 
defined exactly by conditions and circumstances, and is logical in so far as it 
is fitted to these.
 Thus formalization simply involves a particular rigid use of this kind of 
syntax, which is to be found equally in things and in knowledge. I can if I 
wish specify implication with a sign in formal logic, but this only reveals 
even more how it depends on the logic of use and on the operation I am 
performing. As I try to investigate the logic I need for accurate observa-
tion and transmission, I discover the nature of language, ordinary language 
included: it is not a vision of the world through a coherent structure situated 
on a different plane, but a description-interaction carried out with the aid of 
an operative structure. Thus, as I gradually clarify the scientific conditions 
of analysis, the structure of the context emerges ever more clearly. 
 Even in this case, however, the context is explored linguistically. I refer 
to what I can see by means of the language I possess and which forms my 
theoretical framework. Thus the theoretical framework of the world (i.e. my 
overall representation, within which my actions and single contacts take 
place) is my own language when what is involved is the overall represen-
tation necessary for my contacts with my group; whereas it is the sum of 
 scientific language at time t (the theoretical framework at time t) when what 
is involved is a scientific representation. In either case, the general frame-
work is no different from that supplied by language. 
 An important problem of standardization concerns the object. It is 
not enough to say that we attune to the object. What does this mean if the 
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 operations are subjective and inter-subjective? What point is there in talking 
of an object in this case? Actually it is precisely in this phase that the object 
reveals itself as something quite “outside” us, and anything but a shadow 
created by our minds. It is the site of the operations of inter-subjective 
 standardization – a point of convergence that exists and is external in that it 
syntonizes us univocally. The concreteness of the object, above and beyond 
the operations we carry out on it, is revealed by the fact that it directs these 
operations for the purposes of an orderly communication. Once it has been 
stan dardized and admitted to scientific language, the object thus described 
can be used as an element of any scientific sentence that needs it. This is 
exactly what happens in ordinary language, where conventionality is the 
opposite of arbitrariness for the simple reason that what is conventional 
serves in  practice to convey an unlimited number of new circumstances and 
situations. In the same way, an element introduced through standardization 
into scientific language is correct (or corresponds to an objective situation, 
or is satisfactory, or is true – however one cares to put it) because it expands 
throughout the whole language and can be employed in specific situations, 
confirmed, and linked with other elements. 
 Everything, then, in scientific procedure turns out to be linguistic, in the 
sense that it is shown to be objective through the mediation of discourse. 
 To sum up: scientific interpretation is intrinsically linguistic because 
it consists of inter-subjective standardization. As a language it is neither 
 arbitrary nor idealistic: it is the demonstration of the contextuality between 
interpretation and its object.
B. Historicity
No scientific statement makes sense outside its theoretical scheme of 
 reference, in other words outside scientific language at a given stage in its 
development. Not only does it fall into the scheme, but it is also foreseen by 
the scheme, since the language orientates experimentation and causes the 
framework to evolve. New things and new research lead to the intro duction 
of new linguistic operations. There is thus a profound dynamic interplay 
between the coherent set of linguistic-operational expressions known as 
 scientific language and the explorations based upon these; the outcome is 
that the language comes to form the mode of seeing things, these being 
real in so far as they modify the language retroactively. Each new datum 
is searched for with the aid of working hypotheses, and these are made on 
the basis of existing concepts. It is obvious that the operational activity that 
makes up science is not a random undertaking. It would not make sense to 
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imagine a sort of disordered activity upon which the context-environment of 
science acts simply by means of selection. The peculiarity of science cannot 
be accounted for by any model based on the concept of mutation. Working 
hypotheses are obviously directed towards the unknown, but they are built 
on known directives belonging to the linguistic corpus of science. Subse-
quently they return for comparison with what is already known, and will 
enter into one of a number of possible relations with the language being 
used: they may be incoherent and completely unacceptable, or perfectly 
coherent, or coherent with some aspects and not with others. In the first case 
they are rejected because radically non-homogeneous – reality fails to corre-
spond to the hypothetical schemes. In the second case they are accepted and 
do not modify the language in use; if anything, they reinforce and extend it. 
In the third case, they must be accepted because the operations carried out 
lead to a degree of compatibility and hence appear adequate, but at the same 
time necessitate a rearrangement of the language to test whether the partial 
incompatibilities are eliminated by a different linguistic context. 
 This latter point is extremely important. Under the pressure both of facts 
and of pre-existing linguistic structure that must be adapted, scientific lan-
guage is compelled to evolve. In this kind of framework, of course, experi-
mentation is much more than a localized operation aiming to clarify a single 
aspect of the object. It is also far more than merely a strip of discourse added 
to those already produced within a fixed, definitive language. The single 
datum makes it necessary to carry out readjustments in very distant fields, 
and often the revision is far more laborious and pregnant with consequences 
than the experiment in itself. The retroaction of experimentation is constant. 
Scientific theory and scientific practice are a single whole, and there is no 
difference between these two aspects of science, which is an ensemble of 
theory and practice, interpretation and technique. 
 It is increasingly clear that we cannot do without the general framework 
even in the most restricted fields of experimentation. There are no such 
things, in fact, as crucial experiments – i.e. operative situations capable in 
themselves of answering with a yes or a no. A datum is linked up with other, 
pre-existing data and tests the coherence of these; it is inseparable from 
these even when it forces us to rearrange them. It is approved by the state of 
the language as a whole and, if necessary, proposes the readjustment of the 
language as a whole. Even the apparently revolutionary vents occurring in 
science share this feature of internal re-systematization and compatibility. 
The objects of the pre-existing language are rearranged, not discarded. If 
they were valid previously, they will be valid later, with the difference that 
the overall structure has changed. I have devoted a more detailed analysis to 
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this revolutionary-conservative aspect of science elsewhere.2 What I would 
like to stress here is the historical resultant of scientific interpretation and at 
the same time its objective orientation toward the world. In fact, discourse 
is permanently being re-systematized, and our yardsticks are constantly 
being modified: they have already changed radically on more than one occa-
sion since the beginnings of science. Nevertheless discourse is orientated – 
that is, it moves coherently in a certain direction, a direction undoubtedly 
laid down by things. It is things themselves which, when seen through the 
scheme in use, force changes upon it and refuse to fit into the inter pretative 
pigeon-hole assigned to them. As we have maintained for all kind of dis-
course, it is things themselves that make themselves heard by creative lan-
guage. And as many things cannot be seen with the eyes or heard with the 
ears and do not belong to the world of normal language (though this does 
not mean they belong to the world of phantasms or myths), the discourse 
they enforce on us is made up of a series of indirect proofs and apparently 
abstract theoretical constructs. In order to understand the historicity and 
evolutionary character of science, it is essential to observe how it gradually 
penetrates the area lying outside the domain of Man, entering the world of 
objects not directly recognizable and verifiable by means of the senses (from 
the meson of the unconscious).
 Linguistic evolution is thus also an extension of our domain, and brings 
concreteness to regions where formerly there were only indeterminacy and 
the unknown. When language penetrates these areas, the objects found there 
are visited, used, made to interact, demonstrated to be concrete presences 
in our horizon, which is thereby enlarged. Thus historical evolution means 
material expansion and operational refinement. It bears no resemblance to 
the idea held by those who see the historical outlook and the objective out-
look as contraries. The fact that science during its historical evolution has 
penetrated and continues to penetrate regions outside Man’s domain (the 
nucleus of the atom, for instance, or the nucleus of the cell) is extremely 
instructive in this respect. 
  Obviously, given our present approach, we exclude from this concept of 
the expansion of science any overtones extraneous to the observation of facts 
and events as they actually occur.
2 La scienza, il potere, la critica, cit; La scienza, la storia e le n culture, Il Mulino, 240, 583, 
1975; Per un discorso sull’uguaglianza, Il Mulino 236, 910, 1974; La biologia nell’attuale 
pensiero scientifico, Il Mulino, 225, 58, 1973.
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C. Connectivity and meaning
Scientific language is the set of coherent and self-compatible statements 
which is possible to make about reality at a given stage of scientific develop-
ment. These statements, as we have seen, are at once empirical and theoreti-
cal in that they derive both from facts and from the pre-existing language. 
The scientific representation of reality is nothing other than the attunement 
of language to reality through experimentation. It involves as a retroaction 
the modification of language, i.e. of the theoretical framework, and this then 
proposes further experimental possibilities which, in their turn, will bring 
about linguistic changes. 
 Here we wish to draw attention to the “connectivity” of the process, 
which might at first sight seem to be a kind of self-regulating mechanism 
from which physical reality is at some distance. In reality, at the heart of all 
scientific processes lies the referent, the object of discourse. We have already 
insisted on the physical, external origin of the process of meaning, and gone 
so far as to postulate that interpreting machines are simply the products 
of things, which become signs of creating ad hoc the machines capable of 
revealing their nature as signs. 
 The sequence of mediations may be so long as to make it easier to ignore 
the basic connections between referent and interpretation, and see the pro-
cess of meaning as a unilateral assignment of sense. Nevertheless, in spite of 
material impossibility and mental laziness, we prefer to believe that the chain 
exists and that it is made up of real, active referent-signs connected in series 
and in parallel. Doubtless, language is born in a stage of humanity where 
self-awareness is limited. Its mechanism is perfectly logical if examined on 
the basis of objective observation, but the awareness of this does not exist. 
Moreover, it is used logically as long as it is interdependent with necessary 
operations (those actually responsible for creating language) and becomes 
aleatory and ambiguous if applied to the aleatoriness and ambiguity that 
characterize the earliest phase of culture. Here too, as we have seen, it is not 
the language of myth, but myth itself which is imprecise. Language has to 
adapt itself like a servant to the world of things to be communicated, and 
these things are imprecise. And since it is continually involved with things 
and attuned to them, it ends up by representing the ambiguities of culture – 
in other words, it represents with its logical precision an a-logical or pre-
logical cultural state of affairs. Thus a communication system that derives 
phylogenetically from the logic of material exchanges that are inescapable 
and create an inescapable logic (i.e. the syntax and grammar that allude to 
things and to the operations carried out by the reader on the world), has 
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to adapt itself to transmitting the most various and unverified imaginary 
objects with the same logic. It will thus speak of demons or punishment, 
authority or fears, forlorn hopes and joys to come. None of these “things” 
is haphazard: they all express cultural situations and are really symptoms 
rather than things. Language simply acknowledges them. Its connective rela-
tion with these is merely a matter of appearance: the speaker believes he 
is reporting situations and things, whereas he is actually reporting a biog-
raphy – his own and that of his predecessors. It is in this sense that language 
is enriched by cultural experiences; it includes them and continues in its 
historical evolution whilst at the same time fulfilling its obligations of mate-
rial representation. The use of language, which is born of the referent, is not 
confined to precise and uncontaminated referents in a relationship in which 
the whole body of language is designed for the description of the world. At 
every moment, the referent is inevitably overlaid with cultural usage, history, 
the habits of the group, and the partiality of references. 
 Language thus reflects a world in which reality, the interested exploita-
tion of reality and phantasms are inextricably entangled. It is worth noting, 
however, that the connection set up is always satisfactory, in the sense that 
it is performed by the language in its entirely, since it connects an anthropo-
logical reality with cultural situations. We must never fall into the trap of 
considering myths as inexistent, given that they have been created, have 
affected the collectivity, are transmittable and are producers of history and 
social actions.
 However, it is precisely in the realm of culture that the need for objecti-
fying sooner or later makes itself felt. It is necessary, in other words, to raise 
the problem of the referent above and beyond the usury to which it has been 
subjected, or the creations of fantasy with which individuals or groups have 
overlaid it for their own particular purposes. It is during the development of 
culture that knowledge specifically poses the problem of the constancy and 
objectivity of the world, together with that of its description, its modifica-
tion, and hence the freeing of knowledge from all interested interferences. 
Obviously this act of awareness has two inseparable aspects:
(a)  it discovers that the objective situation seen by a reader is necessarily 
subjective-inter-subjective: it implies, that is, a methodology and cor-
related problems of standardization;
(b)  it discovers that there is a connection between things identified in their 
objectivity (rediscovered in their autonomous nature, unviolated by 
Man) and linguistic situations; studying things objectively through lan-
guage, we find that it is precisely the logic of material operations which 
has been transferred to language. 
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The birth of science coincides, methodologically, with a clarification about 
ordinary language, or language (and this is the sense in which, in real terms, 
scientific language derives from ordinary language). Ordinary language 
becomes aware of the fact that it is historical and springs from the world. 
It is thanks to these two features that it is able to represent the world. Thus 
 science is initially a reflection of language upon itself motivated by projec-
tions toward the external world. 
 Science, then, comes into being as an emphasis into the problems of rela-
tions with the referent. The scientist seeks to identify a linguistic referent. 
That need to connect with reality which is expressed almost involuntarily by 
language (whose immediate task lies in other types of link – chiefly anthro-
pological and utilitarian) is here taken up as a primary aim and extended to 
the whole of natural and ontologico-objective reality.
 An important aspect of this is that science, as it proceeds with a certain 
degree of methodological rigour, rediscovers in ordinary language to that 
necessary succession or series out of which language hs arisen – the pro-
cesses of communication of things and of selection of structures. 
We can thus distinguish two dimensions of scientific language:
(1)  a methodological dimension based on experimental and logical opera-
tions, in continual, orientated evolution as the overall corpus of lan-
guage. In other words, a dimension of communication directed toward 
the referent;
(2)  an ontological dimension based on the fact that what it describes – the 
referent – belongs to the framework and is not extraneous to the birth 
of the linguistic capacities that express it. 
We can talk about things because they have created us and we can act on 
them because we are on the same physical-inter-subjective plane. There is 
a genetic interdependence between discourse and the things we talk about.
 In the last analysis, the process of meaning is a rediscovery of relation-
ships, a deciphering of sins and referents that can never be exhausted, but is 
necessarily oriented toward things. 
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19. Language and criticism:  
negative thought and other inventions
The formative power of language with respect to the individual is enormous 
when we consider that the single being is born in a cultural system and set 
in motion by this. He is built within the schemes of language. From one 
point of view, this formative capacity can also be seen as a sort of condi-
tioning or sclerosis. If use is not constantly accompanied by the refurbishing 
of the instruments employed and by the testing of the things explored, it 
becomes mere repetition, false certitude, an a-critical attitude. It is possible, 
in fact, to construct a sort of ideological semiotics in which all the conditions 
appearing at a cultural level are viewed as simple interpretative schemata 
standardized by history and allotted to the individual for the definition of 
his horizon. 
 Clearly, the view of a cognitive structure as having a linguistic scaf folding 
and the objects explored as its only poles of reference, is somewhat illu-
ministic. There are certainly many historical diaphragms between the two, 
and those which are most interesting to study are doubtless the deforming 
lenses of ideologies, which in themselves are authentic historico-linguistic 
apparatuses. We do not intend to pursue this problem here, since it would 
require an extremely detailed semiotic treatment. What we would like to do 
is to draw attention to another issue: faced with the structuring power of 
the codes in use, many thinkers argue that it is necessary to work for their 
disintegration and undertake a thorough-going “semioclastic” activity (to 
use a Barthesian term). The capacity of imagination or fantasy is proposed 
as the individual’s only defence against the uniformity and predictability of 
the codes in use, and against the entire social-productive apparatus bound 
up with the dominant semiotic structures. This kind of outlook creates 
a  bipolarity between an organized and inevitably opaque social world of 
which the codes are a manifestation both as an historical product and as 
the  capacity for social conditioning (conservation, repetition, acceptance 
of the existing, insertion in a repressive society), on the one hand, and the 
individual who has become regimented and petrified in the sea of codes and 
must thus take up arms against them in order to overthrow them, on the 
other. 
 It is a point of considerable importance. It is here that we find the source 
of all contemporary irrationalism and all present-day protest movements. 
It forms the theoretical basis of a vast area of culture modelled yet again on 
patterns of contraries: the individual versus society, the individual use of 
codes versus the structure of codes. What is proposed is thus the  original 
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use of codes, and hence the individual fact of language or action, and experi-
mentation as a means of disintegrating the established language. This is the 
attitude of those who feel that in order to define something specifically 
human it is necessary at all costs to keep some kind of dialectic combat alive, 
or more precisely, some kind of epic of combat. It matters little if the descrip-
tion of the battle is so complicate and remote as to suggest a war of puppets. 
In the struggle to lay the foundation of base “outside” objects (i.e. to make it 
possible to escape from the horizontality and linearity of inter actions) any 
purely verbal-philosophical artifice will do. 
 Adorno talks about the destructuring of alienated reality by means of 
negative thought. The only obvious product of the system of codes is the 
alienation of the individual from his cultural setting. He is either devoured 
(in other words he no longer realizes he is in opposition and becomes part 
of the system’s intestine), or he invents some kind of engine capable of 
 undermining the great monument. This engine may take the form of nega-
tive thought. Although it is clearly quite impossible for anyone to list the 
characteristics of this entity, the name suffices. It is the platform that enables 
us to keep one foot outside the system in use and to feel, even in moments of 
blackest pessimism, somewhat “celestial”.
 Barthes prefers to talk about the epistemological destructuring of the 
accumulated codes that keep social knowledge prisoner. Behind both 
 Barthes and the Frankfurt School lies a strident sociological philosophy 
which succeeded in holding the stage in 1968. However, it does not seem 
to have been sufficiently recognized that the thinkers whose chief intel-
lectual mission seems to be to save the individual from standardization and 
thus make  possible a non-alienated reconstruction of society, take as their 
 starting point an extremely petrified and reductive sociological outlook. 
What they imply is that the individual stands in the same relation to his his-
torical context as the bee to its bee-hive. He is programmed to the last detail. 
Nor is there any alternative to the bee-hive, which is “built by others” and felt 
to be alienating and unalterable. In the precise, time-honoured Manicheism 
underlying these contemporary theories, the bee-hive has replaced the 
devil. Nobody is prepared to admit that we (the collectivity, nature, culture) 
have built it ourselves. There is no way out: all that remains is a dialectic of 
 contraries between bee and bee-hive; the only hope lies in challenging the 
destiny of the ant and hence the constructor of the ant-hill. All this suggests 
that the entire philosophical ideology has its roots far more in the uncon-
scious than in the critical level, and that it is woven on the loom of a myth – 
that of non-immanence. The unknown creator of the bee-hive is the enemy. 
If necessary he can be impersonated by a short-term scapegoat-constructor 
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born a few centuries ago: capitalism, for instance, or feudal society. This 
kind of dialectic revives the need to postulate something radically “other” 
and to found everything upon what does not exist, upon absence – not as an 
empty thing among full ones but as a category of the spirit. This, in fact, is 
the mythical basis of dialectic systems. Their strength lies in their capacity 
for creating enemies that suit their own requirements. When they consider 
scientific investigation, they have a tilt at quantitative positivism and the 
philistines who want to measure and classify everything that exists. When 
they consider the need to rebuilt society, they have a tilt at capitalistic modes 
of production. If one thing is certain, however, it is that neither positivism 
nor capitalistic production are devils that we find before us fully-grown; if 
anything they are devils we ourselves have created and kept alive.
 The problem is to decide where to turn in order to exorcise them: to the 
investigation of the way nature has fabricated demons, or to holy water? If 
religion is the opiate of the people, then many dialectical materialists are 
heavily drugged. 
 What we must decide is how to choose our own judges. Do we want to 
choose judges who teach us how we must see the things of the world, in 
which tiny pigeon-hole (compared with the preponderance of God or the 
Dialectical System) we must place our meagre knowledge, and were salva-
tion lies? Or, do we want to choose knowledge itself, and be judged both by 
this and the world it reveals to us? Do we want to build a fetish-structure 
where everything is organized and worship it, or do we prefer a succession 
of operations – open both towards the past (towards our genesis) and the 
future (towards interaction, transformation, and the unknown)? 
 Undoubtedly, if there is one thing of which the advocates of serial investi-
gation and real immanence (those who are something called positivists, 
sometimes neo-positivists, sometimes neo-illuminists) it is that we must 
criticise the existent and not conceive of anything as “self-explanatory” or 
as “structuring in its own right”. Where, then, does Opposition come from? 
Whence Revision, Resolution, the Struggle of the Individual, the New 
 Society? Do they come from a partisan activity, from the snipers who, in the 
name of liberty, shoot at the great Repressive Code and at the Juggernaut of 
historical determinism?
 From what we have argued throughout this volume, it will be clear that 
this position is mythical, and largely theatrical. There is no such thing as a 
position from which snipers can fire, for the simple reason that all snipers 
are inside. 
 Opposition and criticism come into being during the succession of 
semiotic procedures and are contained by the semiotic process. Their 
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use includes revision and re-systematization which, as we have seen, are 
neces sarily non-harmonious and lacerating. One of the most widely-used 
common places today is the revolution-evolution dichotomy (unfortunately 
the most repressive and conditioning activity of codes is that exercised today 
by the liberators of the individual and the destroyers of repression in the 
name of imagination with their depressingly-stereotyped language). Yet it 
is enough to look just a little further than the words in order to see there 
is no such thing as an evolution which is not a permanent revolution, and 
that no revolutionary process can begin other than from precise theoretical 
constructs and precise judgment on reality. 
 This dichotomy only too clearly leads to non-commitment. It is easy to 
take the negative side because this simply means sprinkling the world with 
holy water and praying for its destruction and resurrection. 
 On the other hand, those who see criticism as immanent, an operation 
remaining within the bounds of cognitive processes, cannot shun respon-
sibility for constructing cultural systems. These systems are collective, and 
though they constitutes an Id compared with the individual, they are not 
“given” or “impersonal”. Culturally they represent everything we put into 
them in our efforts towards analysis, adaptation and change. They also 
 represent the fatigue of living. Criticism, therefore, should not be sought in 
semioclastic activity or negative thought as an anti-code, but in the devel-
opment of codes, in positive interaction and in the sequential processes of 
transformation.
 The capacity to develop language and transform the world with it forms 
part of the physiology of semiosis and always has done. The cultural revolu-
tion forms part of knowledge in itself. The field is undefined, schemes are 
temporary, certitude is an illusion, and one of the greatest illusions is the 
dogmatic certitude of negative thought. The only way to escape from the 
existent is to penetrate more deeply into it. The only way we can break out is 
by constructing broader and more coherent interpretations and inter actions, 
continually pushing beyond short-range ideological-anthropomorphic 
interpretations.
 For ultimately there is no contrast between a structured world and a serial 
world. Structure, in so far as it is actually structured and serve a purpose, is 
a product of the succession of operations. The history of a structure is the 
history of the series of processes that have caused it to evolve. Structures are 
created and continually moulded by the succession of trials and collisions. 
They are thus the culturally dependent situations which mediate relations 
with the world. In this active and socially responsible sense, language, social 
forms and science are structures. Structures are thus open onto the world.
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[This conference paper was previously not published (see Foreword). Footnotes in italic are the 
handwritten remarks added by Giorgio Prodi to the typed text, either in Italian or in English.]
In this paper I would like to make a number of remarks on the formation of 
meaning in phylogenesis.
1) The elementary semiotic situation consists of two material objects, A and 
B, linked by a situation whereby, on coming together, they form a complex 
A–B. Object A moves randomly and collides with an indefinite number of 
objects without establishing any link with them. Only when it meets B does 
it react in a specific manner. This is testified by the formation of a complex.*1
We shall say that:
a)  A and B are complementary.
b)  A reads its environment and finds object B significant (and vice-versa).
c)  B is a sign for A (and vice-versa). Sign and referent coincide in this 
 elementary situation. 
d)  Object A is significant given that in nature there exists an object B  capable 
of reading it: it is significant only for the latter. 
e)  A’s reading consists therefore in “scanning the environment” and finding 
B. Meaning is a situation testified by a material process – the formation 
of the complex A–B. 
f) The reader is always inside the environment, and reads it in so far as it 
constitutes a material hindrance among others, and finds what is signifi-
cant around it. 
g)  The environment consists of a number of things, some of which are 
signi ficant for some others. The environment is always greater than the 
 readers and includes the readers. 
h) Reading is a particular process, because A reacts only with B; however, it 
is also a general process because it can react with all B’s. The capacity to 
react with reader A is what defines the class of B’s. 
i)  A is a reader in so far as there exists a B to which it is adapted. A reader is 
always to be taken as a reader of definite things in a definite environment; 
it can read these in so far as it belongs to the environment. 
* Peirce dice che la azione dinamica tra due non è semiotica. Specificare che si intende una 
fase che ai semiologi appare presemiotica (specificare l’uso che si fa nel libro). Spiegare che 
vantaggio a questo livello significa solo “maggiore durata”, non vantaggio di sopravvivenza. 
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j)  Reading is always governed by parameters and is always subjective. A 
reads its environment from the viewpoint of its own structure, which 
is what enables it to react with B. The specific link of A with B can be 
conceived as a historically determined correlation, in a situation of the 
tenon-mortise, key-keyhole type. 
The interpretation that A gives of reality is its capacity to react to B. This is 
the “subjectivity” of A, a particular instance of the sum of objective reac-
tions between A, B, and the n undefined, indifferent objects of which the 
environment is composed. The environment is greater that the A’s and the 
B’s. Reading is an internal, particular phenomenon.*2 
2) In this elementary model, the two terms are semiotically equivalent: each 
is at once sign and referent, and together they lead to the formation of the 
complex A–B. 
 Situations can be imagined in which one of the two terms, or the  complex, 
has reading advantages in the environment. 
 For example, A finds B significant and destroys it to its own advantage: 
A’s stability may thereby be increased. In this case A is a preferential reader: 
its reading outlasts its discovery of B’s significance, and can be repeated 
with an indefinite number of B’s, which are selected and destroyed one 
after another.†3A has a reading advantage in an environment in which its 
 complementary term B is present.
 Another possibility is that the discovery of the complementary term B 
gives the complex reading advantages over the environment, if the complex 
A–B is able to read a third significant term capable of increasing the stability 
of the complex: this operation may be repeated sequentially. 
 Thus multi-term complexes may be formed, (AB)C, with increasingly 
marked reading advantages over their environment, in that they can read a 
large number of things, an ever-widening section of the environment. The 
reading of the significant object endows the reader with stability: in this way 
it demonstrates its advantage, its “prevalence” over things read. 
 At the same time, the state of complementarity of the various terms A, B, 
C ... which make up the complex is definable as internal significance, i.e. as 
a specific aggregation of the terms of the complex, each complementary to 
the others. The various A’s, B’s and C’s ... that form the complex are mutually 
* Spiegare la differenza tra lettura e semplice stato: ad esempio i cristalli.
† Enzimi.
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adapted. In this way, reader-aggregates are formed which are capable of a 
vast range of external readings because they are characterized by complex 
systems of internal complementarity.*4
 Adaptation towards the exterior (i.e. the capacity to read the things pre-
sent in the environment) and adaptation towards the interior (i.e. the sta-
bility of the various complementary terms that make up the complex) are 
two aspects of the reading advantages of a reader of the world. 
 In nature, the reader which acquires reading advantages over its own 
environment is the individual in the biological sense of the term. From 
microbe to man, it can be interpreted as an aggregate capable of identifying 
as significant a given sum of things to which it is adapted in its environment. 
The significant area differs widely for the different individuals. They have 
acquired reading advantages in directions which differ markedly with regard 
to complication and areas interpreted. 
 Reading advantages can be exemplified in terms of molecular biology 
and biological aggregations, both as regards internal signaling and signifi-
cance and as regards the reading of the environment. 
 The reading of the environment is always centralized, i.e. unitary, and 
at the same time subjective: each reader explores a section of the world and 
explores it with its own parameters. On the other hand, the various kinds of 
complementarity of which it is made up, form a situation of compatibility, 
that is to say a unitary reading. 
3) Given that an object is significant when, in nature, another object is capa-
ble of reading it (i.e. when it has a complementary reader) and given that 
complex readers with reading advantages have a high degree of comple-
mentarity with the things of the environment, the problem of the genesis of 
adaptation arises: namely, that of the correspondence of an individual, and 
the relation of its reading capacity to the many aspects of the environment 
which are “significant to it”.†5
 We may assume that the increasing complementarity and reading advan-
tages postulated in the above-mentioned models have actually occurred in 
nature. This constitutes phylogenesis, which can be taken as a process of 
development from the first stages of equivalence between the various signs-
referents (of which there is no longer any trace) to the appearance of fully-
fledged, progressively more complex individuals. 
* Interno ed esterno. Distinguere esteriore ed interiore.
† Describe how this condition can be explained.
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 Significant aggregation is to be seen in every case as correlated to the 
situations of interpretation of environing objects, and is thus a function of 
the reading and the advantages which this confers upon the reader. It fol-
lows that complication is governed by the reading of the environment: the 
individual develops its complexity via the things it reads; in other words, 
it moulds itself upon the environment with the result that it is always 
adapted to it. In the last analysis, things are transformed into “things which 
are signifi cant for a reader”, that is, into signs, precisely by constructing an 
appropriate reader for themselves, in a continuous contextual relationship 
between signs and readers. It is the things which construct the reader and 
have themselves read.*6 
 In phylogenetic terms, the construction and complication of the reader 
(in its various ramifications known as species) takes place via the encounter 
of a large number of copies and generations of the readers with the environ-
ment, so that adaptation amounts to selection.†7What comes into contact 
with the environment is always an individual which has already achieved 
a certain degree of adaptation. This implies, in addition to the notion of 
 complex situations of complementarity, the notion of the encoding and 
transmission of order. These processes are bound up with the mechanism of 
transmission and stability as well as with accidental variations and environ-
mental selection.‡8
4) Significance is realized in a process which links reader and signs, and has 
its starting point in the elementary model A–B. The chains of the  linking 
process can be of varying lenght, and are extremely long in the case of the 
reading carried out by man. In every case, the process that links reader and 
referent and which is a reading, or a language operation that deciphers (finds 
out) what is significant, is a translation chain. Translation is used here to 
mean a series of operations which links two structures, each of which, by 
the fact of being translated, signifies the other. Translation is carried out by 
creating structural analogues, i.e. structures that “stand for” each other. 
 An analogue is never an indifferent equivalent: it extends the area of 
meaning; in other words, it is a process of reading a reality, and in some 
way modifies the reality. It expresses an order by reference to something 
else. Order is always “an order in relation to”. Thus translation implies active 
constructional processes. 
* Referent creates sign. Sottolineare creates.
† Darwin.
‡ Darwin. Mutazioni.
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 At the macromolecular level, this can be illustrated by the analogical 
translation of DNA into RNA and proteins. These are analogues of each 
other, in that they are constructed on the basis of a sequential reading which 
reproduces the order, but they are different molecules, with different func-
tional meanings, as well as being processes differentiated by their phylo-
genetic development.*9
 If the reader is an organism with a very high reading advantage (and thus 
a complex federation of situations of internal complementarity), its inter-
pretation of the environment will involve a long series of translation chains 
which identify situations of complementarity – i.e. which locate the area 
“that have proved significant during phylogenesis”. 
 This reading machine can, once it attains a certain degree of complexity, 
reconvert the semiotic contact with things into traces: in other words, it is 
capable of memorizing. 
 In a subsequent stage, it can employ these traces to produce internal 
material states, which are taken as translational reactions with things: these 
are hypotheses.
 In a complex reader we may postulate that the levels of reading are 
organized serially, a lower level offering its structural states as a referent 
to a higher level, which reads them by setting up a translation chain and 
ensuring continuity between internal and external readings. The translation 
sequence, which constitutes “knowledge”, makes it possible to inter pret-
identify-manipulate traces, which are, in their turn, translations of semiotic 
events relating to the external referent. 
5) Each reading situation, whatever its level of complexity, maintains the 
characteristics of interpreting a section of the world – the one which is 
 significant to it. This is the section of the world which has produced the 
reader itself and its reading characteristics, i.e. it is its genetic area. Thus each 
act of “knowledge” is the recognition or rediscovery of the genetic area of the 
reader. This holds for man too. Human knowledge leads to the rediscovery 
of man’s connaturality with his material terms. His signs are in a relation of 
solidarity with the referential world. 
 The structure of knowledge is “categorial” in the sense that the para-
metric sections by which man understands (i.e. the translational-semiotic 
chains that characterize his knowledge structurally) form the “a priori” 
of knowledge, which is determined evolutionarily by the things that have 
proved significant – significant precisely because they have determined the 
* To be analog means to be linked to something by a translation.
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 categorial parameters appropriate for having themselves known by struc-
turing the specific modes of human knowledge. 
 This holds for all degrees of knowledge, from its most elementary form 
right up to human knowledge. The phylogenesis of knowledge is a linear-
sequential-selective complication of modes of interpretation of areas of 
meaning. Things become significant by determining the reader, and the area 
of things which become significant expands, determining the phylogenetic 
complication of the reader. 
 The reader is always shaped by what is outside it, and in this sense is 
impersonal, even if it cannot act other than from the standpoint of its subjec-
tive parameters and of its unitary and centralized modality of interpretation. 
This is true for man too, whose knowledge is linked to an extremely vast Id. 
 Human knowledge, in spite of idealistic interpretation of it, is a redis-
covery of a genetic territory, of already-given relations which, in the course 
of phylogenesis, have created the human reading machine which succeeds 
its forerunners. 
6) When a reader reaches the point when it can carry out interpretations of 
meaning which imply both memorization (i.e. the synchronic presence of 
many data) and the production of hypotheses (i.e. the internal manipula-
tion of memorized data as pure internal referents or material states of the 
structure that can be compared with the external referent) what we get is the 
inversion of the sign-code relation. Whereas at the level of simple reading 
systems the code is given by the compatibility and sequentiality of signic-
referential readings, at the human level the referent is interpreted with the 
mediation of a complex code; in other words, it is inserted in a linguistic 
 system which confers sense upon the single reading event. Human knowl-
edge is necessarily linguistic-systematic. It is also cumulative and social, 
being socially acquired. Sociality itself is at once the cause and consequence 
of linguistic communication, since language has acted as a natural object or 
a selective hindrance in causing structures capable of language to evolve. 
At this point, in a specifically human sphere, purely linguistic, semiotic 
relations are set up, in the sense in which they are normally understood in 
semiology. These distinctions nevertheless derive in a linear manner from 
conditions in which the signic relationship is (albeit via long translation 
chains) a directly referential relationship that picks out an object-sign in 
nature, i.e. a genetically significant thing. Hence, I believe that the study of 
human signs – semiology and linguistic – should be based on the study of 
the prehistory of the sign, in other words, on the natural history of the sign 
before the appearance of the human sign. 
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The foregoing observations are a sort of synopsis of a book of mine  entitled 
Le basi materiali della significazione (The Material Bases of  Meaning) 
 published by Bompiani (Milan) in 1977. They derive from a series of reflec-
tions presented in La scienza, il potere, la critica, published in 1974 by 
Il Mulino (Bologna) and in a number of articles which have appeared in 
such journals as Versus, Lingua e Stile, Il Mulino, etc. 
 I have explored the connection with human language and its aesthetic 
content in a book which is shortly to appear: L’uso estetico del linguaggio (The 




Born in Scandiano, a small town near Reggio Emilia (Italy) in 1928, Giorgio 
Prodi was third in a family of nine brothers and sisters. His adolescence was 
marked by restrictions imposed by the Second World War. On the other 
hand, his strictly Catholic family environment placed great importance upon 
ethical commitment and learning. In this period he developed a strong, vis-
ceral  interest in literature and music that would accompany him for all his 
life, until his death in December 1987, at the age of 59. He used to say that 
his need to have a personal private space at home, where to retire to think 
and write while listening to classical music or simply to be by himself for 
a while, was a direct consequence of the inescapable noise that had sur-
rounded him in his parents’ house during his childhood and adolescence. A 
second interest soon became evident and proceeded side by side with that in 
literature and music: an enthusiasm for scientific research, which led him to 
the intellectual focus of his life, namely academic research, carried out in the 
field of chemical carcinogenesis, and personal constant research in that of 
the philosophy of knowledge. Paying great attention to keeping them apart, 
he attended to these three fields (oncology, epistemology, literature) sepa-
rately, in total reciprocal autonomy, convinced as he was that it is possible 
to specialize in more than one subject. He wanted to be judged by special-
ized audiences in each field of study separately, and not be considered as an 
oncologist who writes, or a writer who leads a scientific institution, and so 
on. During a memorial conference on Giorgio Prodi’s work in the field of 
semiotics and philosophy, Umberto Eco said, “It is extraordinary how a man 
had the capacity to cultivate different fields of knowledge without looking 
like an amateur in any of them”.1
 Giorgio Prodi graduated from a high school specializing in classical 
 studies in 1946, winning the Leoni Prize “for the best examination of the 
District in 1946”. Two years later he won the “Unpublished Poets Prize” 
in Reggio Emilia for his first collection of poems. After the summa cum 
1 Saecularia Nona 2, 46–49, 1989.
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laude degree in Medicine obtained at the University of Bologna in 1952, he 
embarked on an academic career which took him to the Chair in Oncology 
(the first in Italy) in 1968, at the University of Bologna. Years later he took a 
second degree, this time in chemistry, with full marks. In 1973 he founded 
the Institute of Cancerology and in 1984, together with clinician colleagues, 
the Interdepartmental Centre for the Research on Cancer, and remained the 
director of both until his death. 
 The main areas of his scientific interest, evidenced by more than 300 pub-
lications, were the mechanisms of the action of environmental  carcinogens 
on cells, and the role of immune response in tumours and in their metastatic 
capacity, followed in his last years by a pioneering study on the hormonal 
dependence of some human tumours. His scientific books include such 
noticeable works as Trattato di patologia generale (eds. Giovanni Favilli and 
Giorgio Prodi, Milano: Casa editrice Ambrosiana, 1982, 1986), La biologia 
dei tumori (Bologna: Esculapio, 1970, 1973, 1977), Oncologia sperimentale 
(Bologna: Esculapio, 1977), Orizzonti della Genetica (Milano: Espresso 
 Strumenti, 1979), Oncologia generale (Bologna: Esculapio, 1985). 
 As regards literature, he published six books, together with several short 
articles. In 2009, a collection of his literary works appeared under the title 
L’opera letteraria di Giorgio Prodi (Reggio Emilia: Diabasis): Il neutrone 
borghese (Milano: Bompiani, 1980), Lazzaro: Il romanzo di un naturalista del 
‘700 (Brescia: Camunia, 1985), Il cane di Pavlov (Brescia: Camunia, 1987), 
Il profeta (Brescia: Camunia, 19922), Le quattro fasi del giorno  (Ferrara: 
La Bautta, 1988), Dopo il mar rosso (with drawings by Cécile Muhlstein, 
 Ferrara: La Bautta 1990). Among the short stories were “L’untore e i mostri” 
(in Ragione e mostri – Boni 1977), “L’evoluzione degli animali a penna” (in 
Ragione e mostri – Boni 1977) and “La tensione e la quiete” (in Ragione e 
mostri – Boni 1978), “Ricerca di casa” (in Dossier – Maggioli 1981). In this 
field, three books and several short or long stories written by Giorgio Prodi 
are still unpublished. A collection of Giorgio Prodi’s poems was published 
as “Cielo” (in Il Belpaese 5, 19873), while a very large number of poems still 
remain unpublished. 
 Asked by Carlo Donati in an interview in 1985 (Il Resto del Carlino, Nov 
6, 1985; ibidem Dec 6, 1988) on how much time he could dedicate to writing 
narrative fiction, his answer was that he used to write on the train (between 
Bologna and Rome, between Bologna and Milan), on the plane, in airport 
2 Written in 1986–1987.
3 Il Belpaese is a book series of ‘Culture and current Literary Events’, edited by Raffaele 
Crovi and published by Camunia. See also [41].
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lounges and the like. “Consider,” he said to Carlo, “that there is something 
similar between writing a novel or a story and  scientific research: there 
must be the same close investigation, the same necessity of com munication, 
the same circulation, even the same solitude, either to write a novel or to 
accomplish a scientific research.” And on the occasion of the publication 
of  Lazzaro (La Gazzetta di Reggio, Oct 25, 1985), he said to Piergiorgio 
 Paterlini,  “writing means for me something largely inward, ascetic. Fol-
lowing a  character, I follow myself, I unify fragments. I am turned outward, 
or rather not outward, but inward. Somehow, writing takes the place of 
 spiritual exercises.”
 The main field of his philosophical research regarded the problem of 
meaning, assumed as the central one, and developed in terms of natural 
situations of significance from the points of view of semiotics, philosophy 
of language, and formal logic. Eight books by him were published, together 
with a long list of reviews and articles, most of which were in Italian. The 
books were La scienza, il potere, la critica (1974), Le basi materiali della 
 significazione (1977), La storia naturale della logica (1982), L’uso estetico del 
linguaggio (1983), Alla radice del comportamento morale (1987), Gli arti-
fici della ragione (1987), L’individuo e la sua firma: Biologia e cambiamento 
antropologico (1989), Teoria e metodo in biologia e medicina (1989) [1–8].
 As regards Le basi materiali della significazione [2], which is the specific 
matter of this afterword, several reviews appeared after its publication in 
1977. The biophysicist Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini4 wrote, 
“the reference mark of this book has an international extension and a re-
markable historic value. Umberto Eco presented it to me as “a biological 
construction of the world”. It is a very original ingenious work, written with 
the aim of telling something new and not of commenting something written 
by others. Gilbert Ryle wrote that a great philosopher is not someone who 
gives new solutions to traditional problems, but one that disarranges all the 
problems concerned with knowledge, reorganizes them in an original way 
and tries to find solutions. In this sense, Giorgio Prodi is a great philosopher. 
He succeeded where Wittgenstein failed”.5 
A similar concept was noted by Giuseppe Mazzei who wrote:
“Giorgio Prodi’s book is a clear demonstration that to do philosophy is 
still possible. He does not seek patrons or tutelary deities, he takes his own 
4 Centre for Cognitive Science, MIT, Harvard University, USA, and Director of the Centre 
Royaumont.
5 Corriere della Sera, Aug 8, 1977.
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 responsibility, referring when necessary to a previous book of his own. 
When you finish reading this book, you want to begin it again and not be-
cause it is an easy reading, but because it is a reading which is at the same 
time thought”.6 
The first article by Giorgio Prodi on semiotics was “La preistoria del segno” 
(The prehistory of sign), published in Lingua e Stile in 1974 [11]. 
Figure 1. Giorgio Prodi (right) making a presentation “Filosofia della conoscenza 
e biologia” (Philosophy of knowledge and biology). Moderator Prof. Sergio Sarti 
(University of Udine, 1983).
To the presentation of the second volume of the Enciclopedia Einaudi7 Prodi 
was invited in the capacity of an “epistemologist” with a lecture on “Il passag-
gio dal non-vivente al vivente” (From non-living to living) in a  roundtable 
with Ilya Prigogine and René Thom. Thereafter he attended the second 
 Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) in 
Vienna on July 2–6, 1979, with a talk on “The origin of  meaning in phylo-
genesis” as part of a roundtable “Levels of semiotic integration:  isomorphism 
between biological structures and specialisation of functions” organized 
6 La Voce Repubblicana, Oct 14, 1977.
7 The meeting was organized by the Enciclopedia Einaudi in the Italian Institute of Culture, 
Paris, February 20–22, 1978, and was attended by Giulio Einaudi, Italo Calvino, Massimo 
Piattelli-Palmarini, Renè Thom, Ilya Prigogine, Carlo Brumat, Pierre Delattre, Ludwig 
Arnold, Adriano Buzzati-Traverso and others.
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by Thure von Uexküll and Harley C. Shands, in the presence of Thomas 
Sebeok, Umberto Eco, Roland Posner and several others. This  presentation 
is published for the first time in this volume. 
 After that, Giorgio Prodi continued to publish short and long papers on 
semiotics together with books (see Bibliography below), so that he began to 
be considered as a co-founder of the field of biosemiotics. He was invited 
to participate in several meetings, among which were the XXVII National 
Meeting of Philosophy, Lecce (Italy) on April 24–27, 1980, where he gave 
a talk “Il problema della libertà individuale di fronte alle acquisizioni della 
biologia” (The problem of individual freedom in front of the acquisitions of 
biology) [21] and the Schiapparelli Lectures, Venice (Italy) on October 28, 
1980, with a talk “Sui nuovi rapporti tra filosofia e scienza” (The new rela-
tions between philosophy and science) [22]; see also Fig. 1. Thomas Sebeok 
invited him to contribute to the Dictionary of Semiotics. In 1981 Giorgio 
Prodi wrote “Phylogeny of codes” and “Ontogeny of codes”, later published 
as “Development of semiosic competence” in The Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Semiotics [39]. 
 Prodi’s work was highly valued by semioticians like Thure von Uexküll, 
Walter Koch, Umberto Eco, Thomas Sebeok and others. Thure von Uexküll, 
Giorgio Prodi and Thomas Sebeok spent a week together in Freiburg in 
1979, discussing the subject that was close to their hearts, biosemiotics. This 
was followed by new meetings of the three semioticians when they attended 
the III Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in 
Palermo, June 1984, talking in the roundtable “Semiotics and the science 
of nature”. Giorgio Prodi and Thure von Uexküll met again for the last time 
on the occasion of the meeting organized by Eli E. Sercarz on “The semi-
otics of cellular communication in the immune system” in Lucca (Italy), 
on September 9–12, 1986 [45]. Walter A. Koch invited Prodi to give a talk 
during the meeting organized by him in Bochum on October 7–11, 1986, 
on “The nature of culture”. Prodi’s talk bore the title “Culture as natural her-
meneutics” [44]. In 1992 Thomas Sebeok dedicated the first volume titled 
Bio semiotics8 to Giorgio Prodi, with the inscription “In memoriam:  Giorgio 
Prodi (1928–1987): bold trailblazer of contemporary biosemiotics”. In more 
recent years, Donald Favareau included Giorgio Prodi into his list of 24 
essential authors of biosemiotics.9 
8 Sebeok, Thomas A.; Umiker-Sebeok, Jean (eds.) 1992. Biosemiotics: The Semiotic Web 
1991. (Approaches to Semiotics 106.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
9 Favareau, Donald 2010. Introduction and commentary: Giorgio Prodi (1928–1987). In: 
Favareau, Donald (ed.), Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Commentary. 
(Biosemiotics 3.) Berlin: Springer, 323–327.
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 Giorgio Prodi and Umberto Eco became acquainted in 1973 and since 
then they remained in touch, meeting at academic events and in philo-
sophical and semiotic meetings, or in Bologna or Milano just to share opin-
ions and have a coffee together. Umberto was an editor for Bompiani for 
several years and had a leading role in the publication of Giorgio’s books Il 
neutrone borghese and Le basi materiali della significazione. In July 1979 they 
both attended the IASS congress in Vienna. 
 After Giorgio Prodi’s death, his wife Anna Gasperi-Campani asked some 
friends, among them Umberto Eco, to participate with personal memories 
in a remembrance day, held in the historic Archiginnasio Library of the Uni-
versity of Bologna in the presence of the Rector Fabio Roversi-Monaco.
 Several memories and articles have been written on Prodi’s work. 
(1) About him as a medical scientist: by Luigi Chieco Bianchi (Giorgio Prodi 
oncologo, Belfagor 66(395): 609–612, 2011), Felice Gavosto (Quel multi-
forme ingegno, Fondamentale, AIRC, 16(2), 1988), and others. 
(2) About him as a philosopher: by Giorgio Ruffolo (Micromega 39(4), 
1987), Umberto Eco (Una sfida al mito delle due culture, Saecularia Nona 2: 
166–168, 1989], Renzo Tomatis (Saecularia Nona 2: 169–171, 1989), Gino 
Mazzoli and Silvano Zucal (editors, Giorgio Prodi e l’avventura del pensare 
poliedrico, special issue of Il Margine, 7/8, 1989), Cosimo Caputo (Biologia 
vs semiologia: La proposta di Giorgio Prodi, Idee: Genesi del senso 5(13/15): 
183–188, 1990), Felice Cimatti (Nel segno del cerchio: L’ontologia semiotica di 
Giorgio Prodi, Roma, 2000; A Biosemiotic Ontology: The philosophy of Giorgio 
Prodi, Springer, 2018). In a short obituary in Fondamentale (16(2), 1988), 
Umberto Eco wrote: 
“Giorgio Prodi represented a challenge to the negative myth of the two cul-
tures. He was one of the country’s leading research oncologists, while being a 
highly original contributor to semiotics, philosophy of language and formal 
logic on the one hand, and a noteworthy literary figure on the other. When 
Giorgio told me he used to listen classical music when working at home, I 
felt angry somehow: why did he have a day of forty eight hours and I one of 
only twenty four? Anyway, not one of the pages written by him is banal. The 
most debatable ones are clearly styled and full of sense. The best ones invite 
us to continue to work in his direction”. 
(3) About him as a literary writer: Raffaele Crovi (Giorgio Prodi narratore, 
Il Belpaese 7: 164–165, 1989), Ermanno Paccagnini (I racconti di Giorgio 
Prodi, Il Belpaese 9: 335–346, 1993), Elvio Guagnini (Letteratura come 
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 ipotesi e sperimentazione della realtà: Itinerario narrativo di Giorgio Prodi; 
introduction to L’opera narrativa of Giorgio Prodi, Reggio Emilia: Diabasis, 
7–17, 2009), Giuseppe Longo (Presentazione dell’Opera narrativa di Giorgio 
Prodi, Intersezioni 3: 459–472, 2011). 
In 1985 Sebeok asked Prodi to prepare a short version of Le basi  materiali 
della significazione in English, to be published in Semiotica and to be 
 followed by the translation of the whole book. The translation of the entire 
book had been prepared by William N. Dodd, Professor of English Literature 
at the University of Bologna, in 1984/85 (see his signed Note in Figure 2). 
The translation was checked personally by Giorgio Prodi (see an example of 
Giorgio Prodi’s calligraphy in Figure 3) with help of Anna Gasperi-Campani 
(for the biomedical terminology). The short version appeared in Semiotica 
in 1988 [46]. William Dodd consulted Giorgio Prodi frequently so as to 
ensure he understood and translated the professional terminology used 
in the original Italian text correctly. Meanwhile, Giorgio Prodi and Anna 
Gasperi-Campani revised the Italian text to detect repetitions and excessive 
length of some descriptions, considering the differences of the English lan-
guage characteristics in respect to the Italian ones. In the end, Giorgio Prodi 
revised the translation personally, as testified by the changes he made in the 
typescript by his own hand (see Figure 4) in order to remove repetitions and 
check once more that all his special terminology had been correctly ren-
dered in English. In 2020, Anna Gasperi-Campani transferred the typescript 
into a computer file. 
Selected publications by Giorgio Prodi
Books (philosophy and semiotics)
1.   La scienza, il potere, la critica. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974.
2.   Le basi materiali della significazione. Milano: Bompiani, 1977.
3.   La storia naturale della logica. Milano: Bompiani, 1982.
4.   L’uso estetico del linguaggio. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983.
5.   Alla radice del comportamento morale. Genova: Marietti, 1987.
6.   Gli artifici della ragione. Milano: Edizioni del Sole 24 Ore, 1987.
7.   L’individuo e la sua firma: Biologia e cambiamento antropologico. 
 Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989. [Portuguese translation: O indivíduo e sua 
marca: Biologia e transformação antropológica. (Lorencini, Álvaro, 
trans.) São Paulo: Unesp Editora, 1993.]
8.  Teoria e metodo in biologia e medicina. Bologna: CLUEB, 1989.
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Articles and reviews
9.  Scienze e potere. Il Mulino 222(4): 655–679, 1972.
10.  La biologia nell’attuale pensiero scientifico. Il Mulino 225(1): 58–98, 
1973.
11.  La preistoria del segno. Lingua e Stile 9(1): 117–145, 1974.
12.  Per un discorso sull’uguaglianza. Il Mulino 236(6): 910–929, 1974.
13.  La storia, le scienze e le n culture. Il Mulino 240(4): 583–605, 1975.
14.  La linea e il quadrato: note storico-critiche sulla attività tabulatoria. Il 
Verri10 12(December): 59–68, 1975.
15.  Scienza – Ideologia – Società. Tavola rotonda con Giorgio Prodi, Sabino 
Acquaviva, Massimo Aloisi, Silvano Tagliagambe. La civiltà delle mac-
chine11 24(1/2): 31–33, 1976.
16.  Le basi materiali della significazione. Versus 13: 69–93, 1976.
17.  Il corpo: in principio o alla fine. Il Mulino 253(5): 713–730, 1977.
18.  The formation of meaning in phylogenesis. Talk at the II International 
Congress of Semiotics, Wien, July 2–6, 1979. Published in the current 
volume.
19.  Economia del significato e significato dell’economia. In: Studi in onore 
di Paolo Fortunati. Bologna: CLUEB, 438–464, 1980.
20.  Cannibali e medici. Il Mulino 273(3): 501–505, 1980.
21.  Il problema della libertà individuale di fronte alle acquisizioni della bio-
logia. In: Atti del XXVII Congresso Nazionale di Filosofia (Lecce, 24–27 
aprile 1980). Roma: Società Filosofica Italiana, 33–63, 1980.
22.  Sui nuovi rapporti tra filosofia e scienza. Il Mulino 274(2): 298–309, 
1981. [Also in the series of Schiaparelli Lectures: Letture Schiaparelli. 
Venezia, 24–30, 1980.] 
23.  Cambiamenti e direzione nell’epistemologia. In: Montalenti, Giuseppe; 
Rossi, Paolo (eds.), Lazzaro Spallanzani e la biologia del settecento: 
Teorie, esperimenti, istituzioni scientifiche. Firenze: Leo S: Olschki 
 editore, 465–499, 1982.
24.  Uomini o topi? Il Sole 24 Ore 95(April 26): 3, 1981.
25.  Salute e malattia. Enciclopedia Einaudi 12: 394–427, 1981.
26.  Sintomo e diagnosi. Enciclopedia Einaudi 12: 972–992, 1981.
27.  Biologia ed Etica. Tavola rotonda: Giorgio Prodi, Evandro Agazzi, John 
Eccles, André Mercier. Cattolica (March 12 – April 27), 1982.
28.  Ragione e miti oggi. Il Mulino 281(3): 432–446, 1982.
10 A literature journal founded by Luciano Anceschi in 1956.
11 Bimonthly journal of comtemporary culture, directed by Francesco D’Arcais. Round 
Table held at “Il Mulino”, Bologna, and published in the January–April issue, pages 32–56. 
209Afterword
29.  Tipologie e livelli della divulgazione scientifica. Il Sapere 858(8): 22–31, 
1983. 
30.  La biologia e il diritto alla vita. Rivista di Filosofia 25/27: 186–203, 1983.
31.  Linguistica e biologia. In: Segre, Cesare (ed.), Intorno alla linguistica. 
Milano: Feltrinelli, 172–202, 1983.
32.  La biologia come semiotica naturale. Il Protagora 24(6): 85–104, 1984. 
[In a special issue of the journal: Bonfantini, Massimo A.; Ferraresi, 
Mauro (eds.), La ragione abduttiva.] 
33.  La biologia come semiotica naturale. In: Herzfeld, Michael; Melazzo, 
Lucio (eds.), Semiotic Theory and Practice: Proceedings of the Third 
International Congress of the IASS Palermo, 1984. Vol. 2. Berlin: Mouton 
de Gruyter, 929–951, 1988.
34.  Biology as natural semiotics. In: Koch, Walter A. (ed.), For a Semiotics 
of Emotion. (Bochumer Beiträge zur Semiotik; BBS 4.) Bochum: Brock-
meyer, 93–110, 1989. [Italian version: [32] and [33].]
35.  L’inventiva è la norma. [Proceedings, National Meeting “La forma 
dell’inventiva”, Milano, June 14–15, 1985.] In: Boeri, Renato; Bon fantini, 
Massimo; Ferraresi, Mauro (eds.), La forma dell’inventiva. Milano: 
Unicopli, 173–180, 1986.
36.  L’ingegneria genetica tra biologia e filosofia. Il Mulino 299(3): 420–470, 
1985.
37.  La logica della finitezza. Zeta 1: 37–48, 1986.
38.  Lineamenti di sociologia degli invisibili. Micromega 4: 221–240, 1986. 
[Three Prodi’s articles from MicroMega – this one, [43], and [47] – were 
republished in MicroMega suppl. al n. 7, 2016.]
39.  Semiosic competence, development of. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Vol 2, N–Z. (Approaches to 
 Semiotics 73.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 884–887, 1986.
40.  L’uomo e l’ambiente. In: Tamburrino, Antonio (ed.), L’era dei bilanci 
ambientali. [Proceedings; held at The Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 
Rome, Nov. 1985.] Roma: Kappa, 249–255, 1988.
41.  Scienza, linguaggio, letteratura. Il Belpaese 5: 1–11, 1987.
42.  Confini della vita. Il Mulino 312(4): 594–600, 1987.
43.  Fondamenti della teratologia. Micromega 1: 191–211, 1988. 
44.  La cultura come ermeneutica naturale. Intersezioni: Rivista di storia 
delle idee 8(1): 23–48, 1988. [English translation 1989: Culture as natu-
ral hermeneutics. In: Koch, Walter A. (ed.), The Nature of Culture: Pro-
ceedings of the International and Interdisciplinary Symposium, October 
7–11, 1986 in Bochum. (Bochum Publications in Evolutionary Cultural 
Semiotics; BPX 12.) Bochum: Studienverlag Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer, 
215–239.]
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45.  Signs and codes in immunology. In: Sercarz, Eli E.; Celada, Franco; 
Michison, N. Avrion; Tada, Tomio (eds.) 1988. The Semiotics of  Cellular 
Communication in the Immune System: Proceedings of the NATO 
Advanced Research Workshop on the Semiotics of Cellular Communica-
tion in the Immune System held at Il Ciocco, Lucca, Italy, September 9–12, 
1986. (Nato ASI Series 23.) Berlin: Springer, 53–64.
46.  Material bases of signification. Semiotica 69(3/4): 191–241, 1988.
47.  Homo hypotheticus. Micromega 2: 97–122, 1989.
48.  Verso un’etica fondata sulla biologia. Toward a biologically grounded 
ethics. In: Etica della conoscenza scientifica: The Ethics of Scientific 
Knowledge. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana fondata da Giovanni 
Treccani, 53–73, 1989. [Presentation in the conference “Etica della 
conoscenza scientifica”, Venezia, 1987. Also published in Alma Mater 
 Studiorum 2(1): 53–73.]
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Figure 2. A note from July 3, 1985, typewritten and signed by William Dodd, 
Adjunct Professor of English Literature, University of Bologna, in the occasion of 
the translation of the text “The material bases of signification”. 
 
212 ANNA GASPERI-CAMPANI
Figure 3. An example of Giorgio Prodi’s calligraphy.
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